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Abstract 
G.A. Cohen argues that John Rawls' method of political philosophy--in particular 
his sensitivity to the facts of human nature--leads him inexorably to producing a 
nonideal conception of justice. In this thesis I defend Rawls against this 
accusation by demonstrating that the facts of human nature that he shows 
deference towards are a product of the "free development" of his ideal 
conception of the person. The result is that Rawls' conception of justice has the 
power and status that Rawls affords it, and that Cohen's critique fails to cause 
internal damage to Rawls' theory. My thesis is thus what the subtitle says it is: an 
essay in defence of John Rawls' deference to "human nature" from the 
"concessionary criticism" of G.A. Cohen.  
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'Men's propensity to injustice is not a permanent aspect of community life; it is 
greater or less depending in a large part on social institutions, and in particular 
on whether they are just or unjust. A well-ordered society tends to eliminate or at 
least to control men's inclinations to injustice.' 
 
Rawls, J. 1999. A Theory of Justice, p215. 
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Introduction 
The thesis 
 
This essay is a sustained argument about how we ought to conceive of a 
particular word in our political vocabulary given its use in everyday political 
discussions. There is a sub-category of political concepts called ideal concepts, 
the most important of which is justice, that have to be the product of a specific 
method of conception if we are going to have the words available to us that 
enable us to work towards better political communities. That method is John 
Rawls' 'realistic Utopia.'  
 
In the course of the essay I shall demonstrate the strength of realistic Utopia. I 
shall begin doing so by explaining what it is, and outlining the qualities that Rawls 
believes it bestows upon the concepts it produces. In particularly the 
„reconciliatory‟ power that he believes it affords the ideal concept of justice. I then 
marshal the method through its strongest criticism—the 'concessionary 
criticism'—which was launched by G.A. Cohen throughout a series of essays1 
that culminated in a book length critique of the Rawlsian approach to political 
philosophy, his 2008 Rescuing Justice and Equality.2 Cohen‟s criticisms can be 
overcome and Rawls' ideal conception of justice, Justice as Fairness, should not 
be understood as making the concessions that it is alleged to.3 However, I will 
                                                          
1
 The most important of which are: Cohen, G.A. 1991. ‘Incentives, Inequality and Community,’ Tanner Lectures: Stanford 
University; and Chapters 8-9 of  Cohen, G.A. 2001.  If You’re an Egalitarian How Come You’re So Rich?, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
2
 Cohen, G.A. 2008.  Rescuing Justice and Equality, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
3
 Justice as Fairness shall be used in the text as a proper name for Rawls' conception of justice. When I refer to the essay 
that takes the same name I shall do so with italics and make it still clearer via footnotes. 
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demonstrate that overcoming Cohen's criticism requires considerable 
philosophical explanation that goes beyond the traditional objections to the 
concessionary criticism. 
 
This is, I think, a defence of the first importance: nothing less than our having 
confidence in the power of the word justice to do what it needs to do depends 
upon it being done well. The rest of this introductory chapter shall begin to 
explain why the stakes are so high through a discussion of the relationship 
between political philosophy and our everyday political language,4 and it shall 
also offer a brief overview of how the argument in the rest of the thesis shall 
unfold. The usual set of acknowledgements and disclaimers attached to a work 
of this nature are included at the culmination of this introduction. 
 
Ideal concepts and political language 
 
Whatever else is going on in politics, the act of convincing others that society 
should be organised in any given way through the medium of language is 
omnipresent. It is our primary means of persuasion, influence and even coercion. 
In many instances it is our only means. Sometimes, it must be admitted, political 
language is merely a means for communicating physical and economic threats, 
or of offering incentives to others to lead them to behave as we wish them to. 
Political language, in these instances, is used as a descriptive medium of 
communicating an external and prior material reality. We have no problem in 
saying that explanations about politics must, in these circumstances, follow the 
same priority.  
 
However, political language can be, and usually is, so much more than that. The 
language we have available to us not only describes the material circumstances 
                                                          
4
 An account of the full sense of what is at stake is developed across chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
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that we find ourselves in, but helps to constitute our understanding of it.5 That is 
to say that we will understand the same set of objective circumstances in 
different ways depending upon the language that is available to us in our 
attempts to describe and interpret them. It is this constitutive power that puts 
language at the vanguard of political dispute. If, through conceptual and linguistic 
innovations, we change the way that individuals understand the world then we 
open up the possibility of them interacting with it differently. We open up the 
possibility of what political discussion, and indeed all political action, is ultimately 
aimed towards: changing the arrangements under which people live with each 
other.  
 
To illustrate the constitutive power of political language we only have to remind 
ourselves of the astonishing success of the feminist movement in establishing 
the concept of gender in popular consciousness. Before the second half of the 
20th century, the word gender was used almost exclusively as a grammatical 
device for categorising nouns.6 There was not a word that asserted what we now 
take for granted—thanks in no small part to the evolution in meaning of the word 
gender—that the differences between men and women are not merely the result 
of biological determinations but also the product of social norms and 
expectations of the way that two sexes ought to behave. When Simone De 
Beauvoir proposed that „one is not born a woman, one becomes one‟7 she was 
                                                          
5
 Those of a certain ontological persuasion would add that our understanding of the world is the world. I hope that nothing 
I have to say in this thesis rests upon such controversial claims, and is read as such. I have sought to avoid these issues as the position 
I hold does not impact the truth status of my claims I make about the way that ideal concepts, and justice, ought to be conceived.  
6
 Even here it is much less common in English than in other Germanic or Latin languages. Ships and Countries may be 
referred to by 'she' but nothing much, other than boys, are a 'he.'  
7
 De Beauvoir, S. 1973(1949). The Second Sex,  New York: Vintage Books, p301. Emphasis added. 
9 
 
making a claim that would come to be widely accepted: that we have to 
differentiate between those aspects of womanhood (and manhood) that are 
socially determined (gender) and those which are a product of biology (sex). 
Before the availability of the language of gender it was easier for those who 
gained from prevailing gender inequality to argue that different stations afforded 
to men and women were the product of natural and unalterable dispositions. 
Once the distinction between gender and sex established itself in popular 
consciousness the onerous and unpaid tasks with which women have 
traditionally been burdened with—house-keeping, childcare, care for the 
elderly—could no longer unthinkingly be claimed to be a part of a woman‟s 
nature. Those listening to such an argument finally had available to them a 
linguistic apparatus to challenge such claims on the basis that they rest upon a 
convenient conflation of sex and gender. Challenge them they did and do in one 
of the great and rare victories for the values of human liberty and equality.  
 
The concepts that are available to us—that is the concepts that we can utter in a 
way that other people will be able to decipher our intended meaning—when we 
seek to describe how we organise our political communities are then a political 
matter of the greatest importance. The study of the avenues of persuasion 
available to political actors, given the linguistic context that they face, has thus 
always been at the forefront of the study of political philosophy. Most famously it 
was Aristotle who argued that logical persuasion was only possible if a political 
community shared a set endoxos that is a shared understanding of the meaning 
and reference of a set of words, which could act to form premises in valid 
arguments. In Aristotle's scheme rhetorical (and sophistical) arguments gain 
much of their force by using particular endoxa in a way that is subtlety different to 
the established consensus, rhetoricians do so in order to convince their audience 
that they must accept the conclusion of an argument on the basis of the logic of 
beliefs that they only apparently hold. For example, a political community may be 
agreed that everyone has the right to a family life but yet oppose the extension of 
marriage to homosexuals. An Aristotelian rhetorician may react to these 
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circumstances by talking about the desire of homosexual couples to create a 
family life. In doing so the rhetorician appeals to conventional understandings of 
what a family is (that it involves marriage) whilst simultaneously subverting the 
previous meaning (that it involves a man and a woman), in order to capture her 
political audience into the new but logical conclusion that homosexual couples 
ought to be able to be married. The slightly changed understanding of the 
endoxa "family", in    combination with the prior and existing commitment to a 
right to a family life, simply demands it.8 This process is why Aristotle described 
rhetorical reasoning as not just a counter-part of logical reasoning, but an 
outgrowth (paraphues ti).9 The Greeks knew that political contention lays first and 
foremost in the struggle to establish the meaning of words in popular 
consciousness. 
 
The present state of political philosophy is sometimes presented as if there were 
a divide between those particularly fascinated by such questions, those who 
elevate „hermeneutics‟—that is the related field of how we interpret the 
statements of others—and 'language games,‟10 to the centre of political study, 
and those who do their best to bracket them. It is said that „analytic‟ political 
philosophy is instead more interested in teasing out the logical implications of a 
                                                          
8
 This very act of Aristollean rhetoric is performed by the US comedy show Modern Family.  The show has a mainstream 
audience and shows a series of families with an unconventional make up (there is a gay couple and another with  a young Latina 
woman and elder Caucasian male) engaged in family activities that couldn't hope to be more conventional. Its very conservativism is 
what allows it to be subversive. 
9
 Aristotle. 1954. Rhetoric, (Trans, Rhys Roberts, W.) Random House: New York, I.2, 1356a. 
10
 'Games' is used here in the Wittgensteinian sense of having to anticipate the way that the use of a word is going to be 
understood by other minds if we are to have access to language’s full descriptive and persuasive force. See throughout Wittgenstein, 
L. 2009(1953). Philosophical Investigation, Trans. Anscombe, G.E.M, Hacker, P.M.S. Schulte, J, Blackwell: London. 
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given set of axioms and beliefs,11 a contemporary proxy for Aristotelian endoxa. 
This position is either taken in the assumption that it is the work of the 
philosopher to bring clarity and coherence where there is confusion amongst 
those that already posses a shared set of beliefs, or more commonly out of a 
genuine scepticism of the more elaborate claims made about the constitutive, 
rather than descriptive, power of language. In a characteristic example of the 
latter thought, Phillip Pettit tells us that what defines analytic political philosophy 
is its commitment to the beliefs that there is a 'reality independent of human 
knowledge' and that we ought to be interested in recovering that external reality 
through the 'power of reason.' These founding beliefs, Pettit tells us, puts 
meaningful distance between analytical political philosophy and those who take 
more 'anthropological' approaches to questions of meaning, thanks to the 
prevailing (malign?) influence of Rousseau, Herder, Hegel and the early Marx.12 
 
Despite the widespread belief that such a divide exists, I would insist that as a 
dichotomy it doesn‟t come close to describing where we are at. The subject of 
this essay is a dispute between two of the greatest minds in recent political 
philosophy, John Rawls and G.A. Cohen, both of whom are usually considered to 
be in the analytic camp. However their analytic dispute is, at its core, over the 
way which a political word, justice, is constructed and the possibilities this affords 
us in political communication and thought. It is a debate between two analytic 
                                                          
11
 Dan McDermott offers the clearest justification of this approach in his Analytic Political Philosophy. McDermott, D.  2008. 
'Analytic Political Philosophy' in (Stears and Leopold Ed.) Political Theory: Methods and Approaches, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
12
 Pettit, P. 2012. 'Analytical Philosophy,' in (Goodman, R, Pettit, P & Pogge, T, eds.) A Companion to Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, Blackwell: Oxford, pp5-6. 
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political philosophers about the effect of the way that they practise their vocation 
on the use and persuasive force of a particular political word13  
 
Ideal concepts 
 
Ideal concepts are the product of what Rawls calls „ideal theory.‟14 That is a form 
of theorising that assumes unrealistic but favourable circumstances in order to 
offer an untrammelled depiction of the relevant concept.15 Political philosophers 
engage in ideal theory because they are primarily concerned with normative 
questions that ask the way the world ought to be, or the way that we ought to 
behave. By assuming favourable conditions when theorising, the philosopher is 
able to imagine how we would deal with political problems if we were not 
constrained by other needs and concerns. It is these prudential needs and 
concerns that ideal concepts are supposed to be untrammelled by. It is said that 
doing this is necessary to form a „clear‟ picture of what we would ideally want, 
which we can have in mind as a goal when we re-introduce non-ideal 
                                                          
13
 I here use the terminology of J.L Austin's influential performative account of langauge. I do so in order to highlight the 
common ground between analytic political philosophy and those 'hermeneutic' thinkers who make explicitly their debt to Austin. 
Austin, J.L. 1962: How To Do Things With Words, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts; Skinner, Q. 1970. 'Conventions 
and the Understanding of Speech Acts,' The Philosophical Quarterly, 20(79). 
14
 The claim that the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction is Rawls’ own original innovation is accepted here as a result of a 
consensus in the secondary literature. See, for example, Simmons, J. 'Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
38(1); and Stemplowska, Z. 2008. 'What's Ideal About Ideal Theory?' Social Theory and Practice, 34(3). 
15
 Rawls offers two justifications for ideal theorising in A Theory of Justice which are substantively the same. Rawls, J. 1999.  
A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts,  p8, p216-217. From here on in referred to 
as 'Rawls, J. 1999. Theory.' 
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circumstances.16 To see why we might want to do this I think it is helpful to 
consider the following question: should criminal defendants be afforded 
translators when on trial in a language that they themselves do not speak? 
 
For the sake of the example assume that the following fact is true: the Ministry of 
Justice is facing severe budget cuts and the cost of translators is a significant 
chunk of their budget. If we accept this fact we have a decision to make whether 
we think that the moral cost of not providing translators is greater than the moral 
cost of other alternative cuts, say for example to the legal aid bill or reducing the 
number of trials by jury. We can imagine that under these circumstances one 
might conclude with a heavy heart that the prudent thing to do, in light of the dire 
available options, is in fact to reduce the access that defendants have to 
translators.  
 
However, there would surely be something wrong if we took from this prudential 
reasoning the following conclusion: defendants ought not to receive translators 
when on trial. This is because we have an answer to the question of whether 
people ought to receive such entitlements which is true independent of the 
difficult circumstances that we find ourselves in. That answer describes how we 
would treat each other in an ideal world. The conclusion would be particularly 
strange if before we were faced with the fact of budget cuts we believed that 
defendants ought to receive the funding. If political philosophers17 did not note 
that the claim „defendants should not receive translators‟ was, in this instance at 
least, the product of non-ideal and prudential reasoning, one can imagine political 
actors with ulterior motives finding it easier to entrench the position once the 
                                                          
16
 Rawls, J. 1999. Theory, p216. 
17
 By this I mean people who are asking fundamental political questions rather than a class of people employed by 
universities to research and teach ‘political philosophy.’ 
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necessity of budget cuts have passed. “I don‟t like having to cut this entitlement, 
but financial constraints compels me” can move easily to “we have now seen that 
fairness doesn‟t demand we hand out this benefit” in the slippery hands of the 
political knave. It is this all too familiar knave that the ideal theorist guards us 
against. 
 
We should note that it might be the case that, having experienced a judicial 
process with diminished access to translators, we do genuinely and sincerely 
come to realise that such entitlements are not necessary in order to treat people 
the way that we wish to. However, that is a question that we are better placed to 
judge if we remember that our change in attitude was once forced on to us by 
circumstance, rather than a reflection of our ideal beliefs. Without having that 
thought in mind we are in danger of behaving like the fox that, upon being unable 
to reach the grapes at the top of the vine and having to eat those at the bottom, 
convinced herself that those out of her grasp had gone sour.18 Without asking the 
question by assuming ideal circumstances we expose ourselves to the risk of 
irrationally conflating what we have with what we ideally want. We are in danger 
of being overcome by cognitive dissonance on matters vital to our moral 
interests. 
 
The importance of our having different answers to the same question before and 
after we have access to a set of facts is intensified when we consider the effects 
of the concepts that political philosophers produce. As we political philosophers 
are concerned with answering ought questions, the concepts that we deal with 
                                                          
18
 For the importance of adaptive preference formation to normative theory and social science see Elster, J. 1983. Sour 
Grapes, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. The relationship between Elster’s work and the ‘functionalist defence’ of ideal 
theory will be explored in more detail in chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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are inescapably evaluative as well as descriptive.19 They attach praise and 
condemnation to, as well as describe, their referents. Indeed there is a pool of 
words that political philosophers argue over the meaning and reference of 
(justice, equality, liberty and democracy to take but a sample), that political actors 
invariably use to describe the circumstances and arrangements that they 
approve of. It is hard to imagine that any political actor could argue persuasively 
in our political culture that we should accept a state of affairs without invoking 
these words. Caring about justice, equality, liberty and democracy are the 
shibboleths of contemporary liberal politics. If political philosophers do not 
conceive of these words from the point of view of ideal theory then it is possible 
that we will all be left, like women were before 20th century feminism, linguistically 
excluded from expressing our moral point of view: the words that should be 
reserved for describing the way that we want to organise the world, instead used 
and understood by others as the way that we have to organise it in light of 
contingent problems. If we think democracy demands the direct participation of 
the people, this line of argument goes, then it follows that we should not use the 
word democratic to describe representative systems brought into place to 
overcome problems of size and space. If we think that equality demands a 
distributive share that tracks only what we are responsible for, and not brute luck, 
then we should not call a system egalitarian that affords privilege to some in 
order to overcome problems of incentives and information in the productive 
process. If political philosophy is not done in this ideal way, then theorists lead us 
like our imagined community facing budget cuts, and the fox with a case of sour 
grapes, to a permanent state of cognitive dissonance about our political wants. 
Our capacity for criticism and yearning for a better world is dulled by the sullying 
of our normative language.   
 
                                                          
19
 The important of words which have both an evaluative and descriptive meaning was first and influentially highlighted by 
Searle, J. 1964.  ‘How to derive “ought” from “is”’ The Philosophical Review, 73(1). 
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Rawls and the concessionary criticism 
 
John Rawls‟ 1971 A Theory of Justice, often regarded as the most important work 
in political philosophy since Hobbes‟ Leviathan, self-consciously offers a 
description of an ideal of justice appropriate to a community of free and equal 
persons.20 His theory of what such an ideal demands, public institutions which 
guarantee that the major social institutions of a society are governed by the two 
principles that could be decided from an original position of fairness, is called 
'Justice as Fairness.' It is rare that any particular work of political philosophy has 
the weight of influence that I have ascribed the field as having in this introduction. 
However, the work of Rawls is surely an exception. His ideas have been read by 
almost every politics undergraduate for the past 40 years. These are the men 
and women that go onto take many of the seats from which our public 
discussions are conducted: offices in politics, journalism, the media etc. Rawls‟s 
conception of social justice is, for better or worse, a presence in our political 
language however conscious most people are of it. 
  
G.A. Cohen spent nearly twenty years of his career launching critiques of Justice 
as Fairness. His criticisms were far ranging and diverse: some focused on 
narrow „internal‟ concerns about the soundness of particular moves made in 
arguments within Justice as Fairness; whereas at other points he critiques the 
entire framework under which Rawls conducts his theory, amounting to an 
„external‟ criticism of the fundamentals of the project. I will touch upon both the 
„internal‟ and „external‟ elements of Cohen‟s assault, but our focus will be on one 
                                                          
20
 Appropriate is used here as it is by Rawls: to denominate that his theory is not universal, but instead restricted to those 
who possess a certain set of beliefs about how they want to treat each other. 
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particular claim that Cohen makes about the ideality, or lack of it, in Justice as 
Fairness: what I call the „concessionary criticism.‟21  
 
The concessionary criticism is the allegation that Rawls‟ theory of justice does 
not produce an ideal concept— even by the standards that Rawls himself 
attaches to ideal theory—as Rawls‟ method of conceiving of principles of justice 
accepts as facts the infirmities and moral failings of human nature. In doing so, 
Cohen claims, Rawls „leaves the very concept of justice behind.‟22 What we are 
left with are mere prudential „rules of regulation,‟ these rules may be wise and 
useful but they do not remind us how we ought to organise ourselves when we 
are at our best.23 His claim is then that Rawls‟ particular approach to political 
philosophy robs the concept of justice of the functional power that an ideal 
concept needs to have. 
 
I will demonstrate that Cohen's concessionary criticism is ultimately unfair to 
Rawls. Justice as Fairness does not make the compromises with infirmities in 
human nature that Cohen imagines and his conception of justice has all the 
„reconciliatory‟ power than Rawls believes it needs to have. However, in order to 
make this case this essay has a lot of work to do. The defences that have thus 
far been put in support of the ideality of Justice as Fairness shall be shown to be 
inadequate and in urgent need of reconstruction. It is to that reconstructive task 
which this thesis is ultimately dedicated. What follows will inevitably be rather 
technical. We will be going through disputes about how to interpret specific 
                                                          
21
 The word 'ideality' will be used throughout this thesis to as a signifier of the extent to which concepts purely reflect our 
ideals. 
22
 Cohen, G.A. 2008. Rescuing, Justice and Equality, p180. 
23
 Cohen, G.A. 2008. Rescuing, Justice and Equality, pp323-330. 
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passages, and—yes—footnotes, from various works by Rawls, Cohen and what 
is already an enormous body of secondary literature. We shall outline how 
slightly different interpretations of these passages lead to what might look like 
equally slight variations in the way we understand the logic of Rawls‟ and 
Cohen‟s arguments. This is all a way of saying that when we are deep in the 
forest of exegetical dispute it will be hard to see the wood for the trees. I will 
endeavour to keep the reader‟s focus on what is at stake throughout but it 
doesn‟t hurt to start with a clear statement on what it is: a dispute about what is 
necessary for us to possess a conception of justice that allows us to successfully 
criticise the moral failings of our political arrangements. Without getting these 
things right our hope of using political language as a means to living better lives 
are sure to be dashed.  
 
Outline of the project 
 
I offer here a brief outline of the structure of the thesis. It is unavoidable that 
without the context provided by the core text this will be difficult to follow. My 
argument is a sustained one whereby each chapter rests upon the claims 
established in the former chapters. What is more, it is my belief that the claims 
made in each individual chapter are original. This means that a description of an 
argument that rests upon the claims made in the chapters of this thesis—such as 
what is about to follow—may be obscure even to those well versed in the 
academic literature. Nevertheless, I hope that it still proves useful for a reader 
looking to orientate themselves as to the structure of my argument. 
 
The first two chapters of this thesis shall establish Rawls‟ conception of how 
political philosophy ought to be done, a method which he calls „realistic Utopia.‟ I 
go on to outline the potential benefits of doing political philosophy in this manner. 
Rawls claims of realistic Utopia that it produces ideal principles that—if we were 
to live in a society that was governed by those principles—we are able to 
autonomously reconcile ourselves with. It will also be shown that Rawls practised 
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what he preached: his own theory of justice, Justice as Fairness, is demonstrably 
conceived of, and is, a realistic Utopia appropriate for free and equal persons.  
 
Chapter three introduces the concessionary criticism levied by G.A. Cohen, to 
which this essay is a response. As already briefly outlined, the fundamental claim 
of the concessionary criticism is that Rawls‟ theory produces a conception of 
justice that is not ideal as it compromises with whatever infirmities there are 
within human nature. The chapter demonstrates that the importance of Cohen‟s 
critique is that, if sound, then Rawls‟ principles of justice will not have the virtues 
that Rawls himself claims of principles produced by the method of realistic 
Utopia. This is important as it demonstrates that Cohen‟s criticism does not 
„speak past‟ the concerns of Rawlsian political philosophy by relying upon a 
meta-philosophy that Rawls himself rejects. The concessionary criticism is 
instead an internal, direct and potentially fatally damaging critique. 
 
Having established both Rawls‟ claims for his political philosophy, and Cohen‟s 
arguments against these same claims, I go on to introduce the most important 
objection to Cohen‟s critique: the liberty objection. Proponents of the liberty 
objection claim that Cohen is wrong to describe Rawls‟ deference to certain 
freedoms, in particular freedom of occupational choice, as concessions to human 
infirmities, but suggest that instead they ought to be considered a reflection of 
liberal ideals. Though this thesis will come to affirm a version of the liberty 
objection, Chapter four will show that it has, as of yet, not been properly 
demonstrated. I do so by arguing that what is usually understood by the term 
„freedom of occupational choice‟ cannot straightforwardly be asserted as a basic 
liberty.   
 
Having cast doubt on the way that the liberty objection has previously been put 
forward the Fifth and Sixth Chapters recast it in such a way that deals with my 
concerns. In order to do this I make the case that the freedoms that Rawls 
prioritises in the labour market can be seen as a necessary response to 
20 
 
something that I call 'the fact of uneven attachment,' i.e. the fact that we are 
emotionally more attached to some persons than we are to others. I then go on 
to claim that the fact of uneven attachment is, like Rawls‟ „fact of reasonable 
pluralism,‟ not simply an observation about the way the world is, but a logical 
implication of the ideal of autonomy. As a result, the liberties that respond to the 
fact of uneven attachment are defensible on the same grounds that Rawls 
defended the priority he affords to stable consensus in his response to criticisms 
from Jürgen Habermas and Brian Barry. Prioritising the liberties highlighted by 
the liberty objection is a reflection of Rawls‟ commitment to the ideal of autonomy, 
and its relationship with justice, rather than a compromise with any infirmities in 
human nature. This is precisely the same way that Rawls‟ priority of consensus in 
Political Liberalism is not, as Habermas and Barry wrongly allege, a compromise 
between justice and order.  
 
The essay concludes with a summary of the arguments made throughout the 
thesis and some brief thoughts on the implications for contemporary ideal theory. 
The virtue of doing political philosophy in the way that Rawls encouraged us to—
through the method of realistic Utopia—will be affirmed. Rawls‟ fidelity to that 
method shall be demonstrated and his ideal conception of justice marshalled 
through its greatest critique. This is my contribution to the ongoing theoretical 
discussion about how we should think about a specific and vital sub-category of 
political language, ideal concepts and to the ever growing literature concerning 
Cohen‟s critiques of Rawlsian justice. More importantly it is my contribution to our 
shared and on-going battle to preserve a conception of justice that reflects our 
ideals, the penalty for collective failure in this vital endeavour is linguistic 
exclusion from expressing our deepest hopes for ourselves and our communities. 
This is a battle we must always fight, and must never accept defeat. The 
consequences of surrender are just to dire to tolerate. 
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Chapter 1: Justice as Fairness and The Facts 
 
Let us start, as all literary works should, with a great opening sentence. I do not 
immodestly mean a line from my own pen but that of the 18th-century Genevan 
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In the first strokes of his The Social 
Contract Rousseau outlines the problem to which that seminal essay responds, 
and, most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, the assumptions he will 
make in the course of overcoming it. He famously writes:  
 
'I want to inquire whether in the civil order there can be some 
legitimate and sure rule of administration, taking men as they are, and 
the laws as they can be.’'24  
 
We start here, and find inspiration for our title, because Rousseau‟s resolution to 
„take men as they are‟ and „laws as they can be‟ amount to a recommendation 
about how we ought to do political philosophy that was both affirmed and 
practised by John Rawls.25 The idea encapsulated in Rousseau‟s remarks, as 
Rawls understands it, is simple. Political philosophers should look for the best 
possible solution to the problems of politics, that is to say it should be Utopian, 
but when doing so should be simultaneously realistic in that they take human 
nature as it is (men as they are) and accept the constraints this places on 
possible institutional and legal design (laws as they can be). It is only these facts, 
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 Rousseau, J.J. 1997(1762). 'The Social Contract' in (Gourevitch, V, ed. and trans.) The Social Contract and other Later 
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and not, for example, prudential considerations about what can actually be 
achieved in a reasonable time-frame, that should constitute the bounds of the 
possible in our search for the best solutions to our political problems. This is the 
idea that Rawls called 'realistic Utopia.'26  
 
As I made clear in my introduction, it is my intention in this thesis to defend 
Rawls‟ conception of political philosophy by way of marshalling it through its most 
powerful critique: the 'concessionary criticism' of G.A. Cohen. In a series of 
articles synthesised together into a single sustained argument in his 2008 
Rescuing Justice and Equality Cohen argues that Rawls' methodological 
commitments lead him to offering a nonideal theory of justice that is 1) in 
contradiction with its own moral commitments, and subsequently 2) unable 
perform the „reconciliatory‟ task Rawls demands of it. It does so, Cohen alleges, 
because it makes concessions to „infirmities‟ in human nature, which are, by 
Rawls‟ own conception of political philosophy, not what we wish to express in the 
concepts we have available to us when we describe our political ideals. Cohen‟s 
critique is powerful enough that Rawls' own realistic Utopia27—a democratic 
community of free and equal persons governed by the principles of Justice as 
Fairness—cannot be left unscathed, but the virtue of taking men as they are and 
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 The phrase had previously been used by Frank Manuel to describe currents in 20th century French thinking in his 
influential 1956 collection of essays on Utopianism.: Manuel, F. 1973 (1956). 'Introduction' in Utopias and Utopian Thought, Souvenir 
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laws as they can be, and Rawls' fidelity to this great method, is, so I shall argue, 
only reinforced.  
 
In this, the first part of the argument, we shall explain in more detail what the 
method of realistic Utopia is, and the virtues that Rawls claims for it. We do so 
because Cohen‟s criticism of Rawls‟ method will not be intelligible until we 
understand why it is that Rawls thought political philosophy must be practised in 
this way. 
 
I say must very deliberately. Realistic Utopia is not thought of by Rawls as just 
one „perspective‟ or „approach‟ to political philosophy amongst equals, but rather 
the way that political philosophy has to be done if the language that we have at 
our disposal is to provide the ideal concepts necessary for us to criticise unjust 
societies and, importantly for Rawls, to be reconciled with just ones. It is the way 
that political philosophy has to be done.  
 
Our explanation of realistic Utopia is made across two chapters. This first chapter 
explains more precisely the relationship between this method of political 
philosophy and „the facts,‟ and then introduces some basic criticisms of how 
Rawls understands that relationship. We shall see that Rawls has been criticised 
on both of his flanks—he simultaneously stands accused of showing too little 
attention to facts about the world to offer action-guiding principles, and too 
greater deference to facts about the world to offer genuinely ideal concepts. The 
next chapter gives a more detailed explanation of the qualities that Rawls thinks 
a set of ideal concepts must have, and in doing so offers a partial defence of the 
criticisms levied against him in this chapter. We come to see that Rawls 
introduces and excludes the facts that he does in order to satisfy his 
understanding of what the concept must be able to do. That is to say what 
function in our language it ought to have. 
 
Justice as Fairness and the facts of human nature 
25 
 
 
We have observed that in his explanation of realistic Utopia Rawls suggests that 
it is a method explained by which facts it is, and is not, deferential towards. In 
particular he suggests the only social facts that we ought to be interested in are 
those which are a product of human nature. In Rawls' most comprehensive 
account of Justice as Fairness, A Theory of Justice, the deference of his theory to 
the facts of human nature is not hidden. The parties that decide upon the 
principles of justice are assumed to 1) 'know the general facts about human 
society' and 2) 'rest... the(ir) choice of principles upon the general facts of 
economics and psychology.‟28 More widely he states that 'contract theory..hold(s) 
that the fundamental principles of justice 'quite properly depend upon the natural 
facts about men and society.'29 
 
Rawls has here introduced two terms interchangeably that need explaining: 
'natural' and 'general' facts. 'Natural' is usually understood in contradistinction to 
'artificial.' What is natural is not a product of human design or creativity—that 
would be artifices—but is something that we simply discover about ourselves or 
the world. We very obviously use natural objects to create artifices, from simple 
tools to complex political institutions, but in doing so we must respond to—and 
are constrained by—the given properties of nature. That we all receive these 
properties in the same way, that gravity is a force that confronts all men and 
women alike, means that natural facts are true for, and potentially known to be 
true by, all. They are general and not particular facts and thus potentially produce 
what Rawls calls 'general knowledge.'30 For a social fact, that is one about human 
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interaction, to be „general‟ it must then also be true and have the potential to be 
known to be true by all persons.31 One of the most obvious sources of such 
generality is for the social facts to be a product of universal features of human 
nature. Rawls' interchangeable use of 'natural' and 'general' suggests that this is 
exactly what he has in mind. 
 
Before I move on a little more clarificatory work needs to be done. To say that a 
feature of human nature is universal is not to say that it manifests itself in 
immutable human behaviour (i.e. claims like "men always seek to maximise their 
own utility"). It is much more usefully seen as a basic framework that, in any 
given set of circumstances, can flourish or indeed degenerate into a large but 
constrained number of potential behavioural patterns. We shall call this a 
"developmental" rather than "fixed" account of human nature. To explain what I 
mean I will use an example that will be of interest later on in the thesis: Rawls‟ 
understanding of Rousseau. 
 
In Rousseau‟s A Discourse on The Origin of Inequality Amongst Mankind, man is 
depicted as having three basic characteristics that are fundamental to his 
nature.32 In Rousseau‟s narrative about the development of civil society these 
basic characteristics of human nature develop under various social 
circumstances, and shape the way that we interact with each other. The basic 
characteristics are: our love of our own good (amour de soi); our sense of pain at 
the suffering of others (pity) and a somewhat latent desire and skill to develop 
our capacities (perfectibility). Rousseau believes that our self-love (amour de soi) 
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 Rousseau, J-J.R. 1997(1755).  'Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Amongst Mankind' in (Gourevitch, V. ed.) Discourses 
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had, at the time of his writing, become inflamed by the essentially competitive 
environment of civil society, and has thus manifested itself in an irrational desire 
to better and overcome the other (inflamed amour propre). If man is governed by 
inflamed amour propre then the possibility of achieving a just political order that 
goes beyond a mere Hobbesian modus vivendi is clearly going to be very 
difficult. Any appeals to the interests of others, or the goodness of moral 
behaviour, are likely to fall foul of the requirement not to theorise in a way that 
fails to pay deference to our motivational capacities. It would seemingly not, as 
Rousseau vowed to do, take men as they are. 
 
However, Rousseau‟s methodological commitment does not require him to 
accept the present manifestation of human self-love as a given. It only requires 
him to not offer principles which do not go beyond the way that man can 
potentially motivate himself. In The Social Contract Rousseau offers a story 
about how man‟s basic capacities (self-love, pity and perfectibility) can be 
transformed into a moral nature given the right institutional circumstances.33 As 
every man has these natural capacities, it is generally true for every man that 
they could develop such motivation even though presently few of them do.34  
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The evidence that Rawls is using a development rather fixed account of human 
nature is two-fold. Firstly we have the fact that Rawls is explicit that he believes 
himself to be realistically Utopian in the way that Rousseau is. There are many 
problems with Rawls' interpretation of Rousseau, but he was a deep and 
perceptive reader and offered compelling and detailed lectures to his students at 
Harvard on the relationship between Rousseau‟s developmental account of 
human nature and The Social Contract. We have then no reason to imagine that 
when Rawls claimed Rousseauvian inspiration for his approach to political 
philosophy that he did so without an acute understanding this aspect of the 
Genevan‟s thought. The second piece of evidence available to us is that in the 
only part of Theory where Rawls does offer an account of human nature, Part 3 
on 'Ends,' he uses a manifestly developmental account. In particular his account 
about why we would find a just society to be congruent with our good is based 
upon the contextualised 'development' of our intellectual capacities. Rawls 
argues that, „acquiring a morality of association rests upon the development of 
the intellectual skills required to regard things from a variety of points of view and 
to think of these together as aspects of one system of co-operation.‟35 Given that 
this is how he understands human nature, as it is how his self-professed 
inspiration does, it would seem strange to conclude that Rawls meant anything 
other than a "developmental" set of facts when he said that his citizens ought to 
be endowed with knowledge of the general facts of human nature. 
 
A further complication with regards to facts about human nature needs to be 
mentioned. The developmental account of human nature that Rawls uses is 
bound up in epistemic difficulties. How do we know how persons will react to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and completion comes through habituation.’ Aristotle, 2000. Nicomachean Ethics, Trans: Crisp, R, Oxford University Press, Oxford. II.I, 
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 Rawls, J. 1999. Theory, p410. 
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different social arrangements and pressures given that we haven‟t had the 
opportunity to observe the development of human nature in all of the 
circumstances we are speculating about? Indeed, this is a particularly acute 
problem for Rawls, as he understands a state of justice as a goal to be achieved 
that we are presently far from realising. Rawls‟ response is to act in the face of 
the inevitability of these complications. The philosopher must make a best 
estimate of our understanding of the limits of human nature, and the general laws 
that it produces, on the basis of the available to evidence, whilst always aware 
that our understanding is subject to revision. 
 
It finally needs to be noted that Rawls is explicit that, despite his deference to 
these general and natural facts about human nature, his theory is otherwise 
„ideal.‟ By this he means that his theory is conducted using the sort of ideal 
abstracting process that was discussed in our introduction: favourable yet 
unrealistic circumstances are assumed in order to isolate our ideal response to a 
given problem. The result is that matters that he accepts as 'urgent and pressing' 
to practical politics are ignored in favour of depicting 'the nature aims of a 
perfectly just society.'36 We will see in a moment exactly why Rawls is interested 
in such „ideality‟ but for now we have shown what we wanted to: to the extent that 
a realistic Utopia is identifiable by its relationship to the facts that Rawls 
highlights, there is little controversy in describing Justice as Fairness as one. 
 
Finally, this view about the relationship between "facts" and "normative theory" is 
one that Rawls held fairly consistently throughout his intellectual development. 
For example, let us look at the social facts he thinks are necessary for 
consideration during  the constructive process portrayed in one of his later works, 
the 1993 Political Liberalism. Rawls endows his decision makers with the 
knowledge that „slavery... allows some persons to own others as their property 
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and thus to control and own the product of their labour.‟37 This, Rawls implicitly 
believes, is a fact that we need to know if we are able to pass judgement on 
different arrangements of property and liberties in a political community. It is 
indeed hard to imagine making a decision about how to organise the basic 
economic structure of a society without some understanding of the power 
dynamics implied by different economic relations. However, what is striking is the 
facts about slavery that Rawls denies his decision makers with. Other questions, 
such as where slavery arose historically, Rawls invites us to accept, are not 
relevant.38 This off the cuff and ignored remark from Rawls is telling. Questions 
about the origins of slavery, and recognition of its role in a system of racist 
exploitation of imperialist possibilities, are clearly vital to pressing matters of how 
to deal with the ongoing fall out of this historic injustice. For example, affirmative 
action arguments are often supported by reference to the need to rectify past 
atrocities.39 By inviting us to ignore these things in our prior search for a 
conception of justice, Rawls demonstrates that his commitment to a strict 
approach of limited 'fact-sensitivity' holds in even the most emotive of 
circumstances and where historical facts are vital to the normative problems of 
contemporary politics.  
 
Fact-sensitivity and the aims of political philosophy 
 
Although Rawls' description of his theory as a realistic Utopia may not be 
controversial, the legitimacy of that approach to political philosophy certainly is. 
His claim that we should accept human nature—and the limitations this places on 
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the possible conceptions of justice—as facts when doing political philosophy has 
sparked a debate about how "fact-sensitive" political theory should be.40 To be 
sensitive to a fact means to accept the existence of, and thus the constraints 
posed by, features of the external world. An entirely fact-insensitive theory would 
not even be constrained by the laws of physics, making the task of political 
philosophy indistinguishable from that of fantasy,41 where as an entirely fact-
sensitive theory would limit the role of political philosophy to describing the given 
nature of politics. When assessing whether Rawls—and his method of realistic 
Utopia—takes too many or too few, or the right or wrong, facts into account, we 
must then also speak of the task and aims of political philosophy. If you think the 
role of political philosophy is to be descriptive then you are going to recommend 
a different level of fact-sensitivity than those who think it should draw impossible 
but inspiring futures. 
 
If political philosophy is to offer immediately useful advice to pressing political 
issues, and that is certainly a common understanding of our task, then it is often 
thought that we must pay close attention to the circumstances that men actually 
find themselves in. For example, an account of the best way to distribute goods 
in circumstances of abundance, where there are more goods than wants, may, 
we can only hope, be a useful intellectual exercise that allows us to predict the 
shape of future political arrangements. However, it is of little use to the 
distributive questions that we presently face in the prevailing circumstance of 
scarcity. Rawls does in fact claim that Justice as Fairness responds to the 
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circumstance of scarcity,42 but in doing so he does not have to leave his 
commitment to only accepting social facts that are implications of human nature. 
The condition of there being more wants than available goods could, after all, be 
seen as a perennial feature of the human condition thanks to the boundless 
nature of our wants. Whatever is scarce we will covet, and our capacity to 
produce new desires will always create scarcity even when all of our fundamental 
needs are satisfied. What is not in doubt is that Rawls‟ theory does „assume 
away‟ many of the other problems of politics if they are not, in his estimation, a 
necessary implication of human nature or unalterable features about the world. It 
is here where controversy arises. 
 
Justice as Fairness assumes 'strict compliance,' such that all the parties involved 
in choosing principles assume that once the principles are selected they will be 
complied with.43 When combined with another assumption that Rawls makes 
when trying to demonstrate which principles of justice would be decided from an 
initial position of fairness—that his decision makers are self-interested—strict-
compliance has a strong influence on the principles eventually decided upon. If 
individuals fear the existence of thieves and fraudsters their self-interest is less 
likely to lay upon the existence of wealth-redistributing institutions that makes 
such nefarious acts more likely. Such individuals would even have to take into 
account the possibility that they themselves may have Artful Dodgeresque 
thieving skills and take joy in practising their illicit talents. Behind the veil of 
ignorance—which cloak knowledge of who possesses such talents and 
conceptions of the good—it would be wise, without the vital assumption of strict 
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compliance, to guarantee that a possessor of this skill and conception of the 
good has a quality existence in case you discovered yourself to be such a thief.44  
 
Rawls does not think that the assumption of strict compliance is a feature of 
societies as he finds them.45 It is, as a matter of fact, untrue. It is instead an 
assumption that he thinks that we have to make if we want to describe the ideal 
of justice, or to describe 'what a perfectly just society would be like.'46 If we were 
to describe the best principles of justice for a society without strict compliance we 
would be, by way of implication, describing an imperfect form of justice and the 
principles appropriate only for an unjust society. Our example of the Artful Dodger 
hopefully brings to life why Rawls thinks this to be the case, we surely  ideally 
wish for a distributive principles to be reflective of those aspects of the self that 
are not prone to undermining the community through trickery and criminality. It is 
a wider truth that without the assumption of favourable circumstances the 
decision making process which Rawls builds is unlikely to isolate our judgements 
about how we want to organise ourselves. It is Rawls' willingness to assume 
benign but unrealistic conditions when practising political philosophy that has 
seen him labelled as an 'ideal theorist' who is not 'fact-sensitive'47 to the actual 
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circumstances that men find themselves in, and it is what he had in mind when 
ascribing himself the 'Utopian' half of the realistic Utopia label.48  
 
Too few facts to be realistic? 
 
The assumption of strict compliance, and others that place his theory in an ideal 
setting, has been criticised on the grounds that it renders Rawls‟ theory impotent 
for the practical purposes of political philosophy. When philosophers, armed with 
Rawls' principles, are confronted with pressing political matters the assumptions 
that constitute ideal theory do not hold. In the real world not everybody sincerely 
wishes to comply with just institutions. It is thus necessary to adapt and change 
the recommendations of ideal theory to work with difficulties posed by nonideal 
circumstances. The need to adapt ideal theory is not disputed by those who think 
Rawls' principles can, with some work, guide action. It is said that works like 
Rawls' theory answer the first-order question about what our perfect conception 
of justice is, which then provides a yardstick against which we can measure our 
attempts to implement our ideals—even if we know we will achieve at best an 
approximation of, or a step towards to, the ultimate goal. 
 
This explanation of the relationship between ideal and nonideal theory is 
advanced by Rawls himself. We are told that our having a 'systemic grasp' of 
problems of non-compliance, criminality, and other barriers to justice, depends 
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upon our having a prior and clear picture of the 'nature and aims of a perfectly 
just society.'49 For one thing, ideal theory gives us a workable priority system of 
how to go about dealing with multiple injustices that can't all be dealt with at the 
same time. The most 'grievous' injustices, Rawls tells us, can be identified by 
their 'extent of deviation from perfect justice.'50 Erik Olin-Wright, though not a 
Rawlsian, provides a metaphor in his Envisioning Realistic Utopias that captures 
this prevailing view about the relationship between ideal theory and political 
action. Creating political change, Olin-Wright claims, requires compass points so 
that we know where we want to go, even if we don't presently know how to get 
there. Ideal concepts provides the point on the map to which the compass directs 
us even if we will have to continuously traverse around various barriers and 
obstacles to get there.51 If Olin-Wright continues the tradition of realistic Utopia, 
we can also see that the idea of something like the compass metaphor predates 
Rawls's adoption of the realistic Utopian label. In 1956 the French bureaucrat 
François Bloch-Lainé contributed to a series of essays on the role of Utopia in 
the study and practice of politics. Bloch-Lainé argued that reformers, such as 
himself, act in order to manage the difficulties of feasibility and political constraint, 
however, they are only able to do so if they act with an idea of the best possible 
world clearly in their mind.52 Rawls stands in the middle of a tradition that says 
reform and progress is not possible without first having the guidance of realistic 
Utopia. 
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In an important contribution to the 'fact-sensitivity' debate, Colin Farrelly claims 
that this process cannot work and that the fact-insensitivity of Rawls' theory 
means that it is unable to guide action even in the indirect manner described. To 
make his point Farrelly returns to the issue of strict compliance. Rawls' 
assumption of strict compliance has a direct effect on the costs of rights. If there 
is no reason to imagine that individuals will seek to undermine a system of rights 
and liberties through crime, fraud and coercion—as there isn't under the 
assumption of strict compliance—then there are no policing costs to assigning 
rights to each member of a society. However, as soon as the strict compliance 
assumption is lifted 'rights have costs.'53 For example, the right to free speech 
carries with it a cost of policing political marches in a world, like our own, where 
large public gatherings have the potential to descend into actions that violate 
other principles and institutions that we value such as public safety. In this 
realistic scenario there is a trade-off to be had between institutions that allow for 
the form of economic equality that Rawls advocates in his second principle of 
justice and the liberties that he gives priority over them in his first. When 
assigning priorities without the assumptions of ideal theory we face an entirely 
different set of choices to the ones that Rawls and other ideal theorists depict.  
 
Farrelly's claim is not just that the relaxing of assumptions makes applying Rawls' 
principles a difficult task. It is that the principles themselves are not action guiding 
once the assumptions are relaxed. How can, the example provocatively asks, an 
answer to the question of how we would prioritise goods that do not have costs 
be used to advise us on the pressing political matter of how much attention to 
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pay to those costs when they actually arrive? Farelly's is but one of many 
criticisms that have emerged claiming that the assumptions of ideal theory take 
political philosophy away from its core task of offering action guiding advice on 
political questions.54 The question of how we would organise ourselves in 
congruent and favourable circumstances potentially misleads us when having to 
deal with the actual dilemmas and trade-offs that characterises everyday political 
decision making.  
 
Too many facts to be ideal? 
 
Rawls' realistically Utopian approach has also been subject to the opposite 
criticism of the one thus far presented. Whilst for the realist critics of ideal theory 
he is not 'fact-sensitive' enough to offer action-guiding advice, there have been 
criticisms that Rawls' approach is too deferential to facts to be an ideal at all. 
Andrew Mason55 and G.A. Cohen56 have advanced arguments suggesting that 
our understanding of the limits of human nature should not impose any limits on 
our understanding of what justice is and more widely that ideal-theory should not 
be in any way fact-sensitive. 
 
Cohen's primary and influential argument against 'fact-sensitivity' in political 
philosophy is that any fact-sensitive normative principle must imply a 
commitment to a further fact-insensitive principle. Stressing that he is articulating 
a logical imperative true of all normative beliefs, he puts his thesis as: 'a principle 
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can reflect or respond to a fact only because it is also a response to a principle 
that is not a response to a fact.'57 The idea behind this argument is simple. If one 
makes a principled statement, for example that we should keep our promises,58 
when one is pressed to justify the statement we are prone to offering facts that 
seemingly 'ground' our claim, in this instance we might say that only in a society 
where the institution of promises is respected can we hope to live good lives. 
However, this fact is only relevant to the question of whether we should keep our 
promises because we hold a further principled belief that we ought to help people 
live good lives. The principle that we should keep our promises would not be true 
if it were not true that promise keeping allows people to live good lives. It is a 
fact-sensitive claim. However, the grounding principle that we ought to help 
people live good lives is not altered by this change in the facts, only its practical 
ramifications.  
 
The previous example is supposed to show that what makes principles fact-
sensitive is the existence of deeper fact-insensitive principles. Cohen calls these 
deeper 'fact-insensitive' principles 'fundamental' and posits their discovery as the 
central task of political philosophy. Our lust for truth demands we explore them, 
the only way to do so is to peel away all the hypothetical imperatives brought 
about by facts, including facts about human nature, until we rest upon the 
grounding principle. This is Cohen‟s vision of what fact-insensitive ideal theory 
should look like. With reference to justice he puts it thus: 
 
„Until we unearth the fact-free principle that governs our fact-loaded 
particular judgements about justice, we don‟t know why we think what 
we think just is just. And we have to retreat to (what we consider to be) 
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justice in its purity to figure out how to institute as much justice as 
possible inside the cave.‟59 
 
My presentation of Cohen's argument in favour of fact-insensitive philosophy has 
the far depended upon a singular illustrative example. I have taken a common 
way of justifying a particular normative principle and shown how, despite its 
apparent sensitivity to facts, it depends upon the existence of a further fact-
insensitive principle. Cohen also offers an argument for why we should think that 
this pattern is not idiosyncratic to a particular chosen example, but is rather part 
of the structure of all utterances of normative principles. I shall briefly present it:60 
 
1) Whenever a fact is offered as support for a principle, there is 
explanation why the fact supports the principle. 
2) Explanation of why a fact supports a principle must invoke a 
deeper principle.61 
 
In support of these two premises, the meaning of which has already been 
captured in our illustration, Cohen offers that they are both theoretically 
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falsifiable. All that one would have to do to show that either premise is not true 
would be to come up with a single example of a principled claim that did not have 
the structure presented. As he is satisfied that no one has thus far been able to 
do so he moves on. For the sake of presenting Cohen's argument we shall to do 
the same. 
 
In order to show that at the root of this process are fact-insensitive principles 
Cohen must deal with the possibility of infinite regress—the danger that 
whenever we invoke a deeper principle it also rests upon facts which themselves 
are only relevant given a further deeper, but itself fact-sensitive, principle. So on 
ad infinitum. If our moral convictions are subject to such an infinite regress, then 
it is not clear that we can identify the grounds for our moral principles through the 
sort of logical deduction Cohen is using: an ambiguous result of the analysis of 
the structure of moral language would leave the matter unresolved, or perhaps 
even provide support for view that nothing grounds our moral reasoning and it is 
thus inevitably circular. 
 
Cohen offers three minor arguments as to why there is no danger of infinite 
regress. The first is simply to raise the challenge of falsification once more. He 
suggests that no one would be able to stretch the process beyond five 
principles.62 Perhaps aware that this falsification challenge is not as 
insurmountable as his previous two he offers two further arguments. The weakest 
of those arguments is Cohen's qualification that this process is only true of 
persons who 'have a clear grasp of what their principles are and why she holds 
them.'63 This does stop the possibility of an infinite regress but only by suggesting 
that this process is only true for people with settled convictions. If, as is plausibly 
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the case, a great number of people do not have settled convictions then Cohen's 
argument will have only a limited applicability and will fall short of its universalist 
aspirations. 
 
In the second and much stronger argument Cohen highlights the commitments 
implied in believing that this process could go on indefinitely. For the regress to 
be infinite it must be the case that there is an infinite number of principles that 
humans can appeal to, else at some point the regress would run out of deeper 
principles to 'ground' fact-sensitive principled claims upon. Cohen is surely right 
that 'few would think there exist an infinite number of principles' and thus in order 
for an objector to consistently pose the threat of an infinite regress they would 
have to adopt a further, philosophically unpopular, position about the boundless 
nature of human principles. Satisfied that his three minor arguments have shown 
that there is no danger of the movement between fact-sensitive principles, facts 
and deeper 'grounding' principles going on indefinitely he is able to state his third 
premise.    
 
3) Our moral thinking is not prone to infinite regress. 
 
Once we have accepted that every fact-sensitive normative principle invokes a 
deeper principle and that this process comes to a rest at the point of our deepest 
convictions we are ready to accept Cohen's conclusion. The chain of reasoning 
demanded by the justification of any fact-sensitive principled claim leads 
inexorably to an ultimate and fundamental fact-insensitive principle. 
 
4) Every fact insensitive principle ultimately rests upon a fact-
insensitive 'fundamental' principle.  
 
Fact-insensitive principles and Cohen’s critique 
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In Chapter 3 on this thesis we shall demonstrate that Cohen's critique of Justice 
as Fairness does not rest upon Rawls accepting the meta-philosophical claims 
that Cohen makes about the relationship between facts and principles. This is 
important, because Rawls does not in fact share Cohen's belief that such 
fundamental principles exist in any objective form.64 Despite this, it is worth 
outlining the challenge that Cohen's meta-philosophy poses to the realistic 
Utopianism of Justice as Fairness. In doing so we can get a clearer idea of the 
apparent alternatives, within the framework of ideal-theory, to Rawls' limited fact-
sensitivity. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to that task. 
 
We have seen that Rawls assumes that any principle of justice must be in 
conformity with the facts of human nature. If, however, we conceive of justice as 
a fundamental principle then the claim that “justice commands we ought to do x 
given y facts about human nature” must imply a commitment to a deeper 
principle which is not sensitive to those facts about human nature. By setting the 
bounds of the possible in your philosophical inquiry at the limits imposed by 
human nature, one immediately cuts oneself off from an inquiry into the deeper 
principles that must, Cohen believes himself to have demonstrated, ultimately 
ground our beliefs about justice and other moral problems. Cohen makes a 
secondary argument that also follows from what he has said about the nature of 
fundamental principles. By setting the limits of a conceptual inquiry in accordance 
with human nature one automatically assumes that justice is something that 
humans are capable of. That is to question-beg against the possible thought that 
there is something unjust about humans themselves. Justice might be a virtue fit 
for the angels and not for us mere sinners. Whilst this might initially sounds like a 
strange and morose thought, it is one that has a long tradition in Western belief 
systems. The Catholic notion that each individual must seek redemption for their 
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sins implies that perfectly morality is something beyond the capacities of any 
actual men and women. The doctrine of Original Sin is at least in part a metaphor 
for the idea that evil and injustice are an inherent component of human nature. To 
be good is to recognise that one can only overcome their inherent flaws by 
transcending the inevitably flawed human self through God. Within the confines 
of contemporary analytic philosophy we can also see that it is not a criticism of 
Rawls that in unique to Cohen. For example, David Estlund writes: 
 
'Rawls‟s doctrine... silences concerns about whether some 
motivational structures—however much they might be part of our 
natures—might be justice-tainting.'65   
 
Cohen's criticism of fact-sensitive ideal theory, it should be noted, implicitly 
rejects the claims made by Farrelly and others about the purpose of political 
philosophy. If one believes that we ought to be describing moral concepts even if 
they are beyond the capacities of human nature, then it is clear that you are not 
committed to offering moral concepts that are directly action guiding. For what we 
cannot motivate ourselves to do is sure to amount to poor practical advice on 
what we should do in the here and now. Imagine that all the available evidence 
suggests that I can only bring myself to write ten references in a weekend. I know 
this because I have accepted more in the past and every time I have done so I 
have run out of energy and, whilst I have sincerely and honestly willed to produce 
more work, I have been unable to produce it. If twenty students ask me to write a 
reference one weekend, and they have no chance of getting the job unless I or a 
colleague do it that weekend, it would surely be wrong for me to accept the tasks. 
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By ignoring the facts of what I can and cannot motivate myself to do I would be 
liable to leaving students in an awkward and harmful situation.66  
 
What we have just hit upon is the intuitive idea behind one of the few accepted 
truths in moral philosophy: that any "ought" statements implies than the subject 
"can" do whatever it is they "ought" to do. If they cannot do it, then it cannot be 
the case that they ought to do it. The only wrinkle added by the case is that we 
have accepted that human motivation may be the sort of thing that makes an act 
impossible. Cohen does not wish to deny this famous tautology; he does, 
however, deny that it has any sanction on fundamental principles. Cohen tell us 
that our fundamental principles are left untouched as the "ought" implies "can" 
injunction applies to our practical, rather than ideal, reasoning. I shall very briefly 
present the argument. Firstly Cohen offers a formal version of a standard "ought" 
implies "can" argument: 
 
1) Normative Judgements are “ought” statements. 
2) "Ought" statements imply corresponding “can” statements. 
Therefore... 
3) Normative judgements imply "can" statements. 
 
His next move is to introduce his characterisation of our commitments to an 
impossible ideal, such as a professor should do references whenever his 
students ask him to do it.  Even if we reject this statement as a piece of practical 
reasoning, because one cannot motivate themselves or find the time, then by 
that very act of practical reasoning we give rise to the following piece of ideal 
reasoning 
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4) One ought to do A (references) if it is possible to do A. 
 
The crucial move in the argument is to point out that if 4) is considered to be an 
"ought" statement, then it follows that the argument from premises 1) and 2) 
through to conclusion 3) does not hold. That is because 4), by the way that it is 
framed, is not responsive to "can" statements. It states that if we could then this 
would generate an ought. Ideal reasoning, Cohen conjectures, is aimed at these 
if we could statements that are by definition not constrained by the ought implies 
can injunction. This argument, distinguishing as it does between practical and 
ideal reasoning, is what allows Cohen to make statements dismissing the 
importance of the famous injunction: „What‟s true in “ought” implies “can,” does 
not show that fundamental normative truth is constrained by what it is possible 
for people to do.'67 
 
The function of ideal theory 
 
If, as Cohen suggests it is, the role of ideal theory is to uncover a set of fact-
insensitive principles which ground our beliefs, what I have described as if we 
could statements, then it may make political philosophy appear to be a task of 
somewhat remote importance. Our practical reasoning, it seems, is always 
deeply embedded in the facts and the way that we respond to them. It is also 
seems true that how we deal with imperfections and demands for compromise 
has a far greater impact on our decision making than the precise nature of the 
ideal that ultimately underpins our thought. Why then spend your time on 
precision in moral philosophy that has little or no effect of normative decision 
making? Indeed, Cohen is sometimes prone to accepting the fundamental 
disutility of moral philosophy to our immediate needs. For example, he 
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occasionally says things like: 'the question of political philosophy is not what we 
should do but what we should think, even if what we should think makes no 
practical difference.'68 
 
I think, however, that we should regard these statements as bravado. By vowing 
to be unconcerned with the practical difference made by his work, Cohen is able 
to emphasise the purity of his commitment to discovering what he perceives to 
be the truth. However, we find elsewhere that he thinks that there is in fact great 
and important utility in keeping our focus on fact-insensitive principles. This is 
what I shall call the functional argument for ideal theory. 
 
The functional argument for ideal and Utopian theory rests upon how fallible our 
knowledge is of what we are, and what we are not, capable of. Take the case of 
our professor who cannot bring himself to do more than ten references over a 
weekend. He might sincerely believe it to be the case that there is no way that he 
could possibly do more. However, our estimates of what we are and are not 
capable of are frequently shown to be wrong. Who is to know that some 
advances in nutrition will not significantly improve the amount of time we can 
spend working in a single session? Perhaps we will find a way to train ourselves 
to be much more efficient at writing and be able to breeze through what now 
takes an arduous amount of time. With these sorts of changes, if we could 
statements could very easily become realisable. However, if we do not remind 
ourselves of what we would do, if we could do, then we are liable to forgetting. 
We certainly have less reason to strive for better. By talking about what we would 
do, if we could, we give ourselves the motivation necessary to aim for better. 
 
It is in resistance to this potentially conservative affect of practical reasoning that 
Utopian and ideal approaches to political philosophy have traditionally been 
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defined. Utopian visions, by offering a depiction of how we would live in an ideal 
world, remind us of how imperfect whatever political settlements we actually have 
are and, it is hoped, inspire us to do better. The very idea of Utopia has its origins 
in a political philosophy of this description. Thomas More invented the word by 
amalgamating the Greek words for good (eu) and place (topos) and by depicting 
an island nation of that name which was constituted by a perfect Commonwealth, 
in doing so he provided a pointed contrast to his own native 16th Century 
England: and started a genre and method of doing political philosophy.69 In her 
history of the concept of Utopia, Ruth Levitas picked out the following quotation 
from Oscar Wilde as owing its popularity amongst Utopians for perfectly 
capturing this fundamentally functional character of Utopia: 
 
 'A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not even worth 
glaring at, for it leaves out the one country at which humanity is always 
landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and seeing 
better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias.'70 
 
The functionalist defense of ideal theory survives in the literature through Cohen 
and Mason.71 It is they who argue for fact-insensitive ideal theory on the grounds 
that it is necessary to prevent 'Sour Grapes'—the phenomena whereby 
individuals ascribe negative attributes to what is out of reach in order to convince 
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themselves what they do have is the best.72 Cohen asks if the present infeasibility 
of socialism is treated as reason enough not to call it a system of justice: are we 
to come to think of the compromises of capitalism as perfections even though we 
previously preferred another ideal? If we are like the fox who 'when (he) 
succeeds in convincing himself that the grapes are sour,... does not build the 
ladder that might enable him to get them' we need to be stubbornly reminded by 
Utopian theorists of our present failings if we are to keep building for a better 
future. Fact-insensitive ideal theory, Cohen tells us, stubbornly reminds us of our 
ideals and does not allow us to become settled in accepting that what we have is 
what we want.  
 
We have seen earlier that Rawls clearly shares with Cohen the belief that a 
degree of fact-insensitivity is necessary if we are to develop ideal concepts free 
of cognitive dissonance about what we want in our moral and political concepts. 
However, the second part of this chapter has developed Cohen's reasons for 
stressing why it is not implausible to stretch the fact-insensitivity of ideal-theory to 
cover human nature itself. How else are we to be sure that we are not merely 
settling for the best we can presently muster from ourselves, rather than the way 
that our moral beliefs indicate we would truly like to be? 
 
Conclusion 
 
The result of the outlined debate is that, on the matter of fact-sensitivity, there is 
something of a pincer movement against realistic Utopia. On one flank Rawls is 
faced by those who, like Farrelly, believe the approach to be insufficiently 
sensitive to the actual facts of politics to offer any guidance for our very real 
political problems. On the other flank Rawls faces those, like Cohen, who make 
the opposite claim—that by introducing any facts political philosophy separates 
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itself from real 'ideal' theory and its truth discovering task. Rawls' approach is left 
looking rather like a compromised and unprincipled Clintonian triangulation. It 
pays too much attention to the facts to count as ideal theory, but too little to be of 
the action guiding use that realistic theories aspire to. By placing itself in the 
centre ground of a fact-sensitivity spectrum73 realistic Utopia stands accused of 
showing none of the virtues of the approaches to its left and right. In the next 
chapter we will challenge that negative depiction of realistic Utopia by being more 
exact in our description of Rawls‟ aims and intentions. Only once we have done 
so will the relationship between facts and ideals in Rawls‟ theory be properly 
understood and the criticisms of realists and, more importantly from the point of 
view of this thesis, idealists, become assessable.  
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Chapter 2: The Function of Realistic Utopia 
 
In the previous chapter we saw Rawls define realistic Utopia by its fact-sensitivity. 
That is by what facts the approach to political philosophy is and is not deferential 
towards whilst conceiving of ideal normative concepts. Rawls offers a second 
definition of realistic Utopia which, rather than describing the conditions of that 
type of theorising, sets out what he wants those normative concepts to do. It is a 
functional definition to go along with the criteria-based definition already outlined 
in Chapter 1. This is appropriate as we have seen that those who have criticised 
the fact-sensitivity of Rawls' approach have done so on the basis of contrasting 
claims about the aims and purpose of political philosophy. If we want to know 
whether Rawls is right or wrong to include and exclude the facts that he does 
then we are going to have to know precisely what he thinks his ideal concepts 
ought to be able to do. Are ideal concepts, as Cohen suggests, perfectly pure if 
we could statements that exist to remind us of what we, when free from cognitive 
dissonance, take to be moral truth? Or are they concepts which, as Farrelly 
demands, give us immediate advice on what we should do in the here and now? 
The answer, I shall argue, is neither. They are instead, for Rawls, ideal 
responses to a given problem. In the case of justice this problem is the need for 
mutually acceptable rules, and thus potentially "reconciliatory" principles, that 
determine the distribution of benefits of burdens within a society. 
 
The function of realistic Utopia 
 
To start to make this case we turn to Rawls‟ functional definition of realistic 
Utopia: 
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'Political philosophy is realistically Utopian when it extends what are 
ordinarily thought to be the limits of the practically politically possible 
and, in doing so, reconciles us to our political and social condition.'74
     
 
Rawls here makes two claims about the effect of practising political philosophy in 
the manner of realistic Utopia. That it 'extends our thought to the limits of the 
practically possible,' the meaning of which we have seen is that which is possible 
given „natural‟ facts, and 'in doing so' 'reconciles us to our political and social 
condition.' I have italicised the bridge of 'in doing so' to highlight an important 
claim. These are not two distinct effects but it is by extending our thoughts to the 
limits of the practically possible that we are able to reconcile ourselves to our 
political arrangements.  
 
To say that political philosophy has the capacity to reconcile us to our social and 
political condition assumes an antagonism between the individual and their 
collective arrangements. If there is no division there is nothing to reconcile. As an 
observation about the human condition this might appear a rather banal claim. 
Without further clarification it is little more than an observation of the existence of 
politics: if there were no tensions between the individuals that constitute the 
collective, there would be no need to form institutions and practices that manage 
their interaction. However, for Rawls, the antagonism that political philosophy has 
the capacity to reconcile has a definite and distinct form. The antagonism is 
between 1) principles and laws that we have to obey and 2) our own moral 
convictions.  
 
We know this to be the case because Rawls offers a precise account of the 
features and virtues of a reconciled society. He calls a reconciled society 'well-
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ordered' when it meets two conditions: 1) 'everyone accepts and knows that the 
others accept the same principles of justice' and 2) 'the basic social institutions 
generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles.'75 The virtue 
of such a society is explained by Rawls in Chapter 9 of Theory where it is stated 
that by living under the law of such a well-ordered society 'persons are acting 
autonomously.'76 The reason it is appropriate to ascribe the value of autonomy to 
citizens of a well-ordered society is, according to Rawls, that „they are acting 
from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best express 
their nature as free and equal rational beings.'77 
 
In this chapter we will set out the relationship within this conception of autonomy 
between the idea of reconciliatory principles and Rawls‟ centrist approach to fact-
sensitivity. Our argument is a simple one. Rawls‟ understanding of what 
normative principles need to do—that is to allow us to be autonomously 
reconciled with our political arrangements—recommends the position that he 
takes on the fact-insensitive spectrum. It is the ideal goal of normative principles 
that allow for political autonomy that suggests we take men as they are and laws 
as they can be.  
 
Political autonomy  
 
Without referring to section 40 of Theory, The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as 
Fairness, the description of the virtues of a well-ordered society can appear to 
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rest upon a somewhat obscure characterisation of autonomy. What does it mean 
for a set of conditions to express an individual's nature as free and equal, rational 
being? Rawls explains in these passages how he believes Justice as Fairness to 
offer a form of autonomy that is similar in kind to the autonomy that is granted to 
moral persons in Immanuel Kant's philosophy of ethics. This part of the chapter 
will offer an exegesis of that section of Theory, and Rawls‟ Kantian analogy, as a 
first step towards explaining the form of reconciliation that his principles are 
supposed to achieve.  
 
Kant defined autonomy as 'the property of will being a law to itself,'78 a state of 
affairs that can only be achieved when we are moved by our moral will—and the 
duties it perceives—rather than any other source of desires or interests. Kant‟s 
reasons for doing so stemmed from his sharp metaphysical dualism between 
'phenomena' and 'noumena.' In Kantian metaphysics, every object that we 
experience is a phenomenon and, as such, is subject to the laws of nature. 
Noumenon, or things-in-themselves, must exist for us to be capable of 
experiencing objects but by our very nature, in particular our epistemic 
limitations, they lay beyond the explanations we can offer of phenomenon. One 
of the laws of nature is that every phenomenal event is explicable by a prior and 
necessary cause. To mix modern parlance with Kantian language, every object of 
experience is causally determined. As this is true of all objects of experience it is 
also true of human behaviour to the extent we are phenomenal beings. If all 
human behaviour is explicable by prior and necessary causes then, as the chain 
of causality extends, it will ultimately be the product of a cause heteronemous to 
the individual. They will act for reasons other than their own choices.79  
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What grants us the possibility of autonomy in the Kantian system is that the 
phenomenal chains of determined causality do not continue indefinitely. At the 
end of a phenomenal chain we are presented with objects that cannot be 
explained by any prior cause. This is true, Kant thinks, both logically in the sense 
that there must have been an original cause at the onset of a chain of causality to 
prevent an infinite regress—thus making room for a deity in Kant's system—and 
empirically given that we are confronted with human „wills‟80 that appear as such 
original causes.81 As we cannot observe these 'things-in-themselves' they are not 
part of the phenomenal world at all and are rather noumenon, things that human 
understanding can only grasp the existence of but not the workings. It is only by 
acting solely out of our will—and not desires which are subject to phenomenal 
laws—that we have any possibility of being the determinate cause of our own 
moral decision making. This is why for Kant an autonomous act is one whereby 
the will is a law to itself. As Kant put it himself: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
is subject to causal determinism? Kant’s solution to the problem of free will is to deny the universalism of causal determinism by 
saying that it only has purview over the phenomenal world of human experiences.  Notice that as a characterisation of the free will 
problem it does not rely upon the need for ‘alternative possibilities’ and is instead as ‘source’ based concern. As such Kant’s concern 
with the problem of free will is invulnerable to the classic counter-examples that Harry Frankfurt developed to the notion that free 
will depends upon an agent having alternative possibilities to the actions they do in fact take. Frankfurt, H. 1969. 'Alternative 
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility ,’The Journal of Philosophy, 66(3).  For a much fuller explanation of the relationship Kant’s 
metaphysics and  the free will debate see Wood. A. 1984. ‘Kant’s Compatibilism’ in Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, Cornell 
University Press: New York.  
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 Kant means by will something thinker than Hobbes’ analytic definition of a man’s final volition. Kant instead wishes to 
suggest that the will is a part of the self which is distinct from, and governed by different laws if any at all, than anything which we 
directly experience. 
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 The human possession of free will can also be argued theologically from the idea that there is a creator with such 
capacities who made man in his own image. 1) God has free will, 2) God made man in his own image, ergo 3) man has free will. 
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'Natural necessity was a heteronomy of efficient causes; for every 
effect was possible only according to the law that something else 
determines the efficient cause to causality; what else, then, can 
freedom of the will be but autonomy, i.e. the property of the will being 
a law to itself?'82 
 
It is quite clear that Rawls' political philosophy does not carry the same 
metaphysical commitments as Kant's. This is not least because Rawls expressly 
disavowals himself of the 'deep dualisms' of the transcendental idealism I have 
just described.83 However, there is a more important point to be made about why 
Rawls cannot embrace the details of Kant‟s commitment to willful autonomy. 
Even if Rawls were himself committed to a Kantian metaphysics it would not 
provide a good justification for the political, and therefore public, account of 
autonomy he is trying to develop here. Allow me to briefly explain why. It is 
inevitably the case that there will be others in a political community who do not 
accept the propositions of transcendental idealism as a part of a body of general 
knowledge. In any plausible and attractive world there will be non-Kantians. If 
there are people who, after plenty of reflection, do not and cannot comprehend 
the existence of a noumenal84 will then they are unlikely to be convinced they are 
acting for their own reasons, and therefore autonomously, because a philosopher 
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 Kant, I. 2012. Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals, p56. 
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 Rawls, J, 1999.Theory, p 226.  
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 There is a much longer discussion of the Rawls’ rejection of the use of comprehensive philosophical doctrines in ideal 
political reasoning in chapter 5 of this thesis. In Rawls’ language he is interested in ‘political’ rather than ‘ethical’ autonomy in that it 
is essential that each citizen, so long as they are committed to settling they deep fair and appropriate. That is reasons that they deem 
appropriate to the political sphere. See Rawls, J. 1993. Political Liberalism, p77-79 for a full elaboration of this distinction.  
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claims that a particular normative principle conforms to what that will affirms. 
When Rawls says that Justice as Fairness grants 'Kantian' autonomy he cannot 
be making an identity based claim but rather one of partial but notable 
resemblance.85  
 
How do we reconcile the thought that politics ought to express our nature as free 
and equal persons with Rawls‟ necessary rejection of Kant‟s metaphysics, and 
indeed any appeal to comprehensive philosophical doctrines? The most plausible 
interpretation runs something like the following: that Rawls does not share Kant's 
thick view about why a special dignity needs to be afforded to acts of the moral 
will does not mean that there is not something significant in their both believing 
that we act autonomously when we express those aspects of ourselves that we 
consider morally significant, rather than those things that we consider morally 
irrelevant, in our engagements with others. For, if we are forced to act out of what 
we consider morally irrelevant reasons in our dealings with others, Rawls says 
deliberately channeling Kant, we act 'heteronomously.'86 We act in accordance 
with reasons other than those of our choosing. However, as Rawls is acting 
under the assumption that there is no shared moral framework that each member 
of the political community can appeal to, we cannot achieve autonomy by relying 
upon such a thick moral framework. Instead, what we have to do is to find a way 
of constructing political principles which each can accept for reasons 
independent of their own personal religious and philosophical beliefs. This is 
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 Rawls justifies his use of the word Kantian as one of 'analogy and not identity' in reference to his Kantian constructivism. 
(Rawls, J. 1980. 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,' The Journal of Philosophy 77(99), p517) We should interpret his use of it as 
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what Rawls calls public reason and it is necessary for autonomy in diverse 
political communities. 
 
In this account of political autonomy the individual‟s particular understanding of 
what is morally significant cannot be the governing reason across the whole 
political community. However, each individual‟s understanding of moral 
significance must not be offended by whatever reasons the public does 
collectively use. One individual may think that to act out of morally significant 
reasons it is required that we conform to a particular religious precepts (the 
believer), another may instead rely upon their own secular system of 
deontological ethics (the secularist) and yet another think that morality is but a 
matter of subjective taste (the emotivist). For all three of these individuals to be 
acting autonomously all that is necessary is that there is a principle or rule which 
they can find a moral reason to support, even if it is the case that all three 
individuals are only able to affirm the principle for distinct and personal reasons.87 
For example, our believer, our secularist and our emotivist may all be committed 
to the idea of equality of persons for different reasons. Perhaps the respective 
reasons are for the believer that we are all the creations of God, for the secularist 
it is because we are all in possession of the same faculties of reason and for the 
emotivist because equality is the most agreeable mode of being. When we 
construct our principles and discuss them in public we make use of this 
consensus and make appeal to the shared commitment to equality rather than 
any of the reasons that each of them have for supporting it. If we wish to achieve 
autonomy we cannot tell the emotivist that an egalitarian principle is in place 
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 Note how Rawls’ notion of political autonomy deliberately seeks to remain neutral in the most significant debates in 
moral philosophy. The persons inside of his political community may have external or internal reasons for being moral, a polity that 
cares about their autonomy must find a set of principles that an adherent to either approach can affirm. For an account of the 
distinction between different sources of moral reasons that I have just used see Williams, B. 1981. ‘Internal and External Reasons’ in 
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because we are all God‟s creation but we can tell him, and the two other 
members of this micro-political-community, that it is in place because they have a 
shared commitment to equality. This way each member can affirm political 
principles on the basis of reasons that they themselves find significant.  
 
How would extending our thoughts 'to the limits of the practically possible'—that 
is, remember, theorising in a way that only accepts those facts about ourselves 
which are naturally determined—overcome the danger of heteronomy so 
defined? Only the full account of Justice as Fairness that unfolds in this thesis 
can properly answer that particular question but by suggesting some possible 
barriers to autonomy the outline of Rawls' response, and the idea of realistic 
Utopia having reconciliatory power, will become clearer. It is to that task that we 
now turn, starting with an explanation of some of the implications of having a 
concern for political autonomy. It is, as we shall see, a problem which demands a 
certain type of ideal principles. 
 
The problem of Justice as Fairness 
 
The problem of political autonomy, as it has been presented, is one that only 
arises in societies where individuals want to treat each other in a certain way.88 If 
you are indifferent to the way that you treat others then you will not be acting 
heteronomously in a set of political arrangements that encourages you to take 
advantage of the vulnerability of others.89 Your understanding of your moral 
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 Rawls would say that this means his moral principles are conception-dependent. If there is no conception of the self as 
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nature would be expressed in the political arrangements and thus your 
autonomy, defined as acting in accordance with reasons of your choosing, could 
remain intact when you act in the exploitative framework of interaction it 
encourages.  
 
Rawls is surely right to believe that this is not the sort of society that we find 
ourselves in. Moreover, to be more loyal to my interpretation of Rawls' 
relationship with 'facts,' it is not the sort of society that could or would develop 
given the free development of what we are—persons who, whilst self-interested, 
have a natural desire to treat other persons as equals. In free societies Rawls 
believes that there inevitably develops a mutual understanding of the moral 
equality of individuals and their desire for freedom, and we want this to be 
recognised in our political arrangements.90 That is why in his most systematic 
explanation of his method Rawls puts the problem to which Justice as Fairness is 
a solution as: to find the basis of 'agreement on the way basic social institutions 
should be arranged if they are to conform to the freedom and equality of citizens 
                                                                                                                                                                             
autonomous acts is set by the logic of what we can and cannot will universally. This is independent of the particularities of human 
desire or culture. Rawls' political autonomy only requires that we express ourselves in a way that expresses our moral natures and 
thus could theoretically describe such a settlement as autonomous if there were such a morally indifferent polis. This is why Onura 
O'Neill describes Rawls' account of public reason as genuinely contractualist and insists that Kant is rather an obligationist. O'Neill, O. 
1997. Political Liberalism and Public Reason, pp 427-428. 
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 The idea that Rawls is committed to the doctrine of 'natural goodness,' that humans have the capacity and desire to be 
just, is self-evident in the congruence argument of Part 3 of Theory. Samuel Freeman stresses that the doctrine's importance to 
Rawls' intellectual development should not be underestimated.(Freeman, S. 2007. Rawls, Routledge: Oxford. pp 8-12. The Holocaust 
had led Rawls to become deeply disaffected with the Christian doctrine of Original Sin, believing it hideous to think that the 
'miserable and distorted' puppets that carried out such evil could glorify God. Building a philosophy on the basis of human goodness 
then took on a great moral urgency.  
60 
 
as moral persons.'91 Justice as Fairness is, Rawls makes very clear, an ideal 
response to this problem.92  
 
For the sake of analytic clarity we shall present the problem formally. Firstly there 
is the premise that we want to treat each other in a certain way. 
 
Free Societies Premise: In democratic and liberal societies people 
want to treat each other as free and equal persons. 
 
When we confront each other we may have differences of opinion, clashing 
interests and uneven emotional attachments but we recognise that we want to be 
treated in a certain way and, because we see other persons as moral equals, we 
want to treat others likewise.93 That we hold these beliefs about ourselves and 
others means that we do not want to act out of reasons that ignore or violate 
them. We shall delay commenting upon the details of what precisely it is that 
Rawls thinks we wish to express in our political life. At this stage I want to present 
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 Rawls makes this clear in a footnote responding to Ronald Dworkin's interpretation of Justice as Fairness as a 'rights based 
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clarification for Rawls scholars and a source of evidence for the interpretation developed in this chapter. 
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 This is made clear by Rawls from the off when he attributes man a ‘general desire for justice’ in the opening pages of 
Theory. Rawls, J. 1999. Theory. p5. 
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a single idea that we might think follows from Rawls' observation about the way 
that we view each other: 
 
Acceptable Principles Premise: Forcing people to live under 
arrangements that are not acceptable to them is inconsistent with 
treating them as free and equal persons. 
 
This premise simply states that to treat people as free and equal it is necessary 
to not want to coerce them through laws and principles that they do not find 
acceptable. If autonomy requires living in accordance with laws and principles 
that one finds acceptable, and we are equally concerned for everyone, then to do 
so would be to fail to express our respect for other individual's interest in being 
autonomous. Or as Rawls says whilst outlining the similarity between his theory 
of autonomy and Kant's: 'the force of the self's being equal is that the principles 
chosen must be acceptable to other selves.'94 
 
If both the acceptable principles premise and the free societies premise are 
true—we have seen that Rawls certainly held them to be—then we know that: 
 
The Problem of Justice: persons must find a set of principles and 
political arrangements that are mutually acceptable so that they can 
treat each other as free and equal. 
 
It is no co-incidence that this is precisely the way that Rawls frames the problem 
of Justice as Fairness in his most complete essay on philosophical method, 
Kantian Constructivism.95 This in turn closely resembles the account of political 
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 Given this the reader may ask what the purpose is of such a long-winded demonstration. My reply is to note that whilst 
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autonomy that Rawls develops in Political Liberalism. To achieve political 
autonomy, Rawls tells us in that work, we must enjoy a „shared political life on 
terms acceptable to others as free and equal.‟96 Justice is then, for Rawls, a 
concept that we need in politics if we are going to interact with each other in a 
way that is appropriate to the standing we hold each other in. Without it our 
political life would deny us the capacity to act out of reasons of our own choosing 
and thus be barrier to autonomous living.  
 
The need for reconciliation 
 
In the previous section we saw how Rawls understood the problem of justice to 
be the discovery of principles that allowed for political autonomy: that is, 
principles that reflected reasons that each member of a political society can 
simultaneously affirm as reflecting their own moral point of view. To see how such 
a conception of the problem of justice calls for reconciliatory philosophy let us 
build up an example of a society with some fairly minimal beliefs. We shall see 
that even in conditions favorable to autonomy the need for reconciliatory 
principles is clear. 
 
There is a world where:   
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Rawls is clear what his problem is, it hasn’t stopped more learned readers than I from presenting them as otherwise. See, for 
example, Burton Dreben’s claim that Theory and Political Liberalism deal with ‘different themes.’ Whilst Theory is interested in 
Justice, Dreben tells us, Political Liberalism is interested in legitimacy. Legitimacy means for Dreben, ‘conditions under which 
someone will properly accept the law.’ However, given the centrality of the acceptable principles premise, we can see that these two 
questions are quite inseparable. Dreben B. 2003. 'On Rawls and Political Liberalism,' The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, p317.  
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1) Everybody accepts that justice means giving each her due 
and what we are due constitutes our rights. 
 
2) Everybody wishes to be just. 
 
These first two assumptions establish that there is a generic understanding of 
what justice is and that everybody wishes to act justly. If the principles that 
govern their social interaction do not give others their due then their political 
arrangements would force them to act heteronomously in that they would be 
ruled by principles which do not express what they wish them to. The next two 
assumptions refer to some of the basic convictions about the content of what we 
are due, or to put the same thing another way, what justice demands. Note that 
both claims are couched in terms of what it is to respect the freedom and equality 
of persons. 
 
3) Everybody accepts that we have a right to show preference 
for those we are most emotionally attached to. (Commitment to 
partiality as an aspect of freedom) 
 
4) Everybody accepts that access to opportunities should, by 
right, not be determined by morally arbitrary factors such as social 
class. (Commitment to impartiality as an aspect of equality) 
 
In this imagined society there is a universal desire to act justly, and unanimous 
agreement about some features of what justice demands. These are by design 
favorable conditions for setting up political arrangements that allow individuals to 
act autonomously. However, even in these benign conditions the need for 
reconciliatory philosophy is imminent and clear. The third assumption, which 
allows individuals to show preference to those that they love, and the fourth 
assumption, which states that opportunities should not be distributed according 
to social class, have the potential to conflict even when they are universally 
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held.97 Situations inevitably arise whereby the rightful desire to show preference 
for those that you love come into conflict with the equally rightful desire to ensure 
that opportunities are not distributed according to social class. In recent 
philosophical discussion this potential conflict has manifested itself in debate 
about the extent to which parents can legitimately use their social capital to give 
educational advantage to their own off-spring.98 If it is agreed that public 
institutions should be impartial between the chances of children whereas in 
private behavior it is right for parents to prioritise the education of their own 
children, how is it that we deal with cases where the line between public 
institution and private behaviour is blurred? Should a musically trained parent 
avoid offering free piano classes at their child's local school in the knowledge that 
the school will not be able to offer that advantage to all of their pupils?  
 
The collision between legitimate parental preference for their offspring and the 
principle of equality of opportunity is just one example of the clash between the 
3rd and 4th principles expressed in our imagined moral society. Without some sort 
of agreed principles that mediate between these clashes of right there is no way 
for the individual to sense that they are treating other individuals in the way that 
they wish to, that is to say justly and as free and equal persons. Our example 
thus illustrates the pervasiveness of the problem to which Rawls tells us that 
Justice as Fairness is the solution. Even in societies with favorable 
circumstances towards achieving justice there is likely to be, without some sort of 
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ordering and organisation of claims, a disharmony and unsettled collision 
between notions of what is right. That is why Rawls tells us, in some of the 
earliest moments of Theory, that ‘a measure of agreement in conceptions of 
justice is…(a) perquisite for a viable human community.‟99 
 
We may note that the problem for which ideal concepts must be produced is one 
in which conflict—between different conceptions of the good and claims of 
rights—is already accepted. This is because, for Rawls, conflict is the inevitable 
product of the part of our nature that we want to express in our political 
arrangements. To wit, such conflicts arise from the very ideal of autonomous 
persons.100 The result is that the ideal concept of justice is, for Rawls, the one 
that best expresses our convictions about how to deal with such conflicts rather 
than one that assumes away the problem of conflict. As Burton Dreben101 put it, 
Justice as Fairness is „not an (ideal) theory about non-conflict, but an ideal theory 
of conflict.‟102 
 
The original position and autonomy 
 
Now that we have understood the problem that Rawls thinks principles of justice 
must overcome we are ready to explain the relationship between the functional 
role of principles of justice and the method under which they are constructed. It is 
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here where we are able to connect the fact-sensitivity that characterises Rawls‟ 
method and the ideal goal of reconciliatory principles.   
 
Justice as Fairness argues that the outlined problem is best answered through a 
constructed decision procedure: a specifically designed mechanism for deciding 
those principles which are appropriate for a community that wants to treat each 
other as free and equal persons. It is hoped that such a mechanism can bring 
clarity to what claims we really care about, what priority they ought to be afforded 
in any collisions of right, and how they can be organised in such a way as to 
make them acceptable to the entire community: that is to say in a way that can 
overcome the problem of Justice as Fairness. The term constructivism shall 
generally be used for the rest of this thesis to identify the belief that principles of 
justice are to be discovered by such a device.103  
 
The decision procedure used in Justice as Fairness is that of the original 
position. It is in the design of the original position that Rawls aims to take men as 
they are and thus offer laws as they can be. In particular it is here where he 
deliberately endows his decision makers with knowledge of the general laws of 
psychology and economics that flow from natural facts about human nature.104 
The next section of this chapter shall outline precisely what it is that grants the 
original position epistemic privilege in our attempts to solve the problem of 
Justice as Fairness and thus how Rawls‟ fact-sensitivity is necessary to 
overcome his problem. 
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The construction 
 
Rawls makes clear the basic framework that Justice as Fairness uses to draw up 
its conditions of a fair procedure in his 1980 account of Kantian Constructivism105, 
the form of moral theory that he takes Justice as Fairness to be a strand. Note 
that Rawls claims that any changes to his position in these lectures are little more 
than a 'shift in emphasis' designed to give greater clarity to ideas that are already 
in Justice as Fairness as it is expressed in Theory.106 We take Rawls' claims of 
continuity seriously and treat any apparent changes to the substance of Justice 
as Fairness as primarily correcting failures of expression and clarity unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
In identifying what is distinctive about the tradition of Kantian constructivism 
Rawls states that: 
 
'(Kantian Constructivism)... specifies a particular conception of the 
person as an element in a reasonable procedure of construction, the 
outcome of which determines the content of the first principles of 
justice. Expressed another way: this kind of view sets up a certain 
procedure of construction which answers to certain reasonable 
requirements, and within this procedure persons characterised as 
rational agents of construction specify, through their agreements, the 
first principles of justice.'107 
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This is an important passage as it identifies clearly the three basic components of 
Justice as Fairness in the first sentence. In the second it specifies how these 
basic components are related to one another.  
 
The three basic components are: 
 
1) A conception of the person. 
2) A procedure for those persons to interact. 
And 
3) Principles of Justice. 
 
If, as Kantian constructivists, we are trying to discover the demands of justice we 
must first seek to understand the subjects of Justice. We need to know what it is 
that persons are seeking to gain out of political co-operation so that we can know 
what they want to secure from the laws that govern it. Once we have established 
what persons want from political co-operation we can then consider what makes 
co-operation possible and what makes it difficult. What propensities do we have 
that allow us to act and think co-operatively and what propensities do we have 
that make co-operation more difficult? Once we have established our subjects we 
are in a position to set out a procedure that eliminates the barriers to reasonable 
co-operation yet respects the ends of co-operation. We can offer a conception of 
justice that reflects what its subjects want from it. Only once the procedure is 
properly constructed are we in a position to work out what principles it would 
recommend. 
 
A famous historical example may help in our understanding of the process. 
Bentham's utilitarianism starts with a conception of persons as equals that all 
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wish to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, our two 'sovereign masters.'108 In modern 
parlance we would say that Bentham has a „mental states‟ account of what is and 
isn't good for humans.109 His utilitarian calculus, designed to deliberate on 
distributive questions between such pleasure seeking and pain averse equals, 
responds to this understanding of the human condition by offering a principle 
appropriate for this conception, the product of this search being the greatest 
happiness principle. As we are equals all aiming for the same mental states, we 
ought to aim at that state of affairs that maximises pleasure and minimises pain. 
 
It may seem odd to have chosen classical utilitarianism as an example of this 
structure of thought given that it is one of the traditions that Justice as Fairness 
wishes to define itself in opposition to. However, Rawls suggests that in the weak 
sense developed here utilitarianism is a constructivist doctrine.110 Justice as 
Fairness differs from utilitarianism in the details of the conception of the person, 
and thus the procedure and principles it recommends, rather than the broad 
trajectory of its reasoning. It is only the conception of the person that makes 
Rawls‟ constructivism identifiably Kantian. 
   
In order to understand what is distinctive about Justice as Fairness we shall go 
through each component of the process to explain its particularities inside of the 
general framework of constructivism. We will start, as we have seen Rawls 
recommends, with Justice as Fairness‟ conception of the person. 
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The person (reasonable and rational)  
 
The important thing to note is that the conception of the person used in this 
phase of the constructive process is not the same thing as a conception of 
human nature. We are not trying to describe what we are like, but rather, what we 
would like to be like if we are given the possibility to express ourselves properly. 
So, for example, we might recognise that we are quite capable of violence but be 
ashamed of it. In our conception of the person we would put forward the desire 
not to be violent as a fundamental interest that we wish to secure in our politics. It 
is only in the second stage of the constructive procedure that we start to consider 
facts about human nature that are relevant to this ideal conception. If we want 
principles that express our commitment to non-violence it is important that we 
know under which circumstances our capacity for violence is awoken. 
 
We have already seen some of the basic material of what Rawls thinks we want 
from our political arrangements. We want, he thinks, to be treated as free and 
equal and to treat others in the same way. This is what he calls our general 
desire for justice. I want to say a little about why he thinks that it is reasonable to 
ascribe this desire to persons as well as some of the other things that we want 
from politics. Rawls identifies two „moral powers‟ which form the basic constituent 
elements of Justice as Fairness' conception of the person. The constituent moral 
powers are: 
 
1) The capacity to act from a sense of justice. 
2) A capacity to form and rationally to pursue a conception of the 
good. 
 
These moral powers are supposed to be offered as descriptions of the way that 
people actually think of themselves from the moral point of view. They just are 
what we want expressed in our political arrangements: 
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'These interests are supremely regulative as well as effective. This 
implies that, whenever circumstances are relevant to their fulfilment, 
these interests govern deliberation and conduct. Since the parties 
represent moral persons, they are likewise moved by these interests 
to secure the development and exercise of the moral powers.'111 
 
The first moral power has already been described in this thesis as our general 
desire for justice. That is our desire to treat other persons in a way that respects 
their equal moral worth. The second moral power needs a little bit more 
explaining. It is one thing to say that you want to respect other person‟s moral 
worth but what exactly does this demand of us? We have seen that Bentham 
believed it required us to treat other person‟s desire for pleasure and aversion to 
pain as important as our own. However, we might be averse to that thought for a 
couple of reasons. The first reason is that we might think that pleasing mental 
states are a bad description of the sort of state of affairs that we wish to bring 
about. Robert Nozick famously challenged the mental-state theory of the good on 
the grounds that we would not wish to take a drug, or enter the influence of a 
machine, that gave us the blissful mental state of pleasure even if we thought 
there was no chance that it would, in the long term, bring about pain.112 According 
to Nozick our intuitive rejection of such an opportunity suggests that our notion of 
a good life entails a concern with how we bring about pleasure and pain. We care 
about the project and plans that we undertake in our life, for their own sake, and 
not simply for the sake of the pleasure that they bring about. Secondly, we might 
also think that it fails to reflect to reflect the priority between persons that any 
individual member of a moral community would actually want. Is there anybody 
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who doesn‟t wish to have the capacity to show a preference for themselves and 
their loves ones over other people? If the answer is not, mental-state 
utilitarianism‟s attempt to treat persons as equals succeeds only at the cost of 
treating persons in a way that is equally dissatisfactory to all. This second 
thought is one of the reasons that Rawls thinks his principles are preferable to 
anything produced by the utilitarian doctrine. However, it is the first Nozickian 
challenge that better reflects why Rawls identifies 2) as one of our two moral 
powers. 
 
Rawls‟ second moral power is best considered a reflection of the complexities of 
establishing an objective account of the good. There is not and cannot be a 
shared plan for life, but retreating to a mental-state theory inevitably fails to 
describe what it is that people actually want from life. To form and pursue a 
conception of the good is to have an idea in one‟s mind about how you want to 
live your life and to go about doing the things necessary to realise those 
ambitions. The fact that this is a power which is possessed by individuals actually 
separates Rawls‟ theory from prominent ethical conceptions other than mental-
state utilitarianism. It is not the case in Rawls‟ theory that a conception of the 
good exists prior to the individual, which they are simply to discover or work 
towards, as in teleological theories like that of Plato or Aristotle. Rawls theory is 
thus explicit that, because of this, individuals are capable of forming different 
conceptions of the good from one another. There is not, to use Rawls‟ own 
language, a 'thick' conception of the good that is shared by all. By making this 
capacity one of his moral powers Rawls empowers his citizens to protect this 
capability and signifies the importance that he believes we attach to it.     
 
By making these moral powers the content of his conception of the person Rawls 
is explicitly making his theory one appropriate to a certain comprehensive 
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understanding of the liberal tradition.113 Most obviously he is working in the 
Kantian tradition, as Rawls believes Kant to also ground his moral theory on a 
conception of the person who revises and pursues their own account of the 
good.114  
 
I would like to finish by tidying up some matters of terminology that will make the 
remainder of the discussion clearer. There are a series of Rawlsian terms that 
are closely related to these moral powers which are not quite synonymous with 
them. Firstly the two moral powers coincide with a pair of moral capacities that 
Rawls endows us with in our ethical decision making. We are reasonable, in the 
sense that we sincerely wish to make concessions to the legitimate claims of 
others, and we are rational, in that we know how to pursue the aims that we are 
set ourselves. The two moral powers are also sometimes couched in the more 
rhetorically powerful terms of our desire for freedom and equality. I will, like 
Rawls, occasionally use them interchangeably. 
 
The procedure (the original position) 
 
Rawls' conception of the person tells us what we want expressed and preserved 
from principles of justice. The next difficulty for any constructivist theory is to 
imagine a deliberative procedure that represents these things alone. If we admit 
interests that we have that go beyond our shared moral understanding, perhaps 
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our fears of the untrustworthiness of others or our immoral desires to better other 
persons, than our deliberative procedure will not produce principles of justice but 
rather a prudential compromise between multiple values. We will have no clearer 
idea of what a shared conception of justice would look like. 
 
Deliberative acts in our everyday society rarely meet this ideal for various 
reasons, but there are two primary obstacles. Firstly we find it difficult to separate 
ourselves from our immediate subjective interests, rather than our considered 
fundamental interests.115 If our primary source of income is the rent gained from 
property then knowledge of this fact is likely to influence any vote we have on the 
future principles dictating the distribution of property. As the renowned novelist 
and socialist Upton Sinclair once said, „it is difficult to get a man to understand 
something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.‟116  
 
Beyond this difficulty of removing ourselves from our immediate subjective 
interests lies a further difficulty. Even if we were capable of identifying our 
subjective interests and removing them from our decision making, we may still 
find it difficult to assume an objective point of view. That is a point of view that 
takes into account the reasonable claims of all persons and shows no priority to 
any. For example, we may find it hard to imagine what the interests are of people 
with a radically different conception of the good to ourselves. Even if we do know 
the diaspora of interests and views of a community are, we might find it hard to 
reconcile competing claims between them without some form of abstraction. How 
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do we deal with situations where two parties assert interests in claiming two 
rights that cannot be held at the same time? 
 
Rawls famously believed that the model of procedure appropriate for such 
persons was the original position. The original position is characterised by self-
interested parties deliberating about what the principles of justice for their society 
ought to be in an imagined environment where there is strict control over what we 
do and do not know about ourselves and society. This next section will explain 
what it is that Rawls allows knowledge of in the original position, and how this is 
appropriate to the conception of the person offered in the previous section.  
 
The most evocative component image of the original position is the 'veil of 
ignorance.' The veil is a physical representation of the things that Rawls denies 
his citizens knowledge of whilst they are seeking to discover principles that best 
express their commitment to freedom and equality, and their shared fundamental 
interest in developing their moral powers. The intuitive idea behind the veil of 
ignorance is a simple one. If we remove from people the knowledge that they 
have about themselves which makes them judge political questions self-
interestedly: the property they hold, the class that they belong to, their gender 
etc. and say to them that they have to make a decision about how to distribute 
advantages, liberties, property and everything else of political importance in a 
society, then they are forced to decide upon principles from a point of view that is 
firstly impartial between different conceptions of the good (thus satisfying our 
second moral power) and secondly pays equal concern to the interests of every 
member of the society (thus satisfying the first moral power). We would, even 
when acting self-interestedly, show equal and impartial concern to the interests of 
all citizens because we are aware that there is a chance that we could find 
ourselves in any position in society once the principles are decided upon. The 
result is that the model of the original position directs us towards an answer 
about how to prioritise different claims and resolve collisions of right in a way that 
conforms to our shared moral point of view. Now that I have expressed the 
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intuitive idea behind Rawls‟ decision making criteria I need to go into a few of its 
more technical details.  
 
Justice as Fairness utilises a 'thick' veil of ignorance rather than 'thin' veil of 
ignorance. The latter is a process that starts with the observation that there are 
positions and advantages that individuals hold that shroud their capacity for 
impartiality. It then seeks to eliminate those advantages until we have modelled a 
system where individuals are unable to vote in any way other than impartially. 
Justice as Fairness, by contrast, starts with the assumption that we know nothing 
and introduces enough information for agreement between rational parties to be 
possible. The distinction is important because a thick veil of ignorance is likely to 
exclude information that a thin veil of ignorance would not. Rawls highlights the 
social history of a nation as a particular example as a piece of information not 
necessary for reasonable agreement between rational subjects but which would 
not shroud the partiality of subjects so long as they did not know the class, 
gender or racial roles that they have within it.117 Rawls advocates the use of a 
thick veil as the principles that he recommends are supposed to be expressions 
of nothing but our moral sensibilities. The inclusion of information that does not 
emanate from our sensibilities would, under the proper understanding of political 
autonomy, make the recommended principles heteronomous rather than 
autonomous.  
 
Rawls' starting point in erecting the veil of ignorance is then to eliminate all 
knowledge and then slowly introduce those things that are necessary for 
agreement. I want to stress that it is at this point, and only at this point, that 
aspects of Rawls' 'theory of human nature,' as opposed to conception of the 
person, are introduced. This stage in Rawls' construction is perhaps the most 
controversial and faces one acute difficulty. The more information that one 
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removes from behind the veil of ignorance the more likely one is to produce a 
deliberative process that biases some reasonable conceptions of the good over 
others. Rawls characterises the difficulty as having to simultaneously satisfy the 
following two conditions:118 
 
1) Agreement in the initial situation must be unanimous. 
And 
2) The parties, with their different conceptions of the good, must 
be treated fairly. 
 
One of the primary mechanisms that Rawls utilises to avoid the second horn of 
his potential dilemma—that is prioritising some conceptions of the good over 
others—is making sure that the goods that are regulated and distributed by his 
principles of justice are useful to all persons independent of what their particular 
conception of the good is. His citizens are not securing access to solely money, 
which is of most useful to the consumerist, or landed property, which is of no use 
to the nomad, but rather an „index of primary goods.‟ The 'index of primary goods' 
is a composite notion of goods that, given our conception of ourselves and the 
nature of political agreement, it is rational for all citizens to wish to secure. A 
primary good is useful to all persons in a political community. Those goods are: 
basic liberties, rights and opportunities for income and wealth, and the 'social 
bases of self-respect.‟  
 
The principles and the reconciliatory power 
 
Now that we have explained the construction of the original position we are in a 
position to pass comment on the reconciliatory power Rawls ascribes to the 
principles that it recommends. What is it about expressing those aspects of the 
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self that we wish to express in our political principles, and the commitment to 
take men as they are and show no other compromises with the facts, that allows 
the individuals of a free community of equals to live autonomous lives? 
 
Part of what makes the original position epistemically privileged is that, by 
removing knowledge from its representatives of information that they may be 
tempted to use to act in accordance with morally arbitrary reasons—for example, 
in order to satiate their weakness for either envy or vanity—each can know that 
the settlement reached is in accordance with the part of their natures that they 
wish to express. We shall call this phenomenon reconciliation through moral 
significance and it is perhaps best expressed by Rawls in his discussion of the 
relationship between his principles and 'self-respect.' Here Rawls highlights that 
by choosing not to seek advantages on the basis of morally arbitrary factors his 
citizens express a respect for each others‟ equality:  
 
'By arranging inequalities for reciprocal advantage and by abstaining 
from exploitation of the contingencies of nature and social 
circumstance within a framework of equal liberties, persons express 
their respect for one another in the very constitution of their society.'119  
 
The second reconciliatory power is that of fraternity and it is again treated as a 
product of the details of Rawls' construction. As the representatives of the original 
position are not aware of their own position in society they, out of their modeled 
self-interest, only accept those inequalities that are likely to the benefit of the 
least well off. The result, Rawls believes, is that both the worst off and the best 
off in a well ordered society know that inequalities could not be altered in a way 
that makes the worst off any better off. As such each individual knows that any 
advantages they accept or pursue have been organised in a manner that 
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respects the equality of all. Or as Rawls puts it: the principles express the 
reciprocated idea of 'not wanting to have greater advantages unless it is to the 
benefit of others who are less well off.' 
 
What combines reconciliation through moral significance and reconciliation 
through fraternity is that they are the result of the original position publicly 
demonstrating that its recommended principles takes what we consider to be the 
best of our natures and is not diluted by any other concerns. The facts of human 
nature were only introduced after the political community had highlighted those 
aspects of the self which they together could affirm as morally significant, or what 
Rawls calls the 'conception of the person.' At the point where the facts of human 
nature are introduced they are not conceived as a constraint on the ideal of 
developing our moral powers, but simply the means that are available to us in 
setting up a society that will allow for their impartial development.  
 
The goal of a realistic Utopia is to facilitate the reconciliation of moral individuals 
with the laws and institutions that govern them. This is what we might call an 
ideal goal. It does so by producing moral concepts that individuals recognise as 
expressing the moral component of their nature. The fact-sensitivity criterion that 
defines realistic Utopia cannot then be separated from its function. To search for 
the best possible arrangements, taking men as they are and laws as they can be, 
is to take the first and necessary step in reconciling those men with their political 
arrangements by finding political arrangements that are mutually agreeable to 
equal persons.  
 
Utopia and inspiration 
 
The fact that the reconciliation that Rawls wishes to bring about through political 
philosophy is one of strong moral content is significant. Without something like an 
appeal to an ideal and value like autonomy the call for reconciliation would be a 
decidedly conservative goal. Reconciling the individual to a status quo that is 
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unjust, perhaps in order to bring about stability or peace, would make political 
philosophy a force against potentially destabilisng but rightful claims.  
 
In the previous chapter we saw that modern ideal theorists have what we have 
called an 'inspirational' account of the function of political theory. Ideals are 
depicted independent of their feasibility in order to inspire us to want better and 
to prevent us settling for what we have. I'd like to conclude this section on the 
functional definition of realistic Utopia by saying how it fits into this tradition. 
 
We have seen that Rawls believes realistic Utopia has the capacity to reconcile 
individuals to their collective arrangements in a well-ordered society. It does so 
by producing principles that they recognise as expressing what they consider to 
be their moral natures. If Rawls believed that we were already in a society with 
just institutions, but just didn't realise it, we might say that the only function of 
political philosophy is to educate individuals so that they can recognise the 
justice than they are embedded in. In this understanding of Rawls he was to 20th 
century welfare-state-capitalism what Hegel was to 18th century Prussian-
constitutionalism, a philosopher whose philosophical aim was to reconcile his 
compatriots to their political arrangements by way of explaining their rightness.120 
This commonplace interpretation of the function of Rawls‟ political philosophy 
was, as with so many ideas in 20th century thought, mostly clearly articulated by 
Brian Barry: 
 
'In return for this primary loyalty, the state undertakes to sustain a 
system of equitable law and order and to provide public goods and 
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services. In the post-war Western European version common to both 
main political tendencies, social democracy and Christian democracy, 
it also provides economic security in the face of such contingencies as 
youth, age, disability and unemployment. In typical Owl of Minerva 
fashion, this whole conception received its most systematic exposition 
in A Theory of Justice.'121  
 
To adopt Barry‟s Hegelian interpretation would be to misunderstand Rawls' own 
appraisal of the political institutions he found himself in. Rawls was doubtful that 
the institutions of welfare-state-capitalism had the capacity to express the moral 
sentiments he believed to be captured by his two principles. He described its 
redistributive measures as 'insufficient and ineffective' in the face of the large 
property holdings it guaranteed for the owners of capital.122 In his mind his 
principles could only be realised if there was a significant dispersal of capital in a 
society either in the form of a 'property-owning democracy' or a 'liberal socialist 
regime.'123 Given this negative appraisal of the political arrangements he found 
himself in it is clear that Rawls would not have expected his principles to inspire 
reconciliation between the individual and her existing political institutions. They 
are not the institutions of a well-ordered society.124  
 
                                                          
121
 Barry, B. 1998. ‘The Limits of Cultural Politics,’ Review of International Studies, 24, p307. 
122
 Rawls, J, 1999.Theory, xv. 
123
 Rawls, J, 1999.Theory, xv. 
124
 The most sustained explanation of why welfare-state capitalism cannot satisfy Rawls' principles see O'Neill, M. 2009. 
'Liberty, Equality and Property-Owning Democracy,' The Journal of Social Philosophy, 40(3). 
82 
 
The knowledge that something else is possible and better expresses ourselves 
should only have the opposite 'inspirational' effect. The effect of grasping Rawls' 
principles of Justice should be to inspire the demand  greater quality in, and 
wider distribution of, the goods that really matter in our society. The potential 
benefit of doing so is, as we have seen, great. By expressing our nature as free 
and equal persons in our political laws and principles the individual is afforded 
the opportunity for their political life to be vehicle rather than obstacle for the aim 
of living an autonomous life. That is the realistic Utopia that Justice as Fairness 
hopes to inspire us towards.    
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Chapter 3: The Concessionary Criticism 
 
Now that we have established that Justice as Fairness is intended to be a 
realistic Utopia—and exactly what this demands of a theory—we are ready to 
move on to the critique of Rawls' method of which this thesis is a refutation of, 
G.A Cohen‟s „concessionary criticism.‟  
 
In the introduction to his Rescuing Justice and Equality Cohen makes an 
observation about the purpose of his critique of Justice as Fairness. He remarks:  
 
'Some people think that I exaggerate the difference between what 
Rawls offers and what I counter offer. If they were disposed, as a 
result, to call me a left-Rawlsian, I would neither disavow nor dislike 
the description. There is a strong egalitarian element in the in 
Rawlsianism that I try to train against its inegalitarian conclusions.'125
    
 
 
From this comment we might imagine that Cohen did not wish to render Rawls' 
theory entirely defeated, but, to copy his habit of almost quoting Marx, to rescue 
the egalitarian kernel from Rawls' constructed shell. It is not, we are led to 
believe, an attempt to rescue equality from Justice as Fairness but to rescue the 
equality in Justice as Fairness. The book, Rescuing Justice and Equality, is 
structured around two distinct 'rescues' of which this is a fairly accurate depiction 
of the first (Chapters 1-5). The second 'rescue' is, by way of contrast and as the 
title suggests, concerned with rescuing the concept of justice itself (Chapters 6-
8). During this second rescue Cohen advances a defence of the sort of fact-
insensitive ideal theory, of which we have seen he was committed to in Chapter 1 
of this thesis. He does so in order to offer a plausible alternative to Rawls‟ 
realistic Utopian constructivism.  
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The sheer depth of Cohen's attack, as well as the fundamentally different vision 
he holds from Rawls about what principles of justice are, may give us reason to 
think that their disagreement is so basic that it cannot be resolved through 
argument. Cohen‟s belief in the existence of fact-insensitive fundamental 
principles which are knowable by all, and his rejection of the idea that justice is 
constructed as opposed to discovered, contravenes one of the fundamental 
axioms of Rawls‟ thought: that principles of justice are just those principles 
objectively acceptable to all when in the correct choosing situation and have no 
external reality. For Rawls principles of justice do not exist outside of the inter-
subjective agreement of subjects.126  
 
It must be admitted that disagreements as deep as this are difficult to overcome. 
We often make assumptions and accept axioms whilst thinking through problems 
because we are most committed to them being true. It is this which makes 
axiomatic disagreement unconducive to reasoned resolution. To understand why 
let us think of the most trenchant philosophical issues of the past two millennia, 
the problem of evil. The problem of evil asks why it is the case that there is evil in 
the world given that God is both omnibenevolent and omnipotent. A perfectly 
good God would surely want to use his infinite powers to prevent serious harm 
and injury to his creatures. To most modern eyes the problem of evil appears to 
be difficult for no greater reason than the fact it rests upon the arbitrary attribution 
of qualities to its primary protagonist, God. If it is not assumed that God is 
omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent then there is not a problem to 
grapple with. However, if you try and challenge somebody working through the 
problem of evil on the basis that God does not exist, or doesn‟t have those 
qualities, then you are unlikely to make any progress. The recipient of such 
criticisms simply would not be engaging with the problem if they have not already 
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come to the considered and fixed judgment that such an entity does exist and 
does have those qualities. 
 
Rawls‟ belief that there cannot be an external grounding to moral principles, such 
as the set of objective fact-insensitive forms that Cohen perceives, was as much 
a product of deep and lasting reflection as that of an expert theologian who has 
found herself engrossed in the problem of evil. It is not something that he is going 
to change his mind upon. Any challenge that Cohen makes against Rawls that 
simply asserts that justice is a fact-insensitive if we could principle will then rest 
upon a disagreement that is beyond resolution in the court of reasoned 
argument. It would not be persuasive.  
 
It is with the limitations of an entirely external criticism of an argument in mind 
that I endeavour in this chapter to present Cohen‟s criticisms as he understood 
them: as part of a critique which internally damages to Rawls‟ project to such an 
extent that its very foundations are fatally undermined. Cohen‟s concessionary 
criticism, as we shall see, challenges Rawls‟ realistic Utopia on the basis of the 
claims that Rawls himself makes for his method. They are not, and cannot be, 
reconciliatory principles in the manner that the previous chapter described. I shall 
demonstrate that he is able to make this critique without depending upon the 
defences he makes on behalf of his entirely fact-insensitive approach to political 
philosophy throughout the second rescue.   
 
Unequalising incentives 
 
The subject that provoked Cohen's rescue of equality, and internal critique of 
Justice as Fairness, was that of 'unequalising incentives.'127 Unequalising 
incentives are rewards attached to offices that are intended to motivate people to 
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perform a task, and to perform it well, but in doing so create inequalities. For 
example, a society which pays its medical professionals a premium to not 
practice privately introduces unequalising incentives in order to achieve the ideal 
of distributing healthcare on the basis of need.128 In the first rescue Cohen is 
concerned to show that Rawls' acceptance of 'unequalising incentives' is 
inconsistent with the egalitarian motivations that ground Rawls‟ principles of 
distributive justice. It is only the behaviour of 'talented' people, Cohen suggests, 
that make unequalising incentives potentially beneficial to a society. However, the 
principles of justice, and particularly the difference principle, are predicated upon 
a prior egalitarian commitment that advantage should not be afforded upon 
grounds that are „arbitrary from the moral point of view.‟129 As the talented are 
only able to make the demand for extra incentives as a result of arbitrarily 
distributed talents, the demands that make unequalising incentives necessary 
are in contradiction with the egalitarian judgements which underpin the difference 
principle.130  
 
We shall see how Cohen uses the internal contradictions that he argues 
inevitably emerge from the construction of Rawls‟ principles of justice to suggest 
that Rawls' principles fail on their own terms. The principles inevitably fail to have 
'reconciliatory' force either by appealing to our fundamental moral convictions 
about appropriate considerations in mediating clashes of right, or by fostering a 
genuine sense of fraternity. Realistic Utopia, it is thus alleged, not only produces 
principles in contradiction with its own motivating principles, but, in doing so, fails 
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to perform the functional task that Rawls designates for it. It does not produce an 
ideal concept even as Rawls understands the term and thus our political 
vocabulary is weakened by the Rawlsian misuse of the term justice.  
 
For the sake of the structure of my argument I do not offer a challenge to 
Cohen‟s interpretive claims throughout this chapter. This is not to be interpreted 
as a sign of my agreement but rather a disciplined biting of the tongue. The 
challenge made to Cohen‟s concessionary criticism should only be launched 
once it has been presented with its fullest force and the implications of the 
possibility of it being true rendered clear. 
 
Rawls' principles of justice 
 
Justice as Fairness recommends two principles of justice. I shall introduce the 
principles by adopting the same formulations used by Rawls when he first 
presents them in Theory.131 The first principle first concerns the distribution of 
'basic liberties' and requires that: 
 
1)  Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for others. 
 
The second principle comes in two parts and is concerned with the distribution 
not of liberties but of all purpose social and physical goods, known as primary 
goods, which allow individuals to carry out whatever it is they plan to do with their 
life. Specifically it states that social and economic inequalities should be 
arranged so that they are both: 
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2a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, 
 
And 
 
2b) attached to positions and offices open to all. 
 
From here on in I shall, in compliance with the usual conventions, refer to 1) as 
the 'equal basic liberties principle,' 2a) as 'the difference principle' and 2b) as the 
'fair equality of opportunity principle.'  
 
Under circumstances in which the principles conflict, they are not to be weighed 
against each other. Instead they are assigned a strict priority whereby the most 
important principles cannot in anyway be compromised in order to make gains 
with regards to the less important principles. The order of the principles by priority 
is 1st) equal basic liberties principle, 2nd) fair equality of opportunity principle and 
3rd) the difference principle. For the sake of understanding this feature of Rawls' 
position, I invite you to assume that it is true that there are great efficiency 
savings to be made by assigning advantageous roles to persons on the mere 
basis of the status given to them by birth. A society would be able to concentrate 
specific educational resources only to those who need them—say an hereditary 
aristocratic elite—and invest the savings in to the production of universally 
available primary goods.132 Even though a greater gain is made with regards to 
the claims of the difference principle than loss is made with regards to the fair 
equality of opportunity principle, the strict 'lexical' ordering of Rawls' principles 
makes the move impermissible.  
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Rawls does not always render the difference principle exactly as it is presented 
here. Two sections further in to Theory Rawls makes an attempt to explain why it 
is that the decision makers in the Original Position—bound by his constraints on 
rationality and knowledge as they are—would come to settle upon a distribution 
of primary goods which conforms to the difference principle.133 Rawls explains 
that the mutual indifference and ignorance of his representatives means that they 
are interested in maximising the advantages of every position in society but at 
each stage give priority to the least well-off. They do as they are risk-averse and 
are ignorant of their own economic standing and thus aware that the unfortunate 
least advantaged individual could be them. Once the primary goods which enable 
welfare for the least well-off has been maximised the mutually indifferent deciders 
then wish to maximise the primary goods of the next better-off representative for 
the same reason. The next best off individual could also be them and they have 
every reason, now the least advantaged individual‟s status has been maximised, 
to make the next most advantaged individual as well off as they can be. As Rawls 
puts it his representatives would: 
 
'first maximise the welfare of the worst-off representative man. 
Second, for equal welfare of the worst-off representative, maximise the 
welfare of the second worst-off representative man, and so on until the 
last case which is, for equal welfare of all preceding n-1 
representatives, maximise the welfare of the best-off representative 
man.'134 
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Rawls invites us to label this description of the difference principle as the „lexical 
principle‟ and Cohen treats it as the 'canonical' formulation.135 The lexical principle 
is supposed to be a more precise description of exactly what is understood by 
the principle of only allowing those inequalities that „can reasonably be expected 
to everyone‟s advantage,‟ or, as he alternatively puts it, „to the greatest expected 
benefit of the least advantaged.‟136 However, the very precision of the lexical 
principle invites us to imagine cases where the worst-off are not strictly affected 
by increasing inequalities which benefit the most advantaged. If there are two 
people in a society and there are 9 perfectly indivisible primary goods to share, 
moving from the distribution 4-4 (with 1 unclaimed primary good) to 5-4 does not 
advantage the individual who still receives 4 primary goods, but it does satisfy 
the „lexical‟ or „canonical‟ formulation of the difference principle. Rawls thinks that 
the 'connectedness' and „close-knitness‟ of economies makes this distinction 
purely theoretical and of no practical importance.137 In the real world, advantages 
afforded to one section of the society will always have an impact on the 
advantages afforded to others precisely because goods are almost always not 
indivisible and, even if they are, can be moneterised and taxed so that the 
advantages that flow from them are. However, it is worthy of note that when 
Rawls makes statements to the effect that 'the difference principle is a strongly 
egalitarian conception in the sense that unless there is a distribution that makes 
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both persons better off, an equal distribution is to be preferred,'138 he speaks 
strictly inaccurately through a conflation of his canonical and more plane 
language formulations.  
 
We should also finally note that Rawls does not envision the outlined principles 
as governing individual behaviour but rather the institutions that individuals in a 
given society share. Rawls thus restricts the scope of justice to what he calls the 
„basic structure.'139There is no ambiguity about this point, but it is important to 
outline it here as we will see it has been raised both in defence of Rawls against 
Cohen‟s concessionary criticism and by Cohen in the course of constructing that 
criticism. Rawls‟ restriction of the scope of justice to the basic structure is then 
central to the dispute under discussion. I shall cite the relevant passage in full for 
future reference: 
 
'The primary subject of the principles of social justice is the basic 
structure of society, the arrangement of major social institutions into 
one scheme of cooperation... The principles of justice for institutions 
must not be confused with the principles which apply to individuals 
and their actions in particular circumstances. These two kinds of 
principles apply to different subjects and must be discussed 
separately.'140  
 
Incentives and the difference principle 
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It is when discussing the 'offices' and 'positions' that are regulated by the equal 
opportunity principle that Rawls introduces what we recognise as 'unequalising 
incentives.' In the essay entitled Justice as Fairness Rawls writes:  
 
'it may be, for the common advantage, […] to attach special benefits 
and burdens to certain offices. Perhaps by doing so the requisite talent 
can be attracted to them and encouraged to give its best efforts.'141  
 
We can see that the idea of paying a talented individual extra to utilise her talents 
in a socially useful way, as captured by the earlier example of medical 
professionals that we wish to work in public hospitals, would appear to meet the 
criteria and represents one sort of case that Rawls has in mind. Complicating 
matters is Rawls' decision to say that unequalising incentives might be necessary 
not only to attract people to such socially useful offices but also to 'encourage 
people to give their best efforts.' Rawls means by this some sort of system of 
extra incentives so that socially useful work is not only done by the talented, but 
done to the best of their abilities. In practical terms we can only assume he has in 
mind the way that pay is often linked the performance beyond the mere fulfilment 
of defined duties through bonuses and performance related pay. We can then 
say that, for Rawls, unequalising incentives are justified in two cases in which 
they are necessary to realise the difference principle. To put the same thing 
formally: 
 
A just settlement allows unequalising incentives in order to... 
 
1) Alter the talented's labour choices. 
2) Alter the talented's work effort. 
If and only if 1) or 2)  
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3) Are necessary to make maximise the advantages of the worst 
off. 
 
It may appear unusual for me to have presented Rawls' incorporation of 
unequalising incentives into Justice as Fairness through passages in the essay 
that takes the same name. It is, after all, an early work which, as we have seen in 
the case of the formulation of the difference principle, contains some differences 
from the canonical Theory. I do so because Cohen's concessionary criticism 
takes particular note of the way that the incorporation is justified in that essay.142 
For the sake of making Cohen's point I shall cite the passage at some length. 
Rawls suggests: 
 
'If, as is quite likely, these inequalities work as incentives to draw out 
better efforts, the members of this society may look upon them as 
concessions to human nature: they, like us, may think people ideally 
should want to serve one another. But they are mutually self-
interested, their acceptance of these inequalities is a merely the 
acceptance of the relations in which they actually stand.'143   
 
The justification that Rawls offers here for unequalising incentives is a familiar 
and seemingly conventional one. In political life we regularly come across 
situations where extra-incentives are afforded to the talented in order to keep 
their labour where we need it to be, but where we think that our having to offer 
those incentives is a reflection of the moral infirmities of the recipient. The near 
universal public disdain for the sizable bonuses for traders and executives at 
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state-owned banks being the most fitting contemporary example of looking upon 
unequalising incentives as „concessions to human nature.‟ It is also a way of 
thinking about such policies with a long philosophical tradition. John Stuart Mill 
called paying the talented people more per an hour‟s graft than that of the 
standard worker a „compromise with the selfish type of character.‟144 He still 
thought such compromises were necessary but compromises they were.  
 
Cohen was interested in this paragraph in Justice as Fairness, and what we have 
called Rawls‟ conventional justification for unequalising incentives, because of 
the way it was altered in a near identical passage in Theory. Thirteen years later 
Rawls states: 
 
'If, for example, these inequalities set up various incentives which 
succeed in eliciting more productive efforts, a person in the original 
position may look upon them as necessary to cover the costs of 
training and to encourage effective performance. One might think that 
ideally individuals should want to serve one another. But since the 
parties are assumed not to take an interest in one another's interests, 
their acceptance of these inequalities is only an acceptance of the 
relations in which men stand in the circumstances of justice.'145 
 
Cohen wants to draw our attention to the fact that in 1958 Rawls called the 
acceptance of unequalising incentives a 'concession to human nature' but in 
1971 this language disappears and is replaced with 'necessary to cover the costs 
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of training and to encourage effective performance.' This is the first major change 
between the two formulations but I would like to draw attention to another which 
Cohen ignores. In 1958 Rawls includes himself in the group of people who think 
that in an ideal world people should 'want to serve one another' by saying it is a 
thought 'we' have. In 1971 he instead says that it is a position that 'one' may 
have and leaves it ambiguous as to whether he himself holds that particular 
position.146  
 
Cohen speculates what may have motivated such changes. He is attracted to the 
1958 phrase as it draws attention to what actually makes unequalising incentives 
'necessary.' We have said that they are necessary to either 1) attract talented 
people to work in socially useful offices or 2) make those talented people work to 
the best of their abilities. It may very well be the case that incentives do have this 
effect and that we have, as of yet, no other policy tool that is as effective at doing 
so. However, it is true that unequalising incentives would not be necessary if 
people wanted to commit their skills to the task that would best serve justice and 
worked to the best of their abilities out of a pure sense of justice. Cohen suggests 
that this means what makes unequalising incentives necessary are 'infirmities in 
human nature.'147 Whilst this may seem like an enormous jump in reasoning—
could unequalising incentives not be a reflection of our rightful desire for freedom 
of occupational choice?—Cohen conjects that, given the 1958 passage, this was 
at least in this stage of his intellectual development, Rawls' position too. 
 
An important point to note is that Cohen suggests that Rawls‟ reason for the 
change of formulation is that at this point in his intellectual development he had 
become committed to the position that whatever was decided from the original 
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position is justice, and, as the original position necessarily assumes that men 
know facts such as the 'basic psychological principles' that make incentives 
necessary, Rawls was therefore uncomfortable calling anything that manifested 
into such facts 'concessions' to infirmities in human nature. Indeed we saw in the 
previous chapter that the construction of a decision making mechanism has to 
involve releasing whatever factual information to the representatives that is 
necessary to go about making an informed decision. Even a „thin‟ veil of 
ignorance would be too thin without facts about human nature. According to this 
narrative Rawls' increasing embrace of 'constructivism,' framed as it is as a 
realistic Utopia, made him reticent to call vices what they were despite his earlier 
recognition that this was the implication of his theory. As Cohen put it: 
 
„The 1958 sentence was dropped because it makes no sense within 
Rawlsian constructivism, according to which justice simply is the set of 
principles that an ideal choosing procedure says we should live by, all 
things considered, including the consideration of what people are like. 
It is difficult, within such a constructivist perspective, to acknowledge 
that a fact of human nature like selfishness shows people to be 
unjust.‟148 
 
Necessity, incentives and the difference principle 
 
Cohen has drawn out a point which is true for reasons independent of 
speculation about Rawls' intentions behind the change of formulation. The 
change reveals an important ambiguity as to how we are to understand the 
difference principle. It is one thing to say that inequalities are justified if they are 
necessary to make the worst off better off, but the implications of such a principle 
can only be understood if we clarify what we mean by necessity in this instance.  
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We have seen that unequalising incentives are portrayed as necessary to 
achieve a given aim, which in this instance is to realise the difference principle. 
When we talk of what is necessary in the context of achieving a given aim we 
refer exclusively to those things which strictly need to be in place for us to 
achieve our goal. If, for example, I were to say that one needs an aeroplane to 
travel from England to America I would be abusing language given that it is 
possible to alight a ship. The fact that flying rather than sailing such distances is 
vastly more time efficient is irrelevant to the question of whether it is necessary to 
fly. If, however, I were to say that it is necessary to use an aeroplane if one wants 
to travel between England and America during a period in which the shipping 
company had cancelled their passages I would not be making the same mistake. 
What these simple examples show us is that when making statements about 
what is necessary to achieve a given goal we respond to the circumstances and 
available options. We have already seen that Rawls' commitment to, and 
conception of, ideal theory means that he is not willing to simply respond to 
presently feasible and available options. Instead he claims that he only wishes to 
accept those social facts that are demanded by human nature. In this particular 
instance this appears to manifest itself in the assumption that people are not 
motivated by 'the desire to serve one another.'  
 
Cohen‟s rescue of the equality within difference principle, and his subsequent 
assault on the Rawlsian approach to constructing justice, starts by introducing 
another way of considering the way that necessity is conceived within Justice as 
Fairness. Cohen invites us to make the following distinction: 
 
„...between inequalities that are necessary, apart from human choice, 
to make the worst off better off, and inequalities that are necessary to 
that end only given what some people‟s intentions are.‟149 
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Cohen calls the first approach an „agent-independent‟ conception of necessity 
and the latter an „agent-relative.‟ The first agent independent-independent 
conception of necessity would recommend what he calls a „strict‟ interpretation of 
the difference principle where as the second agent-relative conception of 
necessity would recommend a more permissive „lax‟ interpretation of the 
difference. The difference between the strict and the lax interpretations of the 
difference principle amounts to the equality within Justice as Fairness that 
Cohen‟s first rescue is intended to recover.150  
 
The alleged contradiction 
 
Cohen‟s rescue of the equality within the difference principle rests upon 
demonstrating that its lax interpretation is in contradiction with the egalitarian 
judgements that underpin it and that only a strict interpretation of the difference 
principle will avoid such a fate. I shall now outline the argument for the alleged 
contradiction between the lax-interpretation of the difference principle and its 
egalitarian underpinnings. 
 
The first move made Cohen is to draw our attention to an argument used by 
Rawls to justify why—when deciding what the principles of justice ought to be—
we start from a prima facie assumption of equality and then, from this initial 
benchmark, ask whether any inequalities are ever justified and eventually move 
towards the difference principle.151 In the „democratic equality‟ argument for the 
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difference principle,152 Rawls goes through three alternative understandings of 
how our political and economic system ought to be organised given the moral 
conception that we have of ourselves as free and equal. The three systems are 
1) natural liberty, 2) liberal equality and finally 3) democratic equality. Each 
system is intended to dialectically follow as a logical implication of the moral 
foundations of the previous system, and the contradictions between these 
foundations and the social and economic order.153 
 
The system of natural liberty is intended to denote a „free market economy‟ with 
an „open social system‟ where there are no formal barriers against talented 
people assuming high office.154 There is, Rawls suggests, at least some 
important senses in which this system recognises the equality and liberty of 
persons. Offices are formally open to all persons affording some limited sense of 
equality of opportunity and the free market ensures many of our basic liberties 
are secured. This is an important improvement on the feudal order that preceded 
the birth and enaction of these ideas. However, Rawls points out the inequalities 
that would inevitably develop under such a system: 
 
„There is no effort to preserve an equality, or similarity, of social 
conditions, except insofar as this is necessary to preserve the 
requisite background institutions, the initial distribution of assets for 
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any period of time is strongly influenced by natural and social 
contingencies.‟155 
 
As such inequalities develop we come to see that it fails to be consistent with one 
of the considered moral judgements we have about social and economic 
systems. Rawls tells us that: 
 
„Intuitively, the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is 
that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these 
factors [the natural and social contingencies] so arbitrary from a moral 
point of view.‟156 
 
The next system in Rawls‟ dialectic is that of liberal equality. The system of liberal 
equality seeks to correct the problem immanent within natural liberty by ensuring 
that individuals are not prevented from securing advantageous offices on the 
grounds of social contingencies and thus that the formal opening of offices for all 
the talents is supplemented by educational and economic institutions that make 
sure that any differences in opportunities are purely a result of native talent. The 
arbitrariness of social contingency is now properly accounted for but that of 
natural contingency is not. The move to democratic equality is propelled by this 
inconsistency. If the natural lottery of our social class is arbitrary from the moral 
point of view then why is the case that the natural lottery of genetic endowment is 
not also? After all, an individual is no more responsible for their genetics gifts or 
burdens as they are their social class. As Rawls says, „from a moral standpoint 
the two seem equally arbitrary.‟157 
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The argument just traced is how Rawls establishes the initial assumption in 
favour of equality. It is from this egalitarian base that Rawls proceeds to argue 
that it would be irrational from this point of view of equality not to allow those 
inequalities that make the worst off representative better off.158 However, the 
inegalitarian advantages that subsequently move us away from this initial 
position of equality are very clearly more readily available to those with a greater 
natural endowment. We have already seen that Rawls has in mind cases 
whereby extra incentives are afforded for talented people to occupy and perform 
well in important offices. Cohen invites us to accept that this is in obvious 
contradiction with the motivations that made us prefer a position of equality in the 
first instance.159  
 
If the talented chose to work as hard and as optimally as they possibly could do 
then the need for unequalising incentives would never develop. In this scenario 
the least advantaged would be made as well off as they can be without the need 
for incentives that take us further away from inequality. By asking for extra 
compensation to perform socially optimal tasks well the talented are using their 
talent to secure advantages that would not otherwise be available to them.160 
They seek reward for that which they themselves think is arbitrary from the moral 
point of view. The behaviour that makes the lax interpretation necessary is in 
contradiction with the moral motivations that underpin the difference principle and 
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thus an agent-insensitive „strict‟ interpretation ought to be preferred from the point 
of view of justice as fairness.  
 
Why Rawls adopts the lax rather than the strict 
 
The previous section has demonstrated why Cohen believed that only a strict 
interpretation of the difference principle, insensitive to agent preference as it is, 
can properly be said to be consistent with the radically egalitarian moral 
underpinnings of Rawls‟ principles of Justice.  I want to comment briefly on why it 
is not simple for a Rawlsian to simply accept Cohen‟s argument and move to a 
strict interpretation of the difference principle.  
 
We remember that Rawls wishes for his ideal concept of justice to enable 
individuals to be reconciled with just institutions. If one adopts a strict agent-
insensitive interpretation of the difference principle, as Cohen recommends, then 
one inevitably sets themselves up to be disappointed with institutions as they find 
them. It will not be the case, in any actual possible world, that talented people 
freely wish to devote their time and energies to whatever social and economic 
tasks happens to be optimal from the point of view of the difference principle. 
Talented people will want, in the absence of the correct incentive structure, to do 
other things. This much Cohen does not deny. This is precisely why Rawls does 
endow his decision makers with knowledge of social and psychological facts 
even when behind the veil of ignorance. Without doing so they can never be 
reconciled with institutions that represent what they understand to be the best of 
themselves. From the point of view of reconciliatory principles, the strict 
interpretation of the difference principle is a non-starter. The most important 
implication of this, from the point of view of this essay, is that if Cohen can 
demonstrate as he believes he can, that the lax interpretation of the difference 
principle will also fail to produce reconciliatory principles then he will have been 
successful in his internal critique of justice as fairness. Whatever Rawls does 
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with regards to agents‟ behaviour in his constructivism he will not produce the 
reconciliatory principles that he aspires to. 
 
Implications of the concessionary criticism 
 
Cohen does indeed go on to argue that the contradiction between the idea that 
nobody should benefit on the basis of morally arbitrary factors and the lax 
interpretation of the difference principle renders Rawls‟ principles lacking in 
reconciliatory force. In a moment we shall see why by returning to the concepts 
developed in the previous chapter of reconciliation through moral significance 
and reconciliation through fraternity. However, before doing so I wish to briefly 
introduce another critique that Cohen develops of the lax interpretation of the 
difference principle.  Justice as Fairness as Rawls presents it depends upon a 
porous and indefensible notion of the basic structure.  
 
'Porous' notion of basic structure 
 
Cohen develops a secondary argument that Rawls' lax-interpretation of the 
difference principle depends upon a philosophically untenable restriction of the 
purview of justice.  
 
Rawls' principles of justice are only intended to apply to the 'basic structure' of 
society. The basic structure is defined by Rawls as 'the way in which major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of 
advantages and social co-operation.'161 Once the basic structure is in place the 
effects of individual behaviour on distributive shares have no effect on whether 
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we call the social system just.162 People are, in effect, allowed to behave as they 
like,163 from the point of view of justice, so long as they adhere to the rules 
established. Importantly they can be as self-interested in their labour choices as 
they see fit. We have already seen the justification for such a restriction. As 
Rawls' principles are said to have been a product of a just process and to have 
shown equal concern for all in their formulation, the individual can be satisfied 
that in pursuing their own self-interest they still express their respect for the 
equality of other persons. Part of the beauty of a reconciled and well-ordered 
society is the individual can get on with living their lives without having to make 
constant calculations of the impact of their behaviour on social justice164 as they 
know that principles and institutions have already been shaped so as to weight 
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the limits and constraints on their due prerogative of self-interest. They will be 
remunerated, coerced by law and taxed accordingly.165 
 
Cohen argues that, despite these seemingly attractive qualities, Rawls' attempt to 
restrict the scope of justice to the basic structure is either too porous to offer any 
meaningful restriction or arbitrarily implemented if it is understood restrictively.166
  
This is an argument that Cohen is able to make by standing on the shoulders of 
feminist critiques of Rawls that had previously questioned the internal coherence 
of Rawls' explanation of the basic structure.167 In order to understand Cohen's 
strand of argument let us return to Rawls' definition of the basic structure: 
 
'The way in which major social institutions distribute fundamental 
rights and duties and determine the division of advantages and social 
co-operation.' 
 
We can divide this definition into two parts. Firstly there is the illustrative 
description of the sort of bodies that he is concerned with, to wit 'major social 
institutions,' and the relevant characteristics of that sort of institution, that they 
'determine the division of advantages and social co-operation.' We assume that 
we are concerned with 'major social institutions' because they have this effect 
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and this is indeed what Rawls appears to indicate. Rawls tells us that 'the basic 
structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects (on life chances) are 
so profound and present from the start.'168 
 
Cohen's discussion of what makes unequalising incentives necessary has, 
however, made it clear that if we are concerned with that which has an impact on 
the 'distribution of advantages in social co-operation' we should be as interested 
in individual behaviour and choices as Rawls is in major institutions. Or, to talk 
about the currents and trends which are constituted by and perpetuates such 
behaviour, the culture and ethos of a society. Individual's labour choices clearly 
have significant impact on others' life opportunities and are thus captured by the 
non-illustrative definition of the basic structure, yet they are also very clearly not 
major social institutions, the sort of thing that Rawls has in mind when he 
identifies the limited scope of justice. If Rawls insists, as he does, that the scope 
of justice is limited to major social institutions he can only do so by abandoning 
his claim that citizens in his vision of a well-ordered society can be satisfied that 
the principles of social co-operation are organised so as to be mutually 
advantageous.169  
 
Reconciliation through Moral Significance 
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The first implication of the contradictions that Cohen believes himself to have 
identified concerns what we have called „reconciliation through moral 
significance.‟ In the last chapter we stated that an individual achieves „full 
autonomy‟ and such reconciliation under Justice as Fairness: 
 
'By arranging inequalities for reciprocal advantage and by abstaining 
from exploitation of the contingencies of nature and social 
circumstance within a framework of equal liberties, persons express 
their respect for one another in the very constitution of their society.'170  
 
However, we have seen that the lax interpretation is only necessary if we allow 
individuals to exploit the contingent natural lottery of talent. As Cohen says 
„incentive seekers...exploit their contingent talent and social advantages‟ if they 
didn‟t there would not be any need for unequalising incentives.171 The individual 
who reconciles herself to such a society on the basis that social co-operation is 
organised so that advantages and disadvantages are distributed in ways that she 
considers morally relevant, is thus acting under a mere illusion. Rawls' principles 
cannot reconcile through moral significance, only the deceptive appearance 
thereof. 
 
Fails to promote 'Fraternity' 
 
Cohen also alleges that the contradictions he has highlighted suggest that Rawls' 
principles will not be able play the 'fraternal' role that Rawls assigns them.172 
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We have seen that Rawls claims that one of the 'further merits' of the difference 
principle is that it 'provides an interpretation of the principle of fraternity.'173 The 
interpretation that the difference is supposed to express is 'the idea of not 
wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to benefit of others who are 
less well off.'174 To say that this is a 'further merit' may suggest that this is a bonus 
feature of the theory that is incidental to its core aims. Indeed of the three great 
values of the French revolution, fraternity no longer carries the same cache as 
equality or liberty. Assigning fraternity secondary importance to Rawls' theory 
would be, however, a mistake. The „interpretation offered‟ describes the attitudes 
of the individual towards the distributive share which they gain via the difference 
principle.  The fostering of this 'fraternal' attitude towards the difference principle 
is a core component of that reconciliatory task. Fraternity, in the sense described, 
is a necessary feature of Rawls' principles and not a secondary concern.  
 
Cohen interprets Rawls' claim that citizens can recognise the fraternal principle of 
'not wanting to have greater advantages unless it is to the benefit of others who 
are less well off' as depending upon the worst-off being in a position where they 
are able to accept their position with dignity as 'they know that no improvements 
of it is possible, that they would lose under and less unequal distribution.'175 
Cohen believes himself to have demonstrated that they would be under an 
illusion. 
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According to this line of argument, by restricting the scope of justice to major 
social institutions, and by hiding the role of human choice in making unequalising 
incentives unnecessary, Rawls' principles only mask the fact that worst off's 
condition is partly a result of the unjust choices of the better off. The better-off, by 
claiming that unequalising incentives are necessary to make the worst off better-
off, do not express the desire only to claim those advantages which will make the 
worst off better off: worse still they demand a distributive share which is in 
contradiction with their own, and the supposedly well-ordered-societies' moral 
motivations.  
 
The implication of Cohen‟s argument is that, if the individual is reconciled to their 
political arrangements out of the sense of fraternity that Rawls highlights, they 
are either deceiving themselves or are being deceived by others. They are not 
acting out of the reasons of their choosing but ones heteronemous to their own 
moral point of view. Fraternity, in a society governed by the principles that Rawls 
describes, is a barrier and not a vehicle for the living of autonomous lives. It 
should be noted that if Cohen‟s argument that the sense of fraternity and 
reconciliation through moral significance in Rawls‟ society is based upon an 
illusion in Rawls‟ well-ordered society then we have every reason to imagine that 
Rawls would be as perturbed by the finding as Cohen thinks that he should be. 
Rawls is insistent in Theory that in order for the self-respect felt by his citizens to 
be of worth it must not be the product of „false and unfounded beliefs‟176 and rules 
out any sort of consensus about principles which is predicated upon a „noble 
lie.‟177 Cohen is right to imagine that if his argument about the nature of the 
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toleration of unequalising incentives is true he has caused direct and destructive 
damage to Rawls‟ own concept of his theory as an ideal response to the problem 
of Justice as Fairness. 
 
Conclusion  
 
We have seen that the implication of Cohen's concessionary criticism is that the 
method of realistic Utopia—that is ideal theory constrained by the limits of human 
nature—is not consummate with its reconciliatory aims. Cohen believes this to be 
the case because by making justice relative to infirmities in human nature Rawls 
is forced to offer a theory that is in contradiction with its own motivations and 
allow for a sphere of human selfishness which is arbitrary from the moral point of 
view. The result of these two contradictions is that any sense of reconciliation 
through fraternity or moral significance that is fostered by Rawls' principle of 
justice is illusionary and deceptive and thus takes individuals away from the 
condition of acting out of principles which express their own moral reasons. That 
is away from Rawls‟ own ideal of autonomy between free and equal persons. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter I have accepted Cohen's interpretive claims so 
that I could present his assault on realistically Utopian constructivism with its 
fullest force. The next chapter will look at the most important challenge made to 
Cohen‟s concessionary criticism of Justice as Fairness: the „liberty objection.‟ It is 
the first step in our defence of the ideality of Rawls‟ realistic Utopia from a critique 
that challenges that method‟s capacity to produce the ideal principles that are 
necessary for us to live autonomous lives. 
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Chapter 4: The liberty objection 
 
In the previous section we came across one prominent criticism of Cohen‟s 
concessionary criticism, the basic structure objection, but concluded that Cohen 
had shown that—from  the point of view of the ideal of Justice as Fairness—it 
was arbitrary to restrict the scope of justice to major social institutions. In short, 
the basic structure objection is a poor candidate to rescue the ideality of justice of 
fairness and instead highlights a potential weakness in Rawls‟ theory. 
 
Other than the basic structure objection the most common line of response to 
Cohen‟s argument is what is conventionally called the „liberty objection.‟178 There 
are many different varieties of the liberty objection179 but they are usefully 
grouped together on the basis of their common belief that: Cohen misconstrues 
the behaviour of the talented as a moral infirmity when it is in fact a legitimate 
exercising of their freedom to pursue their own plan for life. This is usually 
intended by its proponents as an interpretive or exegetical claim about how we 
should understand self-interested behaviour in the labour market, and elsewhere 
in a well-ordered society, from the 'point of view' of Justice as Fairness. However, 
the stakes are higher than this. If the liberty objection is true—and Rawls' 
treatment of self-interested choices is consistent with the moral convictions that 
justice is supposed to express—then Cohen is wrong to characterise Justice as 
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Fairness as a concessionary or non-ideal theory. The interpretive claim then 
leads to the substantial claim that the treatment of self-interest interested 
behaviour in the labour market in Justice as Fairness is ideal. 
 
The liberty objection is, I believe, correct in both its exegetical and substantive 
claims. It is how we can effectively demonstrate Rawls‟ fidelity to ideal theory. 
However its proponents have overstated the degree of freedom of occupational 
choice that is secured by the first principle of justice, and, partly as a result, the 
objection has as-of-yet not been levied in such a way that refutes Cohen‟s 
concessionary criticism. The interpretive truth that Rawls prioritises the „basic 
liberties‟ necessary to pursue one‟s life plans over the difference principle in his 
theory of justice is not sufficient in itself to overcome Cohen‟s suggestion that the 
well-ordered-society Rawls describes is a prudential compromise between 
Justice and other values.  
 
This chapter is written to support that critical claim by showing that, 1) from the 
point of view of Justice as Fairness, Rawls' support for freedom of occupational 
choice has to be far more limited than is usually supposed by proponents of the 
liberty objection and that, 2) the freedom of occupational choice that is 
guaranteed by the first principle is not sufficient to justify tolerance of 
unequalising incentives. The priority of basic liberties, and the identification of a 
measure of freedom of occupational choice as a basic liberty, does not do this in 
and of itself. Therefore the liberty objection, as it has thus far been presented in 
the literature, is not sufficient to overcome the concessionary criticism. 
 
The liberty objection 
 
To frame the liberty objection we shall turn to a passage from the „democratic 
equality argument,‟ where Rawls argues that the difference principle allows 
individuals to express their respect for one another. We do so in light of Cohen's 
claim that Rawls' vision of a well-ordered-society does not express such 
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respect—and thus does not carry the reconciliatory force that the project of 
Justice as Fairness demands—because it violates its self-professed moral 
motivation to eliminate the effects of arbitrary advantages. I would like to highlight 
a qualification made in the following passage that was noticed by M.G. Titelbaum 
in his essay, which stands as an exemplary articulation of the liberty objection, 
'What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like?': 
 
'By arranging inequalities for reciprocal advantage and by abstaining 
from exploitation of the contingencies of nature and social 
circumstance within a framework of equal liberties, persons express 
their respect for one another in the very constitution of their society.'180 
 
Titelbaum draws our attention to the fact that even in the passages where Rawls 
stresses the significance of the moral irrelevance of contingencies of nature, the 
countering of their effects is only said to express respect for one another 'within a 
framework of equal liberties.' This is important because it suggests that, for 
Rawls, the moral demand that we neutralise the arbitrary effects of native 
endowments does not take force until after our demand for basic liberties has 
been taken into account. Titelbaum uses this observation to argue that our moral 
motivation to eliminate the effects of native endowments ought to be fettered by 
our desire allow others to exercise their basic liberties. That is to say that an 
ethos that takes into account our desire for liberties to be prioritised over 
distributive shares better expresses the convictions we hold about justice, from 
the point of view of Justice as Fairness. Titelbaum has used the cited passage to 
ask a question central to the force of the liberty objection: if ethos is part of the 
basic structure, should it not be characterised by the same priority rules as the 
rest of it? 
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It is important to note that Titelbaum‟s argument does not challenge Cohen‟s 
attempt to include ethos as a constituent element of the basic structure. This is 
because the liberty objection does not depend upon the various arguments put 
forward for why it is inappropriate to include ethos as a component of the basic 
structure. It instead makes two moves. It reminds us of the lexical priority of the 
equal basic liberty principle with regards to the difference principle and then 
seeks to implicitly suggest that a degree of freedom of occupational choice is one 
such basic liberty. By demonstrating that Rawls believes his citizens have this 
lexical priority in mind even when they seek to eliminate the effects of arbitrary 
advantage, Titelbaum is able to conclude that Cohen‟s strict egalitarian ethos 
would not capture Rawls‟ citizens‟ considered moral judgements about what 
Justice demands: only a „liberal ethos‟ which celebrates freedom of occupational 
choice would be able to do that.  
 
We can present the argument formally as follows: 
 
1) Ethos is part of the basic structure. 
2) Rawls affords the equal basic liberties principle priority over 
the difference principle in governing the basic structure. 
3) Freedom of occupational choice is a basic liberty.  
Ergo 
4) The ethos of a just society would respect and celebrate the 
exercising of freedom of occupational choice. 
 
Titelbaum concludes that a just society would be governed by a liberal ethos that 
respects freedom of occupational choice as having priority over the difference 
principle: 'All members of the just society, including the worst-off, understand and 
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accept the values that underlie the basic liberties‟ lexical priority.'181 The 
conclusion ensures that, from the point of view of Justice as Fairness, the 
inequalities generated by unequalising incentives can be seen as being 
necessary in order to coherently institute the liberty demanded by the ideal of 
justice rather than a compromise between justice and regrettable self-interest or 
human selfishness. The question of „moral infirmities‟ presented by Cohen is, for 
the raisers of the liberty objection, a rhetorical flourish to an argument which 
depends upon an unsupportable interpretation of the moral convictions that 
Justice as Fairness is supposed to express. 
 
The examples offered by Norman Daniels, in his essay Democratic Equality: 
Rawls’ Complex Egalitarianism, best capture the intuitive thought behind this 
technical point. Daniels offers a series of examples of where we might think 
unequalising incentives necessary to attract talented people to socially useful 
tasks given personal circumstances that we are intuitively more sympathetic 
towards than the cases that Cohen presents. Take his example of Ben, a talented 
individual who, if he were to put his talents to the most efficient use, could greatly 
benefit the worst off: 
 
„Ben supports his family modestly through an ad agency that he runs from his 
home. Being self-employed at home allows him... to give personal care for his 
elderly mothers. He would be willing to work outside of his home... (but) only for 
an incentive that is much larger than is needed simply to cover the costs of care 
for his mother.‟182  
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Ben‟s personal circumstances highlight one of the reasons why we might think 
the freedom to dispose of our labour power as we see fit is a basic liberty. The 
way that we spend our productive time, and the amount of time and effort we put 
into it, is a vitally important decision in carrying out whatever our life plans are. If 
we want to be good sons, or any other role that is not a cog in the machine of a 
just society, then it is a freedom to which we afford high priority. I shall finish with 
one final example from Daniels which rests upon a similar insight and shall prove 
important later in the essay. Sophie‟s preferred role is not that of a good daughter 
but that of an outstanding conceptual artist. However, the talent that she has for 
conceptual art is not enjoyed by many and could, from the point of view of 
making the worst off better off, be better disposed producing commercial art. 
Perhaps she could be a children‟s illustrator or a Hollywood costume designer 
and make a great number of people happier. Sophie‟s conceptual art, is, 
however, extremely important to her. Unless she receives a large amount of 
compensation allowing her to invest in expensive materials to work upon in her 
spare time, she would always prefer to dispose of her labour power in a way that 
is sub-optimal from the point of view of the difference principle. Titelbaum and 
Daniels tell us that a well-ordered Rawlsian society would not look upon paying 
either Sophie or Ben as a compromise between justice and the unfortunate 
infirmities of Ben and Sophie‟s character, but as a respect of the basic liberty of 
freedom of occupational choice that every citizen knows they would demand from 
a position of fairness.  
 
The exegetical claim of the liberty objection 
 
An essential move in the liberty objection is the third premise in the formal 
representation above, which offers freedom of occupational choice as the sort of 
„basic‟ liberty that Rawls has in mind as being guaranteed by his first principle of 
justice. If freedom of occupational choice is not such a basic liberty, then the fact 
that our moral convictions demand that we prioritise basic liberties would not lead 
us to automatically accepting the outcome of free choices in the labour market as 
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being affirmed by our sense of justice. The labour market choices that make 
unequalising incentives necessary would be under the purview of justice and 
Cohen‟s strict application of the difference principle the correct interpretation.  
 
This is a real danger for raisers of the liberty objection because in the few 
moments of Theory where Rawls offers an illustration of what he means by a 
basic liberty he does not explicitly include freedom of occupational choice. In his 
most extensive list183 he includes; the right to vote and to hold public office; 
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; 
freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and 
dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and 
freedom from arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law. If 
freedom of occupational choice is to be shown to be a basic liberty, raisers of the 
liberty objection will have to show either that Rawls made a mistake in leaving it 
off of his list or that it is covered, in some ways, by the liberties that he has listed. 
They are going to have to get creative to demonstrate the soundness of their 
interpretation.  
 
To present the case that freedom of occupational choice is a basic liberty we 
should begin by remembering precisely what Rawls‟ first principle says would be 
demanded from a position of fairness. Rawls‟ first principle of justice states, „each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.‟ There are two 
features of the principle that need to be explained. Firstly it seeks to maximise 
basic liberties, the more of them the better, and secondly this maximisation 
ceases once it is no longer compatible with a „similar scheme for others.‟ We 
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shall call this the egalitarian proviso.184 I shall begin by briefly outlining the 
definition of rights and liberties that Rawls is using in his first principle before 
turning to a passage in Political Liberalism to explain why basic liberties would be 
prioritised and why freedom of occupational choice might be considered a basic 
liberty. 
 
The first thing to note is that Rawls adopts MacCallum‟s triadic conception of 
freedom185 whereby every claim about liberty is constituted by a relationship 
between three items: agents (x), their aims or intentions (z) and potential 
restrictions or limitations (y) that are in place which prevent these agents from 
carrying out their intentions. If a claim is properly about liberty then it can be 
broken down into the form x is (un)free from y to do z. Rawls states that in 
adopting this conception he hopes to „bypass the dispute‟ over the meaning of 
liberty,186 but he does make a noteworthy intervention in stating that he does not 
treat the absence of means or the capability of exercising a freedom as a loss of 
liberty but instead as a diminishing of worth of the liberty.187 For example, if there 
are no restrictions in place that prevent me from travelling on the train from 
Oxford to London, but I do not have the means of buying a ticket due to my 
financial condition, Rawls thinks it appropriate to say that I lack the means of 
                                                          
184
 To my knowledge this is a new term. The creation of new jargon shall be justified later in this chapter where I shall make it 
clear why it is useful to use a term than reminds us of John Locke’s proviso over the right to claim property. 
185
 MacCallum, GC. 1967.  'Negative and Positive Freedom,' The Philosophical Review, 76(3). 
186
 Rawls, J. 1999. Theory,  p176. By which he means to say he wishes to take no stance in Isaiah Berlin’s claim that there are 
two conceptions of liberty, positive and negative, which either focus on what we are free to do (z) or the absence of interferences (y) 
respectively. 
187
 Rawls, J. 1999. Theory, p179. 
119 
 
exercising my liberty to do so. It is his second principle of justice that distributes 
our means of exercising liberties whereas the first concentrates solely on the 
rules that govern the liberties themselves. 
 
The notion of rules that govern liberties, that it to say the institution of rights, 
brings us to our second point of note. Rawls has a Hohfeldian understanding of 
the way in which liberties can be formally instituted as rights; he understands the 
rules that govern liberties to generate duties and to delineate where there is an 
absence of such duties.188 This conforms to Wesley Hohfeld‟s classic account of 
the structure of rights,189 whereby rights either describe „privileges,‟ x‟s freedom 
from duties to do some y, or „claims,‟ the right of x to ask y to respect their duty to 
do z. When Rawls seeks to explain what he has in mind by basic liberties he 
describes one basic liberty, the right to freedom of conscience, in terms which 
can clearly be identified as a set of privileges and claims: first there is the 
privilege, „individual have this basic liberty when they are free to pursue their 
moral, philosophical or religious interests without legal restrictions requiring them 
to engage or not engage in any particular form of religious practice,‟ and then 
secondly there is the claim, „other men have a legal duty not to interfere.‟190  
 
Hohfeldian claims and privileges structure the arrangement of duties that 
constitute our rights. Rights are what are necessary to institutionally guarantee 
liberties.  It follows that the liberties secured behind the veil of ignorance are, at 
root, a demand for a particular set of claims and privileges from and over one 
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another. The question of why Rawls supports the equal basic liberty principle is 
then really the question of why he thinks that a particular set of claims and 
privileges would be chosen from behind the veil of ignorance. Why does he 
support the distribution that he does? 
 
 
To answer the question of why Rawls supports the distribution of privileges and 
claims that he does, I invite you to accept—as we have shown it is a belief held 
by Rawls—that one of the primary goals of a political arrangement is to allow 
individuals to recognise that their desire to pursue their own conception of the 
good is respected by others. It follows that the rights that would be demanded 
would, first and foremost, be those which allow us to form and voice our own 
opinions about a good life. This naturally includes political concerns about the 
institutions that we bring into to being to mediate and pursue our shared common 
endeavours. Without this, whatever concern is shown for our welfare or good 
does not have the quality of respecting our capacity to form and revise our own 
conception of the good. That is why Rawls says that 'liberty of conscience' and 
'freedom of association' are necessary features of the scheme of basic liberties 
that we would secure in a position of fairness. In Rawls‟ own words they are 
needed to 'secure the full and effective application of citizens' powers of 
deliberative reason to their forming, revising and rationally pursuing a conception 
of the good.'191 
 
Rawls goes on to argue in the same passage that the 'liberty and the integrity of 
the person' is necessary if our freedom of conscience and association are to be 
guaranteed. The thought here is that the right to associate and develop your own 
mind is unrealisable if other individual or groups have too stronger claims over 
you. It is necessary to be afforded the claim of a degree of private space and the 
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privilege of time devoted to your own ends, if we are to secure, develop and 
revise our own conception of the good. It is the passage in Political Liberalism 
where Rawls discusses the liberty and integrity of the person that has been used 
as the basis for arguing that he believed freedom of occupational choice to be a 
basic liberty.192 The supporting evidence is offered in a parenthesis which seeks 
to explain what Rawls has in mind by liberty and integrity of the person. Given its 
importance to the exegetical soundness of the liberty objection I shall cite it in 
full. Rawls states that that liberty and integrity of the person is, 'violated, for 
example, by slavery and serfdom, and by the denial of freedom of movement and 
occupation.'193 We might also add in support of the case of the liberty objection 
that freedom of occupational choice is mentioned in the same context—that is in 
conjunction with freedom of movement—in an essay clarifying the content of 
primary goods which was published between Theory and Political Liberalism.194 
As Rawls uncritically references this essay in Political Liberalism as offering his 
settled opinion on the basic liberties we shall treat the two accounts as perfectly 
consistent.195  
 
It should be noted that the passage in Political Liberalism has what appears to be 
a far more extensive understanding of what the integrity of the person demands 
than the relevant passage in Theory, where the integrity of the person is offered 
as being constituted by the absence of „psychological assault, physical assault 
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and dismemberment.‟196 If proponents of the liberty objection wish for their 
interpretation of Justice as Fairness to include the articulation offered in Theory 
they must ask us to accept that this revision represents a clarification rather than 
a modification of Rawls‟ view. They ask us to believe that freedom of 
occupational choice was always, for Rawls, the sort of freedom necessary to 
secure the integrity of the person that itself is necessary to develop and revise 
our own conception of the good. 
 
To set out the exegetical support of the liberty objection formally we can say that 
Rawls appears to argue in Political Liberalism—which is taken as indicative of 
the wider view of Justice as Fairness—that freedom of occupational choice is a 
necessary feature of a just scheme of basic liberties through the following steps: 
 
1) Basic liberties are those liberties that are necessary for us to 
pursue our own conception of the good. Justice affords priority to 
maximising them. 
2) Freedom of conscience and association are necessary for the 
individual to be able to pursue their own conception of the good. 
3) Bodily integrity is necessary to guarantee freedom of 
association and conscience. 
4) Freedom of occupational choice is a necessary feature of 
bodily integrity. 
Ergo 
5) Freedom of occupational choice is one of the basic liberties 
that justice affords lexical priority to. 
 
The argument presented is valid and I do not wish to challenge that Rawls shows 
a commitment to each of the premises and the conclusion: not least because I 
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have provided here the textual support for each of them. There is undoubtedly an 
exegetical case to be made for the liberty objection despite the fact that that 
freedom of occupational choice is not listed as a basic liberty in Theory.   
 
I would like to conclude the section by adding another piece of textual mining that 
proponents of the liberty objection have found useful. The artefact under 
consideration here is not, however, from the pen of Rawls but Cohen. In the 
Tanner Lectures explanation of his arguments against unequalising incentives 
Cohen says that „only an extreme moral rigorist could deny that every person has 
a right to pursue self-interest to some reasonable extent.’197 This comment, with 
its language of moral rights, has been used to suggest that Cohen himself 
believes that justice demands we take into account some sort of basic liberty to 
be self-interested before making demands on the contribution we make to a 
distributive scheme.198  Cohen does not offer himself as what he called an 
„extreme moral rigorist.‟ Indeed in later works he is at pains to deny it despite 
having been often read in that way,199 but instead argues that it is irrelevant to his 
critique of unequalising incentives since 1) he is interested, in part, in the way 
that incentives are justified in actual politics where incentives are used to support 
what Cohen regards to be palpably unreasonable demands of self-interest, and 
that 2) Rawls‟ incentives argument is „supposed to be quite general. It should 
therefore apply no matter how badly off the badly off are, both absolutely and 
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relatively to the well off. Accordingly, it is methodologically proper to focus on 
particularly dramatic cases of its application.‟200 
 
The first point is, on its own, irrelevant from the point of view of ideal theory, 
which is the focus of this thesis. Cohen‟s arguments against unequalising 
incentives are supposed to describe not only what is wrong with the way that 
Rawls‟ principles are used, but why it fails to capture the proper demands of the 
ideal of justice. Cohen‟s plausible claims about the unreasonableness of 
arguments made in actual political communities do not help him make his wider, 
and philosophically more important, point about the depiction of an ideal 
community. 
 
The second point is, however, much stronger. Rawls does not say that 
unequalising incentives are to be supported if they are necessary to make the 
worst off better off in the context of a prerogative of „reasonable self-interest.‟ As 
we have already outlined he instead says they are necessary to attract people to 
a) socially useful tasks and b) to work to the best of their ability. Cohen‟s point is 
that it could be the case that unequalising incentives are necessary to realise the 
difference principle in response to either a) or b), because  the members of a 
political community demand to have a personal prerogative that goes beyond the 
reasonable. If this is the case then Rawls‟ grounds for delineating the degree of 
self-interested that a just society ought to permit would fail to track his own ideal-
societies understanding of the demands of justice.  
 
Two reasons to be suspicious of the exegetical case 
 
Having shown the textual evidence for the interpretation of reasonably self-
interested behaviour in the labour market offered by raisers of the liberty 
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objection we are still left with two important questions that should make us 
suspicious of its soundness.  
 
1) Precisely which privileges and claims are guaranteed under the banner of 
„freedom of occupational choice?‟ If Rawls means something like the claim to not 
be interfered with in the disposal of our labour power, then it is clear why 
unequalising incentives would be necessary, from the point of view of justice, to 
attract to talented to do socially useful tasks. It is a common feature of jobs which 
individuals find personally rewarding that they involve small scale human 
interaction. We have the opportunity to see the worth of our labour to other 
persons in the flesh, and we can develop our skills and talents to suit their 
specific needs and desires. Conversely there are many socially useful tasks that 
lack these personally rewarding factors, for example much bureaucratic work 
relies upon a sense of scale which, whilst helping a greater number of people, 
removes the worker from a direct observation of that good. The result is that 
socially useful tasks often require unequalising incentives to attract talented 
people. Daniels‟ earlier example of Sophie the conceptual artist, who can do 
more good as a commercial artist, is an illustration of this tendency. The 
implication is that, given the freedom to dispose our labour power as we see fit, 
individuals will often enough prefer to do socially suboptimal tasks over socially 
useful tasks to make unequalising incentives necessary. 
 
Rawls might, however, have something far more restrictive in mind than the 
freedom to dispose our labour power as we see fit. Freedom of occupational 
choice might denote something like the following: the right of the individual to end 
a contract with an employer and chose a new place of employment but with the 
proviso that the individual has to dispose of their labour power in a way that is 
close to being socially optimal. I do not mean here that the individual would have 
to calculate in their mind how it is that they themselves can most benefit the least 
well off. What I have in mind, however, is an institutional design whereby there 
are socially productive bodies which individuals have some obligations to support 
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with some their labour power. This qualification ensures that the scope of justice 
remains at the level of the basic structure as Rawls clearly intended, however 
problematic that may be. 
  
If Rawls has such a restricted understanding of freedom of occupational choice in 
mind then it is difficult to see why unequalising incentives would be necessary for 
a social system to tend towards making the worst off better off. If, in a well-
ordered society individuals have to put their labour towards socially useful tasks 
then the buyers of socially useful labour are in a considerably more powerful 
position than one whereby individuals are free to dispose of their labour power as 
they see fit. To wit, they are not in competition with non-socially useful labour, 
and a life time of socially sub-optimal labour, as that choice is barred from 
citizens by right. The socially useful employer of artistic skills does not have to 
compete with the attractions of a lifetime of personally fulfilling but socially 
unwanted artistic endeavour.  
 
I raise this possibility because if we look at Rawls‟ description of one of the two 
possible varieties of a well-ordered society—„liberal socialism‟201—we see that the 
arrangements of privileges and claims that it guarantees in the labour market far 
closer resembles this second, more restrictive, interpretation of freedom of 
occupational choice, than the first. This manifestation of a well-ordered society is 
described as guaranteeing „free-choice of occupation‟202 whilst systematically 
denying the freedom to dispose of our labour power without being subject to any 
interferences, and imparting the duty on their citizens to invest their labour power 
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in socially useful ways. Our suspicion against the Liberal Objection is this: if the 
ideal of liberal socialism is in accordance with the rights that we are entitled to 
demand in the labour market, then the more permissive interpretation supported 
by raisers of the liberty objection must go beyond what justice demands.    
 
What Rawls precisely means by liberal socialism is admittedly hard to deduce, 
since his descriptions of it amount to a series of brief and tantalising hints that 
there is a potentially just alternative to property-owning-democracy.203 However, 
he does tell us that his vision is similar to that of John Roemer‟s depiction of ideal 
market socialist societies,204 and offers that whilst private ownership of the means 
of production would be prohibited „economic power is dispersed among firms, as 
when, for example, a firm‟s direction and management is elected by, if not directly 
in the hands of, its own workforce.‟205 Liberal socialism differs from command-
style economies not by allowing private-ownership of the means of production, 
but by allowing markets and prices, within a framework of collective-ownership of 
the means of production, to determine production decisions. This includes a 
market in labour whereby an individual can sell their labour power to one of the 
collectively-owned firms. We are then able to decipher a vision of a society 
whereby there are defined economic institutions that we have to invest our labour 
power in—since private ownership of the means of production is banned there is 
no other way to secure one‟s living—and thus our freedom of occupational 
choice, which Rawls grants this society as securing, amounts to the capacity to 
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move our labour between these defined, socially productive, institutions. As 
Rawls is willing to call such a restrictive set of claims a just set of demands upon 
one another, we have reason to be suspicious that he believes we have a right to 
dispose of our labour power without interferences or any sort of exemption from 
socially useful tasks.  
 
2) We also have the lingering question of why it is that Rawls does not include 
freedom of occupational choice in his list of basic liberties in Theory. Was this, as 
raisers of the liberty objection must implicitly suggest, an oversight; or 
alternatively was it symptomatic of Justice as Fairness‟ ambiguous response 
towards the freedoms usually associated with that term? 
 
A critique of the exegetical case 
 
In answering the two questions from the previous section I wish to demonstrate 
that an analysis of Rawls first principle proves our suspicions right, the freedom 
of occupational choice that Rawls has in mind cannot be of the quality that 
supporters of the liberty objection wish it to be. To say the same thing more 
precisely, it cannot provide a good reason for requiring unequalising incentives. 
This is because the freedom of occupational choice that Rawls identifies in the 
Political Liberalism passage, and more generally from the point of view of Justice 
as Fairness, must be extremely limited. Most importantly, it cannot take the form 
of the privilege to be free from the „duty to serve others,‟ in productive life or the 
claim that others respect your „right to dispose of your labour as you see fit‟. To 
make either of these demands, would, I shall demonstrate, inappropriately 
prioritise the good of the talented over that of the untalented and thus would not 
be accepted in the original position 
 
To make this claim we move on from why Rawls thinks we would seek to 
maximise basic liberties and on to why he thinks we would only to do so to the 
extent that a similar scheme is extendable to others. We seek to explain the 
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rationale behind what I, self-consciously channelling the spirit of Locke, call 
Rawls‟ egalitarian proviso.  
 
In his Two Treatises of Government, John Locke seeks to offer a moral 
justification for the institution of private property. He plausibly claims that without 
being able to make what we have called Hohfeldian claims over the products of 
nature, that is to assert that others have a duty not to interfere with what we 
grasp from nature as our own, it would be impossible for the individual to sustain 
himself or live a good life.206 We have then a prima facie right to claim products of 
nature, or the natural right to initial acquisition, which Locke famously imagines to 
be exercised by a process of mixing our labour with earthly goods. This prima 
facie right does, however, face one distinct difficulty. The products of nature are, 
before we have mixed our labour with them, unfortunately finite. If each person 
had a right to make innumerable Hohfeldian claims over natural resources there 
will come a point whereby there is no nature left for others to mix their labour 
with, thus denying them the possibility of the same claim rights which are 
necessary for them to sustain themselves. Locke concludes that if the right to 
initial acquisition is to be instituted in a way that respects the lives of all, then it 
must carry provisos. Most importantly he states that for that for an initial 
acquisition is to be just then the acquisitor must leave „enough and as good‟ for 
others.207 Locke‟s right to initial acquisition takes the form of two claims once the 
legitimate demands of other persons is taken into account: 
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1) A has a claim over „property they have mixed their labour 
with,‟ which B has a duty not to interfere with. 
 
This right however is trumped by the following proviso: 
 
2) A has a duty to B not to claim property if by doing so they do 
not leave „enough and as good‟ for B. 
 
The second claim, that made by B over A, is an explicit denial of A having the 
unconditional privilege to acquire nature as they see fit. It is a necessary proviso 
in light of what are not co-incidentally two of Rawls‟ circumstances of justice, 
relative scarcity and the equality of persons.   
 
Rawls‟ egalitarian proviso of his basic liberties principle exists for exactly the 
same logical reason as Locke‟s proviso. It has to exist if equal concern is to be 
shown to the interests of each individual subject. Liberties, like property claims, 
have the quality of being the sort of thing that when demanded by separate 
persons have the habit of clashing. For example, if we were all to demand the 
liberty to drive motor vehicles wherever we chose we would end up in a situation 
where there are so many crashes and accidents that no one would be able to 
drive without being severely interfered with by another motorist. The 'freedom to 
drive where we want' is then not a liberty that is compatible with being extended 
across society. The „freedom to drive where you want‟ is what Hillel Steiner has 
called „incompossible‟ with itself. If we were to afford it the status of right, we 
would have „no principled grounds for a judgement between conflicting claims‟208 
when the inevitable collisions occur.  In the absence of some form of distributive 
principle we can only imagine that those with the largest and strongest cars, and 
those with the least concern for the safety of others, would be better able to get 
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about. The interests and plans of one subsection of society would be prioritised 
over others on entirely arbitrary grounds. Liberties that govern our movement, as 
with most liberties including that of claiming property, must be distributed if we 
are to be afforded the equal opportunity to pursue our life plans. Rawls makes 
this general point about liberties point quite clearly in Theory. Unequal liberties 
are to be rejected by his citizens as they suggest that some individuals are more 
important than others and would undermine the moral equality of persons that is 
necessary to have a fraternal community whereby its citizens can stand with self-
respect. Given its importance to my argument I shall cite the relevant passage at 
length: 
 
„No one is inclined...to acknowledge less than equal liberty...it would 
have the effect of publicly establishing their inferiority as defined by 
the basic structure of society. This subordinate ranking in public life 
would indeed be humiliating and destructive of self-esteem.‟209 
 
I have highlighted two cases where distributing liberties is essential to showing 
equal concern for others—Locke‟s necessary proviso and the case of an 
incompossible privilege—because they capture problems with natural 
interpretations of what is meant by freedom of occupational choice. The liberty to 
dispose of your labour time as you see fit—interpreted either as a claim over 
others that they do not interfere with how you use your labour, or as a series of 
privileges from the duties of socially useful labour, serving others, boring and 
mundane tasks, etc.—is a mutually incompossible freedom. 
 
If these privileges or claims were to be extended to everyone in society then a 
society would not have the means to support and sustain those very same 
privileges and claims. That is because as privileges and claims they depend a 
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productive system which they assert the right not to contribute towards. The 
result is that these privileges are incompatible with being extended across 
society. As boring and menial tasks exist in any productive system, if one person 
has the privilege of being free from menial and boring tasks at work it is 
necessarily the case that someone else is doing them. If an individual asserts 
that their freedom of occupational choice means that society cannot force them 
to do menial and boring labour, they are demanding a privilege that demands 
their good be placed over that of others. The claim of non-interference with your 
labour power, of course, implicitly contains the demand for such privileges since 
it contains the right to choose to use your labour power, if you happen to be 
talented enough to be granted such a privilege, in ways that do not bore you. To 
the extent that Norman Daniels‟ Sophie made her demand to be paid more to be 
a commercial, rather than conceptual, artist on the grounds that she finds the 
former job menial and dull she demanded that uneven payment on the basis of a 
privilege that simply is not extendable across society. It is not, and cannot be, an 
expression of her Rawlsian basic liberties.  
 
It is worthy of note that Cohen makes a very similar point in an entirely different 
context. In an early response to Robert Nozick‟s conception of self-ownership, his 
1977, How Patterns Preserve Liberty, Cohen discusses what we are to make of 
the claim that „every man has a natural right not to work for any other man.‟210 
Cohen accepts that under a capitalist system you might formally have a set of 
rules which extends this right, but the necessity of production means that, if it is 
enjoyed by some, then it must be the case that it is not enjoyed by others. As he 
puts it, „some can live without subordinating themselves, but most cannot.‟211 We 
have used his insight to confirm our suspicions of the interpretive case of the 
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liberty objection: it rests upon an understanding of freedom of occupational 
choice that cannot be demanded in a way that shows equal concern for the good 
of others.   
 
Given the amount of restrictions that Rawls must place on freedom of 
occupational choice we speculate that its non-inclusion in the list of basic liberties 
during Theory was not an oversight on the part of Rawls but a recognition that, 
from the point of view of Justice as Fairness, many of the privileges and claims 
associated with that term are simply unjust. Indeed we shall conclude this 
passage on the textual case for the liberty objection by noting that even in the 
passage in Political Liberalism that it is included in, it does so in a parenthesis 
alongside the freedom to be exempt from slavery and serfdom.212 In light of 
Rawls‟ lack of explicit support for a more extensive interpretation of freedom of 
occupational choice, and the logic of his own egalitarian proviso; it seems far 
more natural to interpret this positioning as significant. By freedom of 
occupational choice Rawls likely means little more than non-slavery or serfdom, 
i.e. the ability to sell your labour power rather than having it owned by another 
agent. We can see that every citizen has an effective interest in not being locked 
into a permanent contract with other persons.213 Every individual must, after all, 
be able to revise their conception of the good over time. I might wish to live in 
one town at one point in my life, and a different one in another. I might wish to 
works nights when I am young in order to study during the day but desire to work 
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regular shifts when later burdened with parenthood. However, the rules 
governing the duties that we must honour and respect in selling our labour are 
however, by right, extensive. They are certainly extensive enough to make 
illegitimate many of the privileges and exemptions which the talented usually 
claim under the banner of freedom of occupational choice. There is no other way 
to show equal concern and respect for the good of others.  
 
Possible responses 
 
One reason readers might reject our claim that Rawls cannot support a 
permissive interpretation of freedom of occupational choice is that they may 
believe that if what we say is true of the right to dispose of our labour as we see 
fit then it must be true for nearly all privileges and claims, and thus we have 
rendered Rawls‟ first principle in such a way that leaves it meaningless and 
without reference. The principle of charity would indeed dictate that any 
interpretation of the logic of Rawls‟ first principle that leaves it powerless to 
guarantee any substantial liberties is clearly barking up the wrong tree. This is 
not, however, an unhappy circumstance that befalls our interpretation. For 
example, the privilege of not having a duty to pray can be extended across 
society.214 That is because our praying or non-praying does not have any effect 
on the production or distribution of a good that it is necessary for the institution of 
praying. The same can be said of voting, associating, expression of opinion etc. 
Nor is it true of all claims. Importantly our restricted understanding of freedom of 
occupational as the right to withdraw labour from a particular employer, and sell it 
to another productive employer, is perfectly extendable across society.  
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Another response to what has been outlined is to stress the point that Rawls‟ 
second principle is designed to fairly distribute our power to enjoy whatever rights 
are secured in the first principle. For example, Rawls, unlike Locke, does not 
need to put provisos on our right to hold property since it is, from the point of 
view of Justice as Fairness, a formal right equally available to all, and then his 
second principle of justice ensures that we have equal power to enjoy the formal 
right through the distribution of the primary goods necessary to take advantage of 
the liberty: income and wealth. Could the right to freedom of occupational choice 
be of the same structure, with the right being absolute and formally equal and 
then resources being distributed in accordance with the difference principle to 
ensure that we have equal power to enjoy it? This form of response simply will 
not work in this case however. The rights that are being demanded ask for 
immunity from contribution to a system that the very immunity depends upon: if 
they are enjoyed, it is necessarily the case that there is someone else not 
enjoying them. There cannot be a mechanism of distributing other primary goods 
which give members of a society equal opportunity, depending on their tastes 
and life choices, to enjoy the privilege of not working for others since some 
having it demands upon it being the case that others do not. It is a right that we 
are, to once again utilise a point that Cohen makes elsewhere, collectively unfree 
to exercise.215 
 
I would also like to deal with another possible response to my claim that freedom 
of occupational choice is not mentioned as a basic liberty in Theory. It could be 
argued that I have offered a somewhat obtuse line of argument since Rawls 
makes it clear in his discussion of conscientious objection that conscription, 
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though sometimes justified, is a violation of our basic liberties.216 However, there 
is no reason to think that freedom from conscription from military forces is a basic 
liberty because of a generalised basic liberty of freedom of occupational choice. 
Engaging in military action demands of the individual that they engage in actions 
that are otherwise totally absent from the employment tasks of a just society, the 
most obviously challenging to an individual‟s sense of the good is the task killing 
of other persons. What is more military service is not like other jobs in that the 
individual is subjected to a new set of codes of practices and indeed laws that 
are not covered by civil law, there are no other jobs that carry with them the 
threat of a courts martial for desertion. There are plenty of specific obligations 
that are generated from military service that are an important restraint on our 
capacity to pursue the good that it would be strange to imagine that his 
description of conscription as violating our basic liberties commits Rawls to a 
general position that extensive freedom of occupational choice is a basic liberty. 
Indeed, given the punishment of courts martial for desertion, military service 
violates our basic liberties on our restricted understanding of freedom of 
occupational choice whether that service is procured by conscription or a market. 
A solider is unable to withdraw their labour if he revises his conception of the 
good. His or her decision is final.217 
 
Finally, those familiar with the details of Rawls' equal basic liberties principle may 
be wondering if one of the complexities of the principle that I have so far ignored- 
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that it deals with schemes of liberties in their totality rather than individual 
liberties separately- masks a more permissive interpretation of the extent of 
freedom afforded in the labour market. When we move our unit of analysis to 
schemes of liberties Rawls suggests that we would be willing to restrict basic 
liberties, but only 'for the sake' of other basic liberties.‟218 Rawls offers further 
clarity on this point by explaining under what conditions it would be acceptable to 
exchange some liberties for others. Under Rawls' understanding there are two 
cases. One is the case of where 'less extensive' liberties, that is liberties with 
greater restrictions and provisos, lead to an overall gain in basic liberty. The 
second is where liberties cannot be extended equally, but doing so better 
secures the liberty of those who are not afforded the liberty. This gives rise to two 
cases, defined by strict necessary conditions, where justice demands that we 
exchange some basic liberties for others:219 
 
a)  A 'less extensive liberty' must strengthen the total system of 
liberties shared by all. 
 
b)  A 'less than equal liberty' must be acceptable to those with 
the lesser liberty. 
 
Cases a) and b) can be taken in conjunction and entitled the Priority Rule.220 I will 
offer an illustrative example of each so that it is clearer what Rawls has in mind. 
After this I shall explain the implications for freedom of occupational choice. 
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Consider the example earlier offered of restricting the privilege to move where 
one chooses with a motor vehicle, doing so vastly improves our capacity to get 
where we chose. I offer this as an uncontroversial example of the introduction of 
a less extensive conception of 'freedom of movement,' in that there are more 
provisos and restrictions (stop at traffic lights  drive on the left hand side of the 
road, do not go over 70mph etc.) which are necessary to strength the total 
scheme of liberties. Our capacity to freely associate, to go to work where we 
choose, to pursue leisure is greatly improved. It is an excellent example of case 
a). 
 
We can also think of fairly uncontroversial cases of b). For example, the claim 
right to coerce during crowd control is not something that can be afforded to an 
entire citizenry. It is, however, the sort of unequal right that we are going to have 
to grant to the police officer or stewards if we want to be able to protest and 
gather in large and potentially unsafe numbers. By affording this unequal claim 
the rest of the citizenry guarantees its own liberty. The pertinent feature here is 
that, as with in Rawls' difference principle, the only reason that a citizen would 
afford an unequal freedom to another person is to guarantee and secure their 
own freedom. Despite allowing the inequality we can still intelligibly label it an 
equal scheme of basic liberties as it is maximised from the point of view of 
equality.  
 
Now that we have clarified the Priority Rule the question is what level of freedom 
of occupational choice is appropriate to a scheme of equal basic liberties? The 
first priority rule offers little hope for the liberty objection since it is concerned with 
cases where we might support more rather than less extensive liberties. Indeed 
we might think various restrictive aspects of employment law, such as mandatory 
retirement ages, as reasonably analogous to traffic restrictions in that they are 
necessary to secure a more generalised freedom of employment. The second, 
however, provides a possible glint of light. The second principle suggests that, 
139 
 
from the point of view of Justice as Fairness, some unequal liberties may be 
tolerated if they would be tolerated by those who do not gain the extra liberties. 
However, Rawls is quite clear that the only thing that we would be willing to trade 
in for an unequal liberty is a gain in other liberties. Unless proponents of the 
liberty objection can demonstrate that the necessarily unequal privileges and 
claims that they hold under the banner of freedom of occupational choice 
increase other, moral valuable, basic liberties, for those who do not gain the 
privileges and claims, then there is no reason for those who have the possibility 
of not gaining the unequal claims and privileges to acquiesce in others having 
them. The only hope the Rawls‟ Priority Rules afford raisers of the liberty 
objection is that—like ceding the crowd control officer being granted limited 
powers of coercion—they can demonstrate that a group of persons being exempt 
from socially useful labour will maximise other‟s basic liberties. I am happy to 
leave that challenge open to them.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Proponents of the liberty objection wished to move from Rawls‟ inclusion of 
freedom of occupational choice as a basic liberty in Political Liberalism221 to the 
conclusion that the necessity of unequalising incentives is a reflection of our 
considered views about justice. The alleged implication is that Cohen is wrong to 
suggest that Rawls must support a strict interpretation of the difference principle, 
and that Rawls‟ treatment of self-interest is in conformity with our ideal response 
to the problem of Justice as Fairness. I have shown, by a clarification of what 
liberties are and are not secured by our right to the basic liberty of freedom of 
occupational choice, that this response to Cohen‟s criticism is untenable. If the 
reasons that Rawls presents for the necessity of unequalising incentives—
attracting the talented to socially useful tasks—are meant in the light of right to 
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dispose of our labour as we see fit then, under the light of a proper examination 
of the just claims and privileges we can demand behind the veil of ignorance, it 
appears to amount to a concession to the special pleading of the talented.  
 
The substantial conclusion to make is that the reasonable prerogative of self-
interest that individuals are entitled to command from one another is not 
obviously tracked by a lax-interpretation of the difference principle. Unequalising 
incentives that are necessary to attract talented individuals to socially useful 
tasks, and to make them work hard whilst in those tasks, ought not, it seems, to 
be a feature of a just society. This is not, I stress, the conclusion this thesis shall 
come to rest at, but it is our understanding of where the literature is at given the 
inadequacies of how the liberty objection has thus far been stressed. In the next 
section of this thesis we shall restate the liberty objection in a new way to 
demonstrate that it can be used to overcome Cohen‟s concessionary criticism. 
We do not have to see the well-ordered society described by Rawls, tolerant of 
unequalising incentives as it is, as a prudential compromise between justice and 
other concerns or as a concession to the infirmities in human nature. If we are to 
do so, however, we must do much more than to assert that freedom of 
occupational choice is a basic liberty, the evidence of the textual material and the 
logic of Rawls‟ egalitarian proviso simply won‟t allow it.  
141 
 
Chapter 5: The Ideality of the Political Turn 
 
At this point in the thesis Cohen‟s concessionary criticism appears to be on a 
strong footing. We have seen how Rawlsians are unable to easily reply to it with 
either the „basic structure objection--‟222because it is not possible to come up with 
a conception of the basic structure that both excludes individual behaviour and 
captures Rawls‟ citizens‟ moral concerns—or the „liberty objection‟—because the 
privileges and claims that would necessitate unequalising incentives are not 
obviously basic liberties.223 There is no straight-forward reason why the logic of 
Rawls‟ ideal of a community of free and equal persons would demand that we 
accept inequalities generated in the labour-market as a result of self-interested 
behaviour. As such, Rawls‟ tolerance of unequalising incentives appears at this 
stage to be as Cohen says it is: a prudential compromise between justice and 
other concerns in light of a concession to the infirmities within human nature.  
 
The next two chapters will demonstrate that, despite this, any move to affirm the 
concessionary criticism would be far too quick. I do so by putting forward the 
liberty objection in a new form which is invulnerable to observation that 
untrammelled freedom of occupational choice is not obviously a basic liberty from 
the point of view of the original position. I show that it is the ideal requirement 
that we secure „stability for the right reasons‟ which makes a thick (incentive 
requiring) notion if freedom of occupational choice a legitimate demand of justice. 
What we could not straightforwardly extract from the logic of Rawls‟ initial 
choosing situation will be justified once, and only once, we take these wider but 
no less central Rawlsian concepts into account. 
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This particular chapter has a modest aim that, without some prior explanation, 
may seem something of a diversion from my core argument. I wish to explain 
why it is that Rawls came to alter the justification for his theory so as to make 
Justice as Fairness deferential towards what he called „the fact of reasonable 
pluralism.‟ That is the changes to Justice as Fairness that came to be known as 
the „political turn‟ which Rawls made between the 1971 publication of Theory and 
the 1993 Political Liberalism in order to make his principles acceptable to 
persons with radically different religious and philosophical beliefs.224  
 
Those versed in Rawls scholarship may be wondering how it is possible to make 
a modest contribution to what was, and is, an enormously contentious moment in 
Rawls‟ intellectual development. Indeed the second half of this chapter will show 
particular interest in the criticisms of the political turn that were produced by Brian 
Barry and Jürgen Habermas. I use the word modest then not as a reflection of 
the weight of the issue but because this chapter boasts of only a little originality. I 
am instead primarily committed to re-producing arguments for the changes that 
Rawls himself clearly articulates.225 My reason for doing so is to express some 
important and salient features in Rawls‟ own argument that will prove to be of use 
in the following chapter where I reconstruct the liberty objection. We will see that 
the way Rawls defends his deference to the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
particularly against the criticisms of Habermas and Barry, provides a workable 
blueprint for how to defend his tolerance of unequalising incentives. My 
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reproduction of Rawls‟ justification of his political turn is provided here in order to 
recover this blueprint. 
 
Reflective equilibrium 
 
I will start laying the foundations of my argument by re-introducing the concept of 
reflective equilibrium in greater depth. It is central to Rawls‟ understanding of his 
theory as an ideal appropriate for equal and autonomous persons. What is 
written in this section is not intended to be controversial as my ambitions are 
limited to offering the consensus understanding226 of what reflective equilibrium is 
(for Rawls)227 and why it is a necessary stage in the justification and construction 
of his principles.  
 
Thus far in this thesis we have presented Rawls' principles as being justified on 
the basis that they would be chosen from an initial position of fairness. We 
explained that what is fair was defined by whatever shared moral convictions 
about how to treat each other the citizenry wanted to express in their politics, in 
the case of Justice as Fairness the pertinent moral convictions being the freedom 
and equality of persons. However, this is only the first stage of justification in 
Rawls' theory. There is a second stage of justification that explains a little more 
about what Rawls means by shared moral convictions and why he wishes to 
afford them such importance. 
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In this second stage of justification the principles recommended from behind the 
veil of ignorance are checked against what Rawls labels our 'considered moral 
judgements.'228  Our considered moral judgements are those moral claims that we 
have thought about seriously and, through a process of critical examination, have 
come to be sure of their truth. Rawls offers as examples the near certain 
conviction we have that religious intolerance and racial discrimination are 
unjust.229  
 
If the principles that come out of initial position of fairness are shown to violate 
our considered moral judgements then, according to Rawls, it is imperative that 
we discover the cause of this disharmony and respond appropriately. It may be 
the case that the incompatibility of our constructed principles and our considered 
moral judgements unveils an error in our previous moral thought. An egalitarian 
may have thought that that to treat people as equals one needs to ensure a 
perfect equality of social and economic goods. However, having been confronted 
with the different recommendation offered by reasoning from the original position, 
to wit, the difference principle, they may come to believe that the constructive 
process, treating each member as an equal as it does, reveals this previously 
settled moral conviction to be false. Alternatively one may decide that the 
incongruence between principles and settled moral judgements is reason enough 
to reconsider the process by which one has constructed their principles. If, to use 
the already cited example, our deliberative procedure recommends principles 
that upon testing are shown to demand religious intolerance or racial 
discrimination, then, given our certainty that these things are unjust, there is good 
reason to believe our constructive process has gone awry. The construction is 
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failing to coherently express our shared and settled conception of justice. Justice 
as Fairness tells us we ought to go on repeating this process of revising either 
our moral judgements, or our decision making mechanism, until our principles 
and judgements are in harmony with one and another. Rawls calls this second 
stage in Justice as Fairness' constructive process 'reflective equilibrium.'  
 
There are particularities of Rawls‟ conception of reflective equilibrium which need 
to be explained if we are to understand my argument that Rawls‟ desire for his 
principles to be able to secure stability for the right reasons is necessitated by his 
conception of ideal theory. Two important features of Rawls‟ theory shall be 
noted, 1) Rawls‟ theory is „anti-foundationalist‟ and 2) it advocates a „wide‟ and 
„political‟ reflective equilibrium rather than one concerned with accurately and 
coherently describing the features of an individual‟s personal moral sense. I shall 
deal with each of these in turn. 
 
1) Anti-foundationalist 
 
Those who read Theory for the first time often ask why Rawls feels the needs to 
include this second stage in the constructive process. It seems superfluous given 
that Rawls‟ principles are already justified on the basis that they are the outcome 
of deliberation in an initial position of fairness. The fairness and neutrality of the 
procedure in and of itself seems to give enough reasons for thinking that we 
ought to accept and agree to the principles that it recommends. What is it that is 
added by then checking the principles recommended from the original position 
against our considered moral judgements? 
 
One possible but ultimately misleading explanation is hinted at in a footnote by 
Rawls in which he notes a similarity between the procedure of reflective 
equilibrium and the way that natural sciences work.230 In the natural sciences 
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deductive claims about the nature of previously unobserved phenomena are 
often justified on the basis that they support, and are congruent with, a set of 
known facts. Congruence with a set of fixed empirical facts is seen as a prima 
facie reason to take seriously a set of theoretical claims and indeed much 
empirical science is dedicated to finding ways to test theoretical claims 
developed to make consistent what we know about the external world. In 
epistemological terms we might say that natural science works primarily with a 
correspondence theory of truth and uses coherence, or the lack thereof, as a 
basis of triggering both empirical investigations and theoretical speculations. 
Rawls‟ footnote suggests that reflective equilibrium might be considered as the 
adoption of this mainstream scientific practice in moral and political theory. 
 
The recent 'confirmation' of the existence of the 'Higgs Boson,' which scientists 
had previously accepted the truth of on the basis of it being necessary to make 
consistent what we already knew about particle physics, drew popular attention 
to the mutually constructive process of inductive and deductive reasoning, and 
the correspondence and coherentist accounts of truth, in the natural sciences. 
The 'Higgs Boson' had been proposed as an explanation for why the particles 
that transmit the fundamental laws of nature, gauge bosons, have high mass 
rather than the zero mass that we usually observe in unchanging objects. Peter 
Higgs is one of the theoretical physicists who in the 1960s suggested that the 
only way to explain the mass of gauge bosons was that the particles interacted in 
a previously unobserved field which allowed this otherwise impossible feature.231 
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It was only after the construction of the Large Hadron Collider near Geneva that 
scientists were able to test the existence of Higgs‟ predicted field, something that 
was finally achieved in 2012. The 'Higgs Boson' was then, in the 1960s, a 
deductive inference formed to make consistent otherwise contradictory empirical 
facts. As a valid and important deductive inference it dictated the research 
agenda of empirical physics, to the extent that it was the primary motivation 
behind the construction of a piece of machinery that cost over 10 billion Euros.232 
Perhaps more astonishingly it brought together the states of Europe to work 
towards a common goal. As a result of successful empirical research conducted 
at the Large Hadron Collider the Higgs Boson is now, in 2014, justified not simply 
by this congruence with wider theory but by it being observed. It has become part 
of our body of empirical knowledge which will contain new contradictions in need 
of testable theoretical explanation. The symbiotic relationship between our 
different capacities to reason and pursue knowledge continues.  
 
Given the parallel that Rawls draws between the natural sciences and reflective 
equilibrium it is tempting to imagine that he conducts his theory in the same way. 
Our considered moral judgements act as revelations of moral facts and we work 
through the process of reflective equilibrium to construct a conceptual apparatus 
that renders them consistent with one and another. This parallel, between 
reflective equilibrium and what natural scientists do, has indeed been 
enthusiastically embraced by later political theorists.233 It is perhaps too easy to 
speculate as why. Political philosophy's flirtation with positivism in the previous 
century and biologism in the one before that speaks to an understandable desire 
to reconnect our field with the always prestigious natural sciences. However, we 
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have reason to be suspicious of the directness of the analogy; Rawls only makes 
the comparison in a singular footnote and does not make it central to his 
justification of reflective equilibrium.234 This, I submit, is because any sustained 
study of reflective equilibrium suggests that what is analogous between 
mainstream scientific practice and reflective equilibrium is cosmetic. More 
precisely the parallel breaks down as soon as we turn to the details of the 
symbiotic relationship between „facts‟ and „theory‟ in Justice as Fairness.  
 
The salient difference is that Rawls, unlike the natural scientists, affords no 
primacy to empirically observed „facts,‟ that is by way of analogy his considered 
moral judgements, over 'theory,' that is the principles recommended from the 
original position. By this I mean that they are not absolute fixed points to which 
the theory/principles must revise in the search for equilibrium; instead he makes 
both variables equally subject to the possibility of alteration. See for example that 
in Theory’s first explanation of reflective equilibrium Rawls writes: 
 
„We can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can 
revise our existing judgements, for even the judgements we take 
provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision... I assume that 
eventually we find a description of the initial situation that both 
expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles that match our 
considered judgement duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I 
refer to as reflective equilibrium.‟235 
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The same point is made again in Rawls‟ next extended explanation of reflective 
equilibrium where he states: „an allowance must be made for the likelihood that 
considered judgements are no doubt subject to certain irregularities and 
distortions despite the fact that they are rendered under favourable conditions.‟236 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls makes much the same point. What we might be 
tempted to treat as moral facts in the constructive process, like the claim „slavery 
is unjust,‟ must be treated as a „possibility of construction‟ that we must go on to 
test in the constructive process.237 Unlike the treatment afforded to empirical facts 
by the natural sciences, there is nothing inviolable or even prior in Rawls‟ account 
of reflective equilibrium about his citizen‟s considered moral judgements. 
 
This is not an insignificant exegetical observation. Rawls makes both his initial 
construction and our considered moral judgements subject to alteration because 
he does not believe that either warrant being treated as genuinely fixed points to 
which the other must respond. Natural scientists prioritise observed facts in their 
process because they implicitly believe in the existence of an objective and 
independent reality that they are seeking to describe and explain in their theories. 
The „real‟ world of matter is the foundation that „grounds‟ any theoretical scientific 
claim.238 In moral and political philosophy there have been many attempts to 
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argue for the existence of a similar foundation that grounds our moral reasoning: 
there have been hopes of an external world of moral facts to which our 
philosophical theories must respond, these external facts being delectable either 
by a priori reasoning, as in both the Natural Law and Kantian traditions, or more 
recently an isolation of our intuitions. If one were to accept with Cohen that our 
intuitions tend towards a set of universally shared if we could statements then 
they would have good reason to treat such fundamental principles as a possible 
candidate for this grounding role. In not considering either our judgements or our 
principles genuinely fixed Rawls demonstrates that he does not believe either to 
provide such a foundation. He is, to use the contemporary jargon, an „anti-
foundationalist‟239 who makes agreement itself, rather than correspondence with 
an external order, the source of objectivity in his theory.  
 
I mention objectivity as it is an essential feature of just principles for Rawls for 
both historical and theoretical reasons. Rawls was writing in an intellectual 
context where those who shared his suspicion of the existence of external moral 
facts had come to embrace scepticism over whether moral language could 
amount to anything more than an expression of the subjective preferences of the 
speaker.240 The ideal of autonomy that we have seen Rawls‟ problem of justice is 
centred around is unlikely to be achieved if the moral language of a political 
community, like justice, is seen by the citizenry as nothing more than an 
assemblage of such subjective preferences. There has to be something about 
the moral principle which is seen by each citizen as having legitimate sanction 
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over them. There has to be something objective about political principles if Rawls‟ 
ideal of autonomy is to be realised. 
 
2) Wide rather than narrow 
 
In Theory Rawls only reveals the full extent of this anti-foundationalism, and thus 
confirms the disanalogy with natural sciences, in the last chapter of Book 1 titled 
Some Remarks about Moral Theory. During those passages he explains what he 
believes the purpose of political philosophy to be, and the most striking thing 
about his discussion is how descriptive and personal his conception initially 
appears. For a characteristic example, Rawls writes:  
 
„one may think of moral theory at first as the attempt to describe our 
moral capacity; or, in the present case, one may regard a Theory of 
Justice as describing our sense of justice.‟241
  
 
In the same passage as above Rawls includes a description of the process as 
reflective equilibrium as that which gives „the best account of the person’s sense 
of justice.‟242 Indeed it is notable that he repeatedly states that it is a process 
conducted by „persons‟ or „individuals.‟ This language leads to the natural but 
mistaken interpretation that reflective equilibrium is a process aimed at 
coherently and consistently describing an individual‟s personal moral sense. It is 
a philosophical process of self-discovery. However, Rawls himself recognised this 
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as a regretful error243 and later states he actually intends reflective equilibrium to 
be a process conducted whereby the individual not only seeks to understand 
whether their own moral convictions are internally consistent, but also seek to 
check that they are consistent with the moral convictions of the other members of 
one‟s political community. For evidence of this see that in Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement he offers reflective equilibrium as an answer to the following 
question: „how can we make our own considered judgements of political justice 
more consistent both within themselves and with considered judgements of 
others?‟244  The demand that we check our principles with the considered 
judgments of others makes Rawls‟ equilibrium a political rather than a merely 
personal balancing act. 
 
In this process of „wide‟ and „political‟ reflective equilibrium individuals attempt to 
come to equilibrium with the moral convictions of other members of their political 
community which, if successfully carried out by each member, makes a set of 
principles mutually acceptable.245  The features of Rawls‟ design suggest why this 
should be possible. Remember that the original position was supposed to be 
created from widely shared convictions about how we ought to treat each other. 
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For example, the lack of information that we possess about our talents was there 
to model the shared political conviction that individuals ought not to be 
disadvantaged on the basis of features about the self that they themselves 
cannot control.246 As the content of the principles is supposed to reflect widely 
shared convictions on how we ought to treat each other it should be the case that 
individual members of the political community can come to affirm the principles 
that are produced as being consistent with their own moral judgements. 
 
We are now in a position to bring together the two features of reflective 
equilibrium, that it is anti-foundationalist and that it is political, to see how they 
are connected. Rawls suggests that we ought to think of a successful political 
equilibrium as a substitute for the foundations that in the previous section we saw 
that Rawls thought were naturally entirely absent in moral theory. As Rawls says 
in 'Kantian Constructivism:' 
 
'The search for reasonable grounds for reaching agreement rooted in 
our conception of ourselves and in our relation to society replaces the 
search for moral truth interpreted as fixed by a prior and independent 
order of objects and relations, whether natural or divine, an order apart 
and distinct from how we conceive of ourselves.'247 
 
Another way of making the same point is to say, as Rawls does in Kantian 
Constructivism, that Justice as Fairness takes the approach of 'pure procedural 
justice.'248 Rather than having a fixed notion of what justice is and then 
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discovering a procedure that tends towards it, pure procedural justice says that 
justice is whatever is acceptable to all persons on matters of duties and 
obligations when they sincerely attempt to reach a political equilibrium. This ideal 
and reconciliatory feature of political reflective equilibrium reached by Justice as 
Fairness is best articulated by Rawls in a long and important footnote in his 
Reply to Habermas. I will quote it as well as some other material that strongly 
supports the interpretation that is offered here.  As a result of the features 
outlined Rawls states that: 
 
'This equilibrium is fully inter-subjective: that is, each citizen has taken 
into account the reasoning and arguments of every other citizen.'249 
 
They are necessary to give objective form to principles in the absence of any 
grounding external moral reality:  
 
'If construction does yield the first principles of a conception of justice 
that matches more accurately than other views our considered 
convictions in general and wide reflective equilibrium, then 
constructivism would seem to provide a suitable basis for objectivity.'250 
 
Objectivity has been reached because citizens have agreed to co-operate on 
terms which are mutually considered to express their understanding of 
themselves as free and equal. The principles dictate the distribution of goods that 
tends towards our realisation of these ideals and do so on terms that each can 
recognise does so. In doing so Rawls achieved one of his primary aims: „Kantian 
constructivism, as I would state it, aims to establish only that the rational 
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intuitionist notion of objectivity is unnecessary for objectivity.‟251 The new 
objectivity formed in Justice as Fairness is 'a practicable conception of objectivity 
and justification founded on public agreement in judgement on due reflection.'252  
 
The corollary of what has been argued, that an ideal conception of justice must 
be able to reach reflective equilibrium, is that principles that are not in such 
equilibrium are not ideal. We know that principles that are not in political reflective 
equilibrium have failed to be constructed in a way that is appropriate to a free 
community of equal and autonomous persons as they are not mutually 
acceptable. Our desire not to impose principles on the other that they themselves 
cannot accept has not been realised and thus our political principles are not a 
vehicle for political autonomy. We have ideal grounds for rejecting them.  
 
The political turn: stability and reflective equilibrium 
 
I hope that none of the interpretive claims that came in the previous section were 
too controversial. It was intended as an explanation of the consensus view of 
why Rawls includes his two levels of justification, and what the relationship 
between the two is. We are now ready to move into choppier waters. For this 
uncontroversial interpretation of reflective equilibrium is the key to understanding 
Rawls' position on the much thornier issue of why his principles must show 
deference to what he calls „the fact of reasonable pluralism.‟ We will see that 
Rawls is accused of inappropriately extending the process of reflective 
equilibrium to circumstances where citizens are not seeking to isolate their moral 
point of view. This is, we shall see, a false charge, and Rawls‟ deference to the 
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fact of reasonable pluralism does not depend upon a misuse of reflective 
equilibrium. 
 
In order to advance this claim I will proceed with the following structure. Firstly I 
am going to explain some of the new vocabulary that Rawls introduced during 
what we have called „the political turn,‟ which has been correspondingly absent 
thus far from this thesis. I then offer a short explanation of some of the key 
alterations that Rawls makes to Justice as Fairness in light of his self-perceived 
failure to show deference to „the fact of reasonable pluralism.‟ Once this is 
complete, and thus the political turn has been explained, I shall then introduce a 
criticism of the turn that was levied by Jürgen Habermas and Brian Barry. Both 
Barry and Habermas argue that the political turn reduces the normative force of 
Rawls‟ argument by making his principles subject to the vagaries of human 
motivation. They develop their own version of what we have called a 
concessionary criticism. I will then finally go on to show how Rawls responds to 
such criticisms and thus how Justice as Fairness retains the normative force of 
its principles and shows fidelity to Rawls‟ commitment of producing ideal 
principles. 
 
We are then ready to move on, in the next and final chapter, to my claim that the 
argument Rawls offers in support of showing deference to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism is also applicable to a different set of facts—which happen to 
necessitate the use of unequalising incentives—and thus that the argument 
Rawls develops in response to Habermas and Barry offers a blueprint of how we 
can reconstruct the liberty objection. 
 
Terminology of the political turn 
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Reasonable pluralism is a situation whereby individuals have thought deeply 
about religious and philosophical questions and have come to divergent views.253 
Citizens must not have not been tricked or coerced into accepting different 
philosophical beliefs, or simply not thought about religious and philosophical 
matters that much at all, but instead have come to their divergent views as a 
result of the „free exercise of their reason.‟ If this is not the case there may be 
pluralism, but it would not be reasonable.254 I will leave aside for now what is 
added by the prefix „the fact of‟ to „reasonable pluralism,‟ mostly because, as we 
will see, the answer is unfortunately best expressed as “only confusion.” 
 
A fully comprehensive doctrine gives answers to specific questions by calling 
upon a philosophical or religious framework that seeks to explain much wider 
questions.255 If I were asked to explain my views on marriage equality, and I were 
to invoke the divinity of scripture in my response, I would be invoking a fully 
comprehensive doctrine about where moral truth comes from (the word of God) 
and what epistemic capacities humans have to access it (literal interpretations of 
holy books).  
 
Central to the political turn is Rawls‟ insistence that fully comprehensive doctrines 
cannot be accepted as reasons in a community where there is reasonable 
pluralism, as citizens trying to persuade each other will be relying upon premises 
that their fellow members cannot accept as a result of their divergent beliefs. The 
originality of this thought, and indeed Rawls‟ brand of liberalism, is brought out by 
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the fact that we recognise most great works of political philosophy as explicitly 
being part of a fully comprehensive doctrine. For example the answer to problem 
of political obligation offered in Hobbes' Leviathan is predicated upon a 
physicalist account of human motivation, Locke's alternative answer to that same 
problem calls upon his Protestant theology and the terms of God's gifting of the 
world to humankind. If you do not believe that God gifted mankind the world in 
common in order for them to live their lives, and in doing so generating duties 
and obligations amongst the citizenry, Locke‟s justification for the institution of 
property rests upon premises than you do not have reason to accept.  
 
Stability is a political system's ability to motivate the behaviour necessary to 
maintain itself over time.256 If a political system can maintain itself by every citizen 
being self-interested, and its people are as a matter of fact self-interested, then it 
would be stable in the relevant sense. Conversely if a political system requires its 
citizenry to be altruistic and collaborative, but encourages them to be competitive 
and self-interested, we may suspect that it is fundamentally unstable. There is a 
familiar argument that the competitive nature of market societies systematically 
destroys the traditional values of trust that those markets, backed as they are by 
contracts and property claims with difficult enforcement issues, actually depend 
upon. This famous „parasitic liberalism thesis‟ can usefully be considered as an 
argument about the lack of Rawlsian stability in market societies.257  
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The congruence that we shall see Rawls is concerned with is that between a 
community's principles of justice and its citizens‟ conception of their own good.258 
It is important to note that this account of the good is slightly but significantly 
different from „considered judgements‟ that constitute the material of reflective 
equilibrium, and the „thin‟ conception of the good that is used to make neutral 
principles behind the veil of ignorance. The conception of the good that we speak 
of here is one that is held by „flesh and blood citizens‟ once they are attempting to 
live with constructed principles, and is thus not lacking in information (like a thin 
conception of the good), and is not necessarily limited to the moral standpoint 
(like considered judgments). It may include religious, philosophical and personal 
beliefs and everything else that is central to a flesh and blood individual‟s actual 
personal plan of how to live their life.  
 
Stability for the right reasons 
 
Now that I have introduced the vital terminology for understanding Rawls‟ political 
turn I want to put them into the context of Rawls‟ philosophical arguments. First 
we will see how „stability‟ and „congruence‟ are connected in Theory and then we 
will see why Rawls thought that this part of his articulation of Justice as Fairness 
was a failure that needed correcting. We do so by re-introducing the concepts of 
„reasonable pluralism‟ and „fully comprehensive doctrines.‟ 
 
Congruence and stability are self-evidently not entirely distinct concerns. If an 
individual finds the principles of justice that they are bound to obey offend their 
own notion of the good, which is to say that they are incongruent, they are far 
more likely to engage in behaviour that undermines the institutions that uphold 
those principles. The virtuous connection between congruence and stability is a 
characteristic feature of a well-ordered-society. An example will help elucidate the 
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idea in question. If an individual thinks that the state spends money on practices 
that they are not proud of, perhaps they are committed to racial equality and the 
state is using the income gained through taxation to uphold a system of 
apartheid, they are unlikely to think that state spending represents an opportunity 
for them to be good persons. In such a scenario we might expect tax evasion and 
avoidance to be high or for the state to have to pay extremely high wages to 
attract enforcement workers, or perhaps even being reduced to coercively 
enlisting staff. If, however, there are fervent racists in this particular political 
community no such mechanisms will need to be put in place. Racists will freely 
step forward to sell their labour to racist institutions. We can conject from this with 
Rawls that political institutions that are perceived to be governed by principles 
incongruent with its citizens sense of the good life are unlikely generate the 
sympathies that help to maintain themselves over time. Incongruent societies are 
inherently less stable. The corollary of this is that institutions which are congruent 
will motivate the correct behaviour and are thus inherently stable. 
 
That congruence is of instrumental use to stability does not mean that is the only 
reason that Rawls places value in it. It demonstrably is not. We know this 
because whilst it is clear that Rawls thinks congruence can play a role in 
generating stability he does not think it is a necessary condition, or that there are 
not genuinely viable ways to achieve stability without congruence. His 
commitment to principles of justice that are both stable and congruent must 
therefore be for reasons other than the instrumental value the former has for the 
latter.  
 
Evidence for this claim can be found in the way that Rawls frames his interest in 
the problem of stability. Rawls surprisingly suggests in Political Liberalism that his 
problem of stability is almost unique in the history of political philosophy.259 Many 
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of Rawls‟ contemporary readers were puzzled by this as the problem looks a lot 
like 'the problem of order,' which has an undeniably long tradition and most 
notably played a central organising role in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan. 
Habermas implicitly treats Rawls‟ problem as identical to that which exercised 
Hobbes,260 and the thought that these problem are synonymous is voiced even 
more explicitly by Brian Barry. Barry writes: 
 
„All we have to do is rechristen the problem of stability as the problem 
of order and we can immediately recognise it as a central focus of 
political philosophy in all periods-but especially, of course, at times 
when order is particularly problematic. (i.e.) Hobbes, reacting to the 
English Civil War, and de Maistre, reacting to the French 
Revolution.‟261 
 
In his Reply to Habermas Rawls responds to this observation by distinguishing 
his concern from that of Hobbes by saying that he is not interested in stability per 
se, but rather something that he calls 'stability for the right reasons.'262 What was 
wrong with Hobbes‟ theory, Rawls thought, was not that it failed to answer the 
problem of stability- in fact he thought that it did-263 but it failed to do so for 
whatever the right reasons are. As Rawls was only interested securing stability 
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for the right reasons, and Hobbes just wanted stability of any form, they were, 
Rawls concluded, really consumed by different problems.  
 
In fact Rawls had noticed the affinity between Hobbes' problem and that of 
stability long before Habermas and Barry commented upon it. In a 1987 paper 
called The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, Rawls presents an account of the 
differences between the two problems which provides the most enlightening 
explanation as to what he means by the distinction between stability and stability 
for the right reasons. Rawls calls the Hobbesian response to the question of 
stability a modus vivendi.264 This is a Latin phrase that roughly translates as 'way 
of living' but is often used more specifically to describe a temporary 
accommodation to a political dispute that is reached in order to allow its 
participants to get on with their lives until a more permanent resolution is found. 
For example the present peace process in Ireland is often described as a modus 
vivendi, because although the Republican side still support the principle of a 
united Ireland they have agreed to work within present British institutions within 
Northern Ireland so that the people of the region can get on with living their lives. 
Rawls' first example of a modus vivendi is similar in that it describes two rival 
nations who wish to overcome each other by force but recognise that, as they 
each have enough strength to wound but not overcome the other, it is in their 
temporary interests not to attack and thus sign a non-aggression treaty.265 
 
Rawls' use of this phrase might give us reason to pause before accepting my 
interpretive claim that what was wrong with Hobbes' solution to the problem of 
stability, at least in Rawls' view, wasn't that it wasn't stable. Modus vivendi are 
almost by definition contingent holding positions rather than permanent 
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resolutions and thus might be seen as unlikely to provide stability in the relevant 
sense. Rawls‟ example of the two rival nations is a potential case in point. The 
two nations only sign the agreement in recognition of their equal power. If one of 
the two nations were to become more powerful than the other then the basis of 
the agreement would have disappeared. Similarly Hobbes' 'balance of power' 
solution to the problem of stability depends upon the roughly egalitarian 
distribution of strength accorded by nature between persons. Once that equality 
is disrupted, perhaps by men and women grouping together to conjoin and 
multiply their force, the balance of power is broken, and with it the basis for 
stability. 
 
Despite this observation, and Rawls stating that Hobbes' solution rests upon a 
'fortuitous conjunction of contingencies,'266 a careful reading of the paper in fact 
suggests what we have already proposed—Rawls' opposition to the Hobbesian 
solution to the problem of stability is based on qualities and values other than 
stability itself.  We make this claim on the basis that when Rawls descends from 
abstractions and uses historical anecdote to describe an actual modus vivendi, 
he criticises it not for its instability but for its effect on the 'moral quality of public 
life.'267  
 
His anecdote is a stylised version of the principle of toleration that arose in those 
16th and 17th century European nations that had a roughly equal proportion of 
Protestant and Catholic subjects. The legal embodiment of that principle being 
the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, which allowed for subjects within the Holy Roman 
Empire to enter the protection of their preferred denomination and thus created 
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an institutional framework for Lutherans and Catholics to co-exist.268 For the sake 
of the example Rawls asks us to accept the claim that those religions at the time 
demanded that religious rulers had a duty to uphold 'the true faith' by punishing 
heretics. To use Rawlsian language this is the „considered moral judgement‟ that 
the subjects of these states wanted their political institutions to represent. Rawls 
also asks us to accept that, to the extent that the principle of toleration emerged 
and thrived in nations facing these circumstances, it did so as each greatly 
feared being a victim of persecution. This, it is important to remember, was a 
psychological status that was only preserved due to the roughly equal power of 
the respective sects in such nations and would have wilted if either side believed 
they were capable of getting the upper hand. Rawls is not explicit about what the 
pernicious effects such a scenario is supposed to have on „the moral quality of 
public life,‟ assuming them to be obvious,269 so we can only reasonably conject. 
We can make two observations about public life in Rawls' stylised account of a 
reformation-era modus vivendi. 
 
Firstly it is noteworthy that for neither Protestants nor Catholics in the stylised 
society does the principle of toleration affirm their actual view of the correct role 
of the state in governing religious beliefs. The state does not, as they want it do, 
use its coercive power to uphold the true faith. We may say that as a response to 
circumstance it asks them to put their rational interests, not being persecuted by 
opposing sectarian forces, ahead of their considered illiberal judgements about 
how a political community ought to be organised. 
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Our second observation about the effect of a modus vivendi on „the moral quality 
of public life‟ is a reflection of the fact that stability rests upon the maintenance of 
a balance of power. This may be possible to maintain over time but, at least from 
the point of view of the rational choice theory that Rawls so often flirted with, only 
if the subjects interpret those that do not share their faith as rivals.  As rivals it is 
in their interests to thwart the development of each other‟s power, population 
numbers and capacities. Given that Protestant and Catholic strands of 
Christianity are cosmopolitan in their belief structure, they believe that all men 
were created equal; we can only assume they would rather convert rather than 
stifle the heretics. The „tolerant‟ political settlement once again demands of them 
an attitude and mode of behaviour towards the other that is exterior to their moral 
beliefs. 
 
Both of these concerns, we may observe, are denials of Rawls' understanding of 
political autonomy. The sources of stability in a reformation-era society governed 
by a tolerant modus vivendi are heteronomous to the moral perspective of its 
constituents and its subjects are behaving in a way that subsumes the 
reasonable part of the self to the force of instrumental rationality. This is why the 
Hobbesian answer to the problem of stability is uninteresting, even though it is 
not wrong, and this is what Justice as Fairness must correct. Stability for the right 
reasons must produce the motivation to act justly but do so in a way that does 
not deny or diminish the quality of autonomy. In order to do so the constituent 
members of a political community must find the principles which govern their 
society to be congruent with their own good. Congruence, just as mutually 
acceptable principles before it, appears to be a pre-condition of autonomous 
politics. 
 
The congruence argument in Theory 
 
Stability for the right reasons is secured in Part III of Theory through the 
argument from congruence. The members of a society governed by Rawlsian 
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principles of justice develop what he calls an „effective sense of justice,‟ which 
means that they come to consider the behaviour necessary to uphold those just 
institutions as a constitutive element of their own good.270 In this section of the 
argument I am going to briefly outline three things. Firstly, how the argument from 
congruence works, secondly why Rawls came to believe that it was inconsistent 
with „the fact of reasonable pluralism‟ and finally the changes made to Justice as 
Fairness that were made in response to this inconsistency. The end result shall 
be a workable synopsis of what the political turn is, and why Rawls felt that he 
had to undertake it. 
 
Despite unfolding slowly over three chapters the congruence argument in Theory 
is actually rather simple. Rawls believes that the persons that will emerge in a 
well-ordered society will desire to act justly more than any other rival desire and 
thus they will find it part of their good to commit to, and support, whatever just 
institutions there are available to them. The remarkable simplicity of the structure 
of the argument is best captured in the following passage: 
 
„Being the sorts of persons that they are, the members of a well-
ordered society desire more than anything to act justly and fulfilling 
this desire is part of their good.‟271 
 
Though the structure of the argument may be simple it is clear that the claims 
within it are highly contentions. We will grant for the sake of the argument, in the 
face of many very real concerns about collective action problems and neglect of 
the role of irrationality in human behaviour, Rawls‟ implied claim about the 
relationship between subject, institutions, desires and motivations. That is 
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something like the following: if x is y’s strongest desire and z institutions supports 
x then y will support and uphold z.  However, there is a much more challenging 
question that it would be too generous to simply grant: how is Rawls able to posit 
the original premise that for the citizens of a well-ordered society „acting justly‟ is 
their strongest desire?  Whatever Rawls precisely means by that set of 
motivational capacities, it is certainly not something that we witness in 
contemporary societies. This question is particularly pertinent in the context of 
this thesis which takes seriously Rawls‟ claim that he shall „take men as they are.‟ 
 
The first thing to note is that Rawls does not mean something that is a natural 
interpretation of „to desire more than anything to act justly‟ but must strike every 
reader as highly implausible: the desire to be just will always be our strongest 
desire and trumps all other desires no matter what the situation. I think we can all 
recall situations where our desire to act justly, to the extent that we possess one 
at all, was far from the most powerful motivating force in our behaviour. It would 
be a perverse individual indeed who, even at life‟s finest and most personal 
moments, thought primarily of a political virtue like justice. Rawls instead means 
something far more restrictive like „the desire to be just will always be stronger 
than the desire to be unjust‟ when we are subject to situations where our desire 
to be just comes into conflict with other motivations. That is to say, when politics 
comes into play. We know this to be the case because Rawls proceeds through a 
series of arguments where he contrasts our motivation to be just with available 
substitutes, this is, pace Rousseau when interpreted as moral rigorist,272 rather 
than a series of arguments about why justice will become our highest and all 
consuming good.273  
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The first argument that Rawls develops begins by asking the reader to place 
herself in the context of a well-ordered society. Such as society has, Rawls 
suggests, features which are significantly different to our own unjust societies 
that make the development of an effective sense of justice more plausible. It is 
important to note here that as a well-ordered-society is as of yet unrealised, 
Rawls is making claims about the way that human motivation will behave in an 
unobservable world. He is asking for a speculative act of the imagination on 
behalf of the reader. We will see in the next chapter that this is far from the last 
time that he will do so, and that it is an argumentative technique not without 
controversy, but for the sake of the argument I ask you to provisionally accept it. 
 
Other citizens in a well-ordered-society are, by way of definition, genuinely acting 
justly and supporting and upholding institutions which we know have been 
designed in accordance with principles that you yourself accept as reflecting how 
you want to treat other persons. The choice then, when we properly consider the 
circumstances, is between acting justly and „a systemic course of deception and 
hypocrisy.‟274 Rawls is well aware that in actually existing social institutions 
people regularly choose to publicly pay lip service to reasonably just institutions 
whilst hypocritically undermining them through their personal behaviour. For 
example, many a tax dodger has taken Rawls‟ second option of systemic 
hypocrisy by giving vocal support to the publicly funded institutions of the welfare 
state and the principle of progressive taxation. However, as Rawls points out, in a 
well-ordered society we, the potential hypocrites, do not have refuge in the 
common self-justifications of “everyone‟s at it” or that the institutions of the state 
are “not all that fair anyway.” The individual who chooses to act unjustly in a well-
ordered society must live knowingly with their own hypocrisy. This, Rawls 
suggests, is a strong psychological barrier against wanting to be unjust. It is not a 
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normal feature of human desire to want to be hypocritical, and when it is more 
difficult to engage in a personal conceit that barrier becomes higher and less 
likely to be hurdled. 
 
You might think that Rawls account of the psychological drain of hypocrisy is 
insufficient to demonstrate that individuals will always choose justice over 
injustice. Our powers of personal conceit are certainly stronger than anything that 
can be dismissed in the space of the two short paragraphs that Rawls devotes to 
that particular line of argument. If so, there are still two more claims made by 
Rawls that may convince you. The next argument that Rawls develops concerns 
the development of our moral powers. We have seen in our explication of the 
primary goods that Rawls assumes that we always seek to develop our human 
capacities and always prefer the opportunity to do so over not doing so.275  There 
are, Rawls suggests, some powers and capacities that we possess that we come 
to see can be expressed only in union with others. In Rawls‟ words we „depend 
upon the cooperative endeavours of others not only for the means of well-being 
but to bring to fruition our latent powers.‟ Just social institutions, in providing a 
platform for fair co-operative endeavour, are likely to gain our allegiance as we 
recognise them as a vehicle for developing our moral powers.  
 
The strongest challenge to this second argument is quite obvious. It might be the 
case that we find acting in concert and collaboration with others allows us to 
develop our moral powers, but there seems to be few reasons why those co-
operative institutions need to be just. For example, if a talented scholar is able to 
develop her intellectual capacities at a university which systematically rips off its 
students, she may still find her desire to develop her most complex capacities is 
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best satisfied by upholding and supporting unjust institutions rather than just 
ones. Indeed just institutions may require her to devote more time to teaching 
and administration that she presently has to give away. One might observe that 
the history of political philosophy has been littered, from its Athenian genesis, 
with talented men justifying seemingly unjust institutions on the basis of the 
talents it allows them to cultivate. 276  
 
The final argument that Rawls presents rests upon the notion developed in 
chapter 2 of this thesis that principles of justice „express our nature as free and 
equal persons,‟ or what Rawls calls the „Kantian interpretation of Justice as 
Fairness.‟277 We remember that Rawls attributes to every individual the desire to 
treat other persons in accordance with principles that they themselves can 
accept, this desire apparently flows from our shared conception of each other as 
free and equal persons, Rawls then goes on to suggest that this desire motivates 
our engagement with the problem of justice in the first place. The relationship 
between our desire to express ourselves as free and equal persons and Rawls‟ 
claim that we develop an „effective sense of justice‟ is the most direct of his three 
arguments. Rawls straight-forwardly believes that properly just institutions are an 
avenue for realising this immanent desire. There is, Rawls tells us, a „practical 
identity‟ in the interest to express oneself as a free and equal person and the 
desire to act out of an effective sense of justice.278 
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The beauty of the third argument for congruence is that it deals with many of the 
problems of the first two. Our desire not to be hypocritical is less likely to be 
dulled by the ingenuity of human self-deception if we also possess a desire to 
express ourselves as free and equal persons. Our desire to engage in 
collaborative exercise is more likely to attach itself to just rather than unjust 
institutions in the context of this general Kantian desire to express our nature as 
free and equal persons. The third argument complements and supports what has 
come before and thus is essential in the development of a clear and 
comprehensive picture of why Rawls believes that in a well-ordered society our 
desire to be just will trump any conflicting desires. The well-ordered society of 
Justice as Fairness is so congruent with its flesh and blood citizens‟ conception 
of the good that it ought to organically produce those motivations that are needed 
for a stable system. What is more, this is all done for the right reasons and thus 
preserves our opportunity for autonomous politics. The deleterious effects on the 
moral quality of public life that we associate with a Hobbesian modus vivendi are 
kept at bay. 
 
The political turn 
 
Rawls is quite clear in introduction to Political Liberalism that the changes he 
makes to Justice as Fairness through the political turn are a result of 
dissatisfaction with this argument from congruence.279  Rawls suggests that the 
argument will not work as it is in conflict with what he calls „the fact of reasonable 
pluralism,‟ that is the plurality of beliefs that inevitably exists within a liberal 
political community about philosophical and religious issues.  
 
Rawls is frustratingly vague about which components of the argument from 
congruence are supposed to be in conflict with the fact of reasonable pluralism 
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but it is perfectly possible to recover what aspects of the argument he was 
dissatisfied with. The well-ordered society described in Part III of Theory is said 
to be „unrealistic‟ as its members endorse the principles of justice as part of a 
„fully comprehensive doctrine.‟280 A fully comprehensive doctrine, we remember, 
answers localised questions with reference to much more generalised system of 
philosophical beliefs. Rawls believed that the utilisation of fully comprehensive 
doctrines in the justification of political principles was not appropriate to a 
community with reasonable pluralism, as there would always be people for whom 
the wider premises of the invoked comprehensive doctrine were unacceptable. 
 
We can why Rawls might have thought that the congruence arguments relied 
upon such fully comprehensive doctrines. One might think that the first two 
arguments, from hypocrisy and from the development of powers, rest upon an 
account of developmental psychology that doesn‟t amount to public knowledge 
about social facts which effect political matters, but rather Rawls‟ own 
speculations and personal conception of the good. He certainly does not attempt 
to demonstrate any embeddedness of the psychological claims within our 
political tradition in the same way he does the considered judgements that frame 
the original position, and it is possible to imagine religious and philosophical 
communities that would not be persuaded by its claims. For example, some 
religious belief systems strongly emphasise the role of independence and 
isolation in the good of individuals, they see the temptation of mass-production 
and collaboration as a danger to, rather than part of, the living of a good life. 
Indeed the notion of solitude as a core component of the good life is hardly 
absent from the dominant religion of Western cultures. We are told that Christ‟s 
own self-development was accelerated by an extended period of meditation in 
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the Judean desert.281 Why then should those committed to such religious beliefs 
be particularly attached to institutions which foster large scale collaboration?  
 
Perhaps more problematic is Rawls‟ claim that we have a generalised desire to 
express our nature as free and equal persons. There are, we must surely 
recognise, religious belief systems which believe that our good is realised in 
fulfilling our duties to others rather than securing our freedom from their 
demands. The Kantian interpretation of Justice as Fairness, central though it is to 
the argument from congruence, seems sure to demand allegiance to a 
comprehensive belief system that many would reject, and, perhaps more 
importantly, find to violate their most personally important belief systems. 
 
Even a staunch critic of the political turn like Brian Barry is willing to concede 
that, „if the stability of a just society can be securely underpinned only by 
appealing to the "Kantian interpretation'" of the principles of justice. This must 
count as a "comprehensive view" inasmuch as it invokes a particular conception 
of the good: a conception according to which the highest good of human beings 
is to express their free and rational natures.‟282 As Barry points out, this is an 
assessment shared by those far more sympathetic to these developments in 
Rawls‟ intellectual journey, such as Samuel Freeman. Freeman writes, „from 
reading the first hundred pages (chapter 1-8) of A Theory of Justice, it is hard to 
see exactly where Rawls thinks he had to invoke a more comprehensive ethical 
doctrine to justify Justice as Fairness....only when we reach chapter 9 and the 
second stage of the argument for stability, from „congruence,‟ that the deeper 
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basis of the view in Kantian ethics becomes really apparent.‟283 Rawls, his 
supporters and his critics are in unanimous agreement that the central role of the 
Kantian interpretation of Justice as Fairness in the argument from congruence is 
likely to be unconvincing in a society marked by a reasonable pluralism of 
religious and philosophical belief. 
 
Rawls‟ response to his dissatisfaction was to emphasise the „political‟ rather than 
„metaphysical‟ grounds for thinking that his principles of justice were mutually 
acceptable across liberal political communities. The considered judgements that 
we use to construct and test the decision making criteria are presented as those 
which pertain to our shared conception of each other as citizens, rather than as 
moral beings. As the shared conception of the citizen that Rawls identifies in our 
political community is, like the conception of the moral persons, constituted by a 
commitment to freedom and equality, Rawls does not believe that this leads to a 
different set of principles. It is not the principles of justice that are changed in 
Rawls‟ theory, they are the same in Political Liberalism as they are in Theory, but 
rather the grounds upon which individual members of the political community 
come to find the principles to be congruent with their good, and the justification 
offered for the principles amongst the citizenry. Each member sees in political 
institutions not an opportunity to practice and develop her moral nature, but 
recognition of her own conception of citizenship. When persuading a fellow 
citizen of the merits of political institutions we make appeal to our shared political, 
rather than moral, conceptions. 
 
Rawls’ deference as a concession 
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Now that I have explained what is meant by the political turn I am going to 
introduce a common criticism of this development in Rawls‟ political thought. The 
charge is this: by stating that his principles must produce stability for the right 
reasons, and that a plurality of religious and philosophical belief must be 
accommodated in this search for stability, Rawls renders his principles subject to 
concerns that are exterior to the proper concept of justice. The exterior concern is 
whether principles would actually be accepted by the citizenry as being 
congruent with their own good. This, it is alleged, is a very different criterion from 
Rawls‟ previous commitment to political reflective equilibrium, which asks the 
importantly different question of whether the principles are acceptable from a 
point of view that isolates our moral judgement. Only the latter concern, with its 
carefully constructed model of neutrality and its ideal setting, properly directs us 
to the question of what justice is. This criticism was most famously voiced by 
Jürgen Habermas284 in his 1995 'Consensus, Stability and Normativity in Rawls’ 
Political Liberalism,' and Brian Barry in his 'John Rawls and The Search For 
Stability.'285 Although their responses to Rawls were developed independently of 
each other they are similar enough that I shall present them as a united 
challenge.286  
 
To understand Barry‟s critique of Rawls‟ political turn we need to bring together 
the first half of this chapter, on political reflective equilibrium, with the second, on 
stability and congruence. We need to consider the difference between the 
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second stage of reflective equilibrium—that is when we check whether our 
considered moral judgements are consistent with the principles of justice—and  
the process of checking to see whether the principles are congruent with the 
good of flesh and blood citizens. Barry‟s critique amounts to highlighting the 
difference between these two processes, and accusing Rawls of slowly and 
unacceptably collapsing them together.  
 
We can start explaining this charge by noting similarities between the two stages 
of Rawls‟s theory. Considered moral judgements, like the good of citizens in a 
well-ordered society, belong to what we have called flesh and blood citizens 
rather than the abstract and radically disembodied decision makers of the original 
position. However there are good reasons to think we should not be seduced by 
this similarity into thinking that these are identical processes. The test of stability 
for the right reasons is not just an instance of our playing out the process of 
reflective equilibrium. To see why we might think this would be a mistake, 
consider that those attempting to engage in reflective equilibrium are still trying to 
isolate their moral or—to show fidelity to the changes Rawls makes through the 
political turn—political point of view. For evidence see that Rawls tells us in 
Theory that in identifying our moral judgements we must disregard our thoughts 
on matters to which we have a strong emotional or material attachment, for if we 
reason from these examples we are „likely to be influenced by an excessive 
attention to our own interests.‟287 Indeed, we remember that the radical ignorance 
of the original position is supposed to be little more than a device for representing 
the considered judgements of the citizenry. This commitment to isolating the 
moral or political point of view is not something that is true of the flesh and blood 
citizens that are going about their daily lives in the situations that test the stability 
of a society. These citizens are not attempting to reflect upon their understanding 
of what is right, but are instead trying to pursue their own individualised 
                                                          
287
 Rawls, J. 1999. Theory, p42. 
177 
 
conception of the good. Their interests, their emotional attachments and 
everything else that is central to a full conception of the good are thus very much 
on the table.  
 
This observation is important because we have seen that reflective equilibrium is 
part of the justification of the principles themselves. An objective account of what 
is right could, in the absence of any exterior object called justice, only be 
constructed by identifying what is acceptable to all persons when they sincerely 
attempt to express their considered moral judgements about what justice 
demands of them. Barry suggests that whether a set of principles are stable, and 
indeed if they are congruent with the good of citizens, does not have the quality 
of reflecting our moral or political point of view, and thus should not play any part 
in their justification. This is for the good reason that flesh and blood citizens have 
their own interests and mix of motives that quite simply may be in violation of 
their own considered judgements about justice. In a seemingly flippant but 
actually rather pertinent passage he notes that one may come to find the desire 
to go on an expensive trip around the world to be a central component of our 
good once we become flesh and blood citizens. The second stage of reflective 
equilibrium, Barry suggests, would, so long as we have any interest in equality, 
tell us that this is simply an unreasonable claim over others that goes beyond any 
privileges that justice demands. However, what do we do if a vacation adoring 
individual is particularly disruptive and seeks to undermine the whole political 
system in order to get her trip, ought we to alter our principles and accommodate 
her demands to make sure the system is more stable? If we erect a test of 
stability as part of our attempt to identify what justice is, we may very well come 
to answer in the affirmative. This, Barry thinks, would fundamentally undermine 
the normative force of the principles of justice in a society and render them 
subject to the vagaries of human motivation.  The proper thing to do would be to 
dismiss this particular citizen‟s demands as unjust and do so with reference to 
mutually acceptable principles produced from a fair procedure. Stability will either 
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have to be damned, or be sought through an alternative and more coercive 
source. 
 
The accusation that Barry is putting forward is that Rawls‟ search for principles 
which are stable in a society with a plurality of religious and philosophical 
doctrines is analogous to absurdly seeking to compromise with potentially unjust 
demands. Religious and philosophical beliefs do not represent the judgement of 
individuals when they are sincerely seeking to create principles acceptable 
across a political community, and are thus liable to generating claims that go 
beyond that of the reasonable and the right. Justice as Fairness must, Barry 
thinks, be comfortable with the thought that sometimes the full conception of the 
good developed by its citizens will lead to unjust demands, and be willing to 
stand tall and say so. The acceptability of the principles from a position of 
fairness must be separated from their actual acceptance in any given society. 
 
Barry even goes as far as to suggest there is good reason to think that Rawls, at 
the time of Theory, used to agree with him. It is only later, through the course of 
the political turn, that he changed his mind. In support of this claim he points out 
that in Theory Rawls suggests that when a political system is incongruent it must 
find stability from an alternative source, such as active and deliberate coercion.288 
Stability for the wrong reasons was a potentially just if sub-optimal scenario from 
the point of view of Justice as Fairness. However, by the time of Political 
Liberalism Rawls had converted stability for the right reasons from a desirable 
bell and whistle of just principles to part of the justification of principles 
themselves. He had raised the test of stability for the right reasons to the same 
philosophical standing as the second stage of the constructive process, reflective 
equilibrium, by saying that just principles must be self-motivating rather than that 
it is desirable that they are.  We finish our exegesis of Barry‟s critique of the 
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political turn with the following passage. It offers a perfect encapsulation of the 
objection: 
 
„In A Theory of Justice the validity of the theory was unaffected by any 
lack of success it might have in forming a part of a people‟s 
conceptions of their good. For we could say that all conceptions of the 
good incompatible with the principles of justice were necessarily 
unreasonable. But in Political Liberalism, Rawls denies that that a 
regime can be legitimate if there exists people with “reasonable 
comprehensive views” who reject its foundational principles.‟289 
 
We can find clear echoes of Barry‟s critique of the political turn in Jürgen 
Habermas‟ celebrated 1995 essay on Rawls‟ philosophical project. Habermas 
developed the language that we have used here distinguishing between „the 
acceptable‟ from a specific moral vantage point, and the „actually accepted‟ in a 
flesh and blood society. As Habermas puts it, ‘when he (Rawls) calls his 
conception of justice political, his intention appears to be rather to collapse the 
distinction between its justified acceptability and its actual acceptance.'290 
 
Habermas rejects the alleged collapse of the distinction. He welcomes the notion 
that consensus in a constructed position of fairness is a reasonable ground for 
determining the contents of justice. Indeed his own normative philosophy 
suggests something similar; albeit where the ideal decision making situation is 
one of perfectly egalitarian discourse and argumentation rather than Rawls‟ 
                                                          
289
 Barry, B. 1995. John Rawls and The Search for Stability, p890. 
290
 Habermas, J. 1995. Reconciliation Through The Public Use of Reason, p122. 
180 
 
radical ignorance.291 In his essay on Rawls he puts this as „principles are valid 
which meet with uncoerced intersubjective recognition under conditions of 
rational discourse.‟292 However, his own commitment to ideal theory leads him to 
concluding that the question of stability ought to be considered a „further and 
primarily empirical question‟ which is outside of the province of normative 
theory.293 By making the lack of stability a reason to consider and revise a set of 
principles, Rawls‟ theory loses its focus on constructing autonomous principles of 
justice and instead makes distortionary concessions to the preservation of 
political stability.294 This is the unified challenge that Barry and Habermas present 
to the changes Rawls makes through the political turn. 
 
The ideality of the deference 
 
We have seen both the changes that Rawls made to Justice as Fairness through 
the political turn and the accusation of Habermas and Barry that these changes 
reduce the ideality, and thus the normative force, of his principles.  We are now 
ready to see how it is that Rawls defends himself from this particular 
concessionary charge. Rawls‟ self-defence is important to this thesis as we will 
see in the next chapter that it offers a perfectly workable blueprint of how one can 
defend his tolerance of unequalising incentives, and thus ultimately defeat 
Cohen‟s own concessionary charge.  
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At the heart of Rawls‟ defence is a clarification of the status of the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. The fact of reasonable pluralism is not, we shall see, 
straightforwardly a fact. It is instead a 'fact of the free development of human 
reason.' Such facts need to have their own sub-category because they are not 
empirical observations about the external world, but rather necessary 
implications of the conception of the person as free and equal that Rawls‟ 
principles of justice are appropriate for. In a political community committed to the 
freedom and equality of its citizens, those citizens will be able to freely develop 
their reason. The argument is that whilst it would be concessionary to show 
deference to any empirical facts about political cultures, showing deference to a 
fact of the free development of human reason amounts to little more than the 
commitment not to develop principles that are not in contradiction with their own 
aim of being fair across a community of free and equal persons. It is, we argue, 
the failure of Rawls‟ critics to recognise this distinction that gives the misleading 
impression that Rawls‟ deference to the fact of reasonable pluralism reduces the 
ideality and normative force of Rawls‟ position.  
 
Ed Wigenbach, an advocate of a similar line of argument pushed by Habermas 
and Barry, offers a quotation that perfectly summaries the interpretive confusion 
under discussion. In the process of criticising the political turn he laments that: 
 
'Rawls takes historical facts about modern culture as the necessary 
conditions of any discussion about politics or justice. Self-evident 
truths about the common conditions of modern democracy.'295  
 
We start our argument by noting that the two categories that Wigenbach offers as 
synonyms, that is 'historical facts' and 'self-evident truths,' are in reality two very 
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different beasts. It is to the first that Barry and Habermas implicitly accuse Rawls 
of conceding the concept of justice, and not the second. However, the fact of 
reasonable pluralism is much closer to a self-evident truth than a historical fact. It 
is a theoretical and inevitable feature of Rawls’ ideal of pure procedural justice 
rather than a historical truth which he so happens to take seriously.  My argument 
will take the following structure. Firstly I will show why if the fact of reasonable 
pluralism is a „self-evident truth‟ rather than a „historical fact‟ it would not be 
concessionary to be deferential towards it. I then go on to show that Rawls 
unambiguously conceived of the fact of reasonable pluralism as a self-evident 
truth rather than as a historical fact. 
 
Why self-evident truths are special 
 
If reasonable pluralism were simply an historical fact about democratic 
communities we can see why it would be problematic to suggest that political 
principles must be deferential towards it. It might be, as Barry seems to suspect, 
simply the case that religious and philosophical pluralism is, from the point of 
view of justice, an unfortunate feature of modern democratic societies which 
makes justice hard or difficult to obtain without strict coercive practices. Its 
existence should not be reason to alter the justification of the principles unless 
these divergent philosophical and religious belief systems actually alter the 
understanding that citizens have of how they ought to treat each other when they 
sincerely contemplate their considered political judgements. The potential for 
instability, or the need to seek stability for the wrong reasons, is not reason in 
and of itself to alter the way that the principles are justified. Doing so would 
subject the principles to a stage of justification that, unlike reflective equilibrium, 
is outside of our sincere attempt to adopt the moral point of view. 
 
 However, if the fact of reasonable pluralism is not a historical fact but rather a 
„self-evident truth‟ we would have excellent grounds for treating it differently. If 
reasonable pluralism will inevitably be produced in a society that is committed to 
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the autonomy of its citizenry, we develop a new reason for not wanting to 
promote principles that can only be either unstable, or stable for the wrong 
reasons. We remember that the citizenry is ultimately looking to establish political 
principles that will allow each citizen to pursue of his or her own good in a 
framework that is known to be fair to all. This, Rawls thinks, is the only way we 
can properly express our shared commitment to the freedom and equality of 
persons. If it is the case that such an autonomous society would always be 
pluralistic, and Rawls‟ decision makers advance principles that are only 
congruent for believers of a particular fully comprehensive doctrine, then it 
follows that his decision makers are unwittingly exposing themselves to the 
possibility that they will be actively coerced into supporting the basic structure of 
society. If only a minority in the society have this fate fall upon them then we 
might say that it turns out that the basic structure is more hospitable to some 
conceptions of the good life than others. If everyone succumbs to stability for the 
wrong reasons then we will certainly suspect that the basic structure is sub-
optimally arranged for the society in question. 
 
Sub-optimality and lack of neutrality between different conceptions of the good 
are not, in a vacuum, necessarily reasons to dismiss a set of principles. There 
will of course be conceptions of the good which go beyond what justice can grant 
and there will be times where pursuing justice is less important than other goods. 
This is what Barry‟s flippant example reminds us. However, when sub-optimality 
and lack of neutrality are built into the design of the basic structure—when they 
are an inevitable consequence of the way that principles are decided upon—we 
are left with a very different problem. For in such a scenario the participants in 
the constructive process are inevitably subjecting themselves to the possibility of 
these dangers despite the fact the system itself is supposed to be one of mutual 
advantage. They are trying to will for a system whereby each reasonable 
conception of the good can prosper, and, by not taking into account the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, engaging in a task that is certain to fail. It would, in short, 
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be self-contradictory not to make sure that principles are deferential to the fact of 
reasonable pluralism „from the start.‟ 
 
I think we will bring clarity by putting what we have just said in the language of 
constructivism that we developed in chapter 2 of this thesis. We saw that Justice 
as Fairness was supposed to develop principles appropriate to the conception of 
the person or citizen as free and equal. In a political community which values the 
freedom and equality of its citizens, the citizenry will be able to freely develop 
their reason. One inevitable effect of the free development of human realism is 
that there will be a pluralism of beliefs about religious and philosophical issues. If 
political principles are proposed that are only congruent with the good of citizens 
that adhere to a particular religious or philosophical doctrine then there will be 
some persons who are subject to coercion through no fault of their own. To 
coerce an individual for no fault of their own would fail to express our 
commitment to the person as free and equal. It follows, therefore, that in order to 
properly express the conception of the person that Justice as Fairness is 
interested in—that is the free and equal person—we must make sure that 
principles can be accepted by those with a divergent set of religious and 
philosophical beliefs. The fact of reasonable pluralism must be shown deference 
if we are to build principles appropriate to the conception of the person as free 
and equal.  
 
This suggests that the test of stability for the right reasons cannot, as Rawls‟ 
critics suggest, straightforwardly be dismissed as a bell and whistle of just 
principles. Political principles which guarantee instability or stability for the wrong 
reasons are in contradiction with the very ends to which they are supposed to 
aim towards. What is more, we can see that Rawls preserves the ideality of his 
conception of justice. The reason we take the fact of reasonable pluralism into 
account is that it is an implication of the development of the part of the self that 
we want to develop (the capacity to reason that is a moral power), as well as the 
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values we want to express (the respect of the autonomy of other free and equal 
citizens).  
 
Whilst stability for the right reasons is not the test of reflective equilibrium, it is—
so long as the stability considered is a product of the free development of human 
reason—quite properly the sort of thing that has to be considered when we seek 
to determine what justice is. It is, and ought to be, part of the justification of the 
principles themselves. 
 
The fact of reasonable pluralism is not a fact 
 
If we look at the way that Rawls defends his deference to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism we see bountiful evidence that he fully intends the fact of reasonable 
pluralism to be understood as a logical implication of an autonomous political 
community. For example, In Political Liberalism he writes that:  
 
„the diversity of comprehensive... doctrines found in modern 
democratic societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon 
pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture of 
democracy. Under the political and social conditions secured by the 
basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting 
and irreconcilable doctrines will come about and persist.'296  
 
I have added emphasises to the above quotation to highlight certain key features 
of Rawls' understanding of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Namely that it is a 
permanent and necessary feature of societies, such as the one outlined by 
Justice as Fairness, which guarantees citizens basic rights and liberties. The 
claim that reasonable pluralism is not a contingent feature of free and democratic 
societies is intended as a strong one. It is not one that could be made by 
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observing that all hitherto free societies have contained this feature, for such 
inductive reasoning can never guarantee the continuation of a correlation. In 
order for Rawls to make that claim he has to be able to show that there is 
something inherent in the idea of free societies that guarantees reasonable 
pluralism. Rawls establishes such a relationship through an extraordinary 
suggestion. The originality and importance of which I and many others would 
have missed if it were not for Burton Dreben's essay On Rawls and Political 
Liberalism.297 Rawls posits that, if human reason is left to its own devices, it will 
by its very nature come to different conclusions about the moral and 
philosophical questions over which comprehensive doctrines compete. 
 
Rawls is aware that this is a strong claim about the nature of human reason. In 
the section where he explains the fact of reasonable pluralism he asserts his 
claim by way of contrast to rival theories that seek to explain the diversity of 
human thought. His first point of contrast is those that explain diversity solely as 
an 'up-shoot of self- and class interest,'298 where his implied opponents are those 
committed to a form of Marxism that sees religious and philosophical 
consciousness and an epiphenomenon of power. He also mentions those who 
bemoan diversity as the result of an 'understandable tendency to view the 
political world from a limited standpoint.'299 One would only regret a 'limited' 
standpoint if one felt there was a privilege attached to the an 'unlimited' 
standpoint that tends towards universal answers to comprehensive questions, 
which we might think of the traditional and predominant Platonic view in Western 
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thought. Against these two positions Rawls asserts his alternative view, that 
diversity is '(in part) the work of free practical reason within the framework of free 
institutions.'300 As Burton Dreben puts it: Rawls is, 'asserting that it is inevitable—
not inevitable because of some faults in us, but inevitable to the free use of 
human reason—that reasonable and rational people will inevitably differ on 
fundamental doctrines.'301 
 
Rawls concludes his discussion of reasonable pluralism by suggesting 'in framing 
the political and conception so that it can, at the second stage, gain the support 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, we are not so much adjusting that 
conception to the brute forces of the world but to the inevitable outcome of free 
human reason.'302 He could have just as easily observed that the adjustment is 
made not in response to stubborn feature of the real world, but inherent features 
of the ideal society affirmed by Justice as Fairness. He comes closest to making 
this thought explicit when he tells us of his motivation: 
 
„The fact of reasonable pluralism...shows that, as used in Theory, the 
idea of a well-ordered society of justice is unrealistic. This is because it 
is inconsistent with realising its own principles under the best 
foreseeable conditions.‟303 
 
Justice as Fairness as presented in Theory is not a successful realistic 
Utopia. It does not express the best that laws can be given how men are.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated why it is that Rawls' ideal of a community of free 
and equal citizens demands that we pay deference to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. It is not, we saw, a prudential compromise with our desire for stability. 
Nor is it a mistaken extension of the process of reflective equilibrium. Instead, the 
failure of a set of principles to be congruent with those conceptions of the good 
that will inevitably be held in a well-ordered society would show that the initial 
process of construction had failed to properly express a commitment to treating 
citizens as free and equal. It is Rawls' belief that the flesh and blood citizens of 
Theory, freely developing their reason, could not affirm the principles of justice as 
a constitutive element of their own good for the reasons stated in the argument 
from congruence that led to the political turn. This is the impeccably ideal, and 
realistically Utopian, explanation for Rawls' deference to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. 
 
This explanation of the political turn is only the foundation of a two-part 
argument. In the next chapter we shall see that Rawls' tolerance of unequalising 
incentives can be justified on the grounds that they are rendered necessary by 
something that I call the 'fact of uneven attachment.' The fact of uneven 
attachment is, like the fact of reasonable pluralism, not just a feature of societies 
as we find them. It is instead an inevitable consequence of the free development 
of human reason. Proposing principles that would violate the fact of uneven 
attachment would then fail to be affirmed by flesh and blood citizens in a well-
ordered society, and is thus unjustifiable. Ideal theory, as realistic Utopia 
understands it, demands that the concept of justice show deference towards the 
fact of uneven attachment, and ultimately tolerate of unequalising incentives, for 
the same ideal reasons we have seen here that Rawls believes it demands we 
show deference to the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
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Chapter 6: The Fact of Uneven Attachment 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated why Rawls' ideal of principles of justice 
appropriate to a community of free and equal citizens demands deference to the 
fact of reasonable pluralism. The failure of a set of principles to be congruent with 
those conceptions of the good that would inevitably develop in a society 
committed to the free development of the reason of its citizens, such as one 
organised by Rawls‟ principles of justice, would, from the very outset, fail to 
express our shared understanding of the citizen as free and equal.  
 
The explanation offered for the political turn is only the first leg of a two-part 
argument. In this chapter we shall see that Rawls' tolerance of unequalising 
incentives can be justified on the grounds that they are rendered necessary by 
something that I call the 'fact of uneven attachment.' The fact of uneven 
attachment is, like the fact of reasonable pluralism, not just a feature of societies 
as we find them. It is instead an inevitable consequence of the free development 
of human reason. Principles that violate it would thus inevitably fail to be 
congruent with the good of citizens in a well-ordered society. Ideal theory, as 
realistic Utopia understands it, thus demands that the theorist of justice show 
deference towards the fact of uneven attachment, and ultimately unequalising 
incentives, for exactly the same reasons we have seen that Rawls believes it 
demands we show deference to the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
 
To make my argument I will explain what the fact of uneven attachment is and 
make the case that it has the same logical status as the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. Once this has been done I offer a suggestion that the general social 
facts that Rawls‟ citizens take into account must include the fact of uneven 
attachment and that this is enough to render unequalising incentives necessary 
from the ideal point of view of Justice as Fairness. After making clear the 
implications of my claims for both the liberty objection (it has been successfully 
reconstructed) and the concessionary criticism (it has been defeated), I conclude 
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the chapter by dealing with some possible objections to the way that I have 
reconstructed the liberty objection. I will pay particular attention to the idea that 
my reconstruction renders Justice as Fairness unfalsifiable. I accept the charge 
but suggest that it is not fatal to Justice as Fairness, and that unfalsifiable 
theories are the only reasonable response to the task of ideal theory. 
 
Formal argument 
 
We will start the presentation of the second leg of the argument by reiterating the 
formal constraints on principles of justice that Rawls‟ justification of deference to 
the fact of reasonable pluralism commits him to: principles of justice must be 
congruent with those conceptions of the good that inevitably flow from the free 
development of human reason.  
 
For the sake of reference I offer a formalised expression of the argument for such 
a constraint. It merely expresses the claims that we developed in the previous 
chapter: 
 
1) Principles of Justice ought to express our shared 
understanding of the person as free and equal.  
2) To express our understanding of the person as free and equal 
we must not produce principles that will inevitably conflict with the 
good of free and equal persons through no fault of their own.  
3) In a political community that supports the freedom and 
equality of persons we want the citizenry to freely develop their 
reason.  
Ergo 
4) Principles of Justice must not conflict with those conceptions 
of the good that are a product of citizens freely developing their 
reason.  
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We can add the implications for the fact of reasonable pluralism to this general 
argument about the formal constraints placed upon principles of justice: 
 
5) Pluralism of philosophical belief is a natural outcome of the 
free development of human reason. (The fact of reasonable pluralism 
properly understood) 
 
If we then turn conclusion 4) into a premise and combine it with premise 5) we 
find that the following flows: 
 
6) Principles of Justice must not conflict with the conceptions of 
the good that we associate with the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
 
Now that we have outlined the formal constraint that Rawls‟ approach to ideal 
theory places upon principles of justice, and reminded ourselves of the 
consequences for the fact of reasonable pluralism, we are ready to connect this 
to the matter of unequalising incentives. Our argument rests upon demonstrating 
that unequalising incentives are made necessary not by human selfishness, or 
an arbitrary demand for the right to buy and sell our labour as we see fit, but by 
the free development of human reason. I am going to do so in two stages. Firstly 
I am going to argue that there is something called the „fact of uneven 
attachment,‟ which is a logical parallel of our 5th premise. It is, like the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, a set of affairs that will inevitably come about with the free 
development of human reason. I will then argue that, in light of the fact of uneven 
attachment, unequalising incentives are necessary to make sure that principles 
are not inconsistent with those conceptions of the good which Justice as 
Fairness ideally wishes to encourage. 
 
The parallel  
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In this section of the argument we want to show that there is something called 
„the fact of uneven attachment‟ and that it is a logical parallel of the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. We remember that the feature that makes the fact of 
reasonable pluralism play a role in the justification of principles of justice is that it 
the inevitable product of the free development of human reason (Premise 5 of 
our formal argument). As Rawls puts it in Political Liberalism: 
 
'Pluralism... is the natural outcome of activities of human reason under 
enduring free institutions.'304 
 
We thus want to demonstrate that: 
 
Uneven attachment... is a natural outcome of activities of human 
reason under enduring free institutions. 
 
I will start by defining the fact of uneven attachment. The fact of uneven 
attachment states that, under conditions which allow for the free development of 
human reason, it is inevitable that individuals will become more attached to some 
individuals than to others. Attachment here means that the understanding of the 
good life of one individual is bound up in the good of particular other individuals. 
Seeing a particular other live a good life is part of an individual‟s own good life, 
as is helping them live that good life through support, friendship and work. 
 
A couple of points of emphasis need to be drawn out here if what I am saying is 
not to be misunderstood. The fact of uneven attachment doesn‟t just say that 
some individuals care about the good of some other individuals more than they 
care about the good of others. After all, principles of justice exist in part to 
overcome this problem by setting up a basic structure that treats us fairly 
independently of who knows and who likes who. For example, we want principles 
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of distributive justice to guard against the perfectly understandable nepotistic 
urge. We want principles of retributive justice to punish the crime rather 
exonerating the well liked criminal. The fact of uneven attachment says 
something importantly different. We mean that in cases where our interest in the 
good of another is at its most acute—our lovers, our family our best friends—it 
becomes vital to our sense of our own good that we are able to spend our time 
and efforts helping them and seeing them prosper. The just claim made by the 
individual who is unevenly attached to another is not „this other person is to be 
advantaged,‟ it is „I must be able to devote my time and efforts to helping that 
person prosper.‟ This is a vitally important distinction. It does not posit that one 
individual‟s interests ought to be considered more important than others when we 
distribute benefits and burdens in a political community. Instead it says that when 
we understand what the interests of an individual are, a vital stage in any 
constructivist process, we have to take into account their desire to serve some 
individuals more than they serve others. Failure to do so would inevitably subject 
citizens to principles that are inconsistent with their own conception of the good. 
 
An example may help elucidate the idea in question. If I were a parent 
particularly committed to social justice, I may not wish for my sons or daughters 
to receive advantages that cannot reasonably be extended across a political 
community. However, this does not stop me having a vital interest in wanting to 
be one of the persons that administer the just opportunities that they do have 
available to them. Parents want to drive their children to football practices, to take 
them to museums and go on holidays independent of any positional advantage 
such acts have. Their attachment demands it. 
 
How can we demonstrate that what I have called the fact of uneven attachment is 
„a natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free 
institutions?‟ Like Rawls we have no society governed by perfectly free 
institutions that offer a testing ground to look to see if this is a feature of human 
rationality that has always developed. We must instead speculate from the way 
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that human reason has developed in other imperfect environments. The 
development of reason in imperfectly free institutions is as good a foundation for 
speculating about the development of reason in perfectly free institutions as we 
have. I do not anticipate it will be hard to persuade the reader that the fact of 
uneven attachment is true, but I shall still offer an argument from this sound 
basis. 
 
George Orwell‟s dystopian novel, Nineteen Eighty Four, has assumed a position 
in the popular imagination as the perfect exposition of the horrors of a totalitarian 
state.305 This is a well deserved reputation for what is a brilliant work of fiction. We 
turn to Orwell because one of the most disturbing features of his dystopian vision 
appeals to our deep seated interest in being free to devote our time and efforts to 
the good of another. The hero of the novel, Winston Smith, is ultimately arrested 
for various political 'thoughtcrimes.' However, the Thought Police only become 
suspicious of Smith as a result of his clandestine relationship with a woman 
named Julia. In Orwell‟s nightmare society the desire to spend your energy and 
time with a particular individual is reason enough to be suspicious of disloyalty to 
the state. Indeed of all the horrific subversions of political language in the novel I 
find the most egregious is that the department for Law and Order is named the 
Ministry of Love.306 Love, the highest form of uneven attachment, is subverted 
into something that requires devotion to the common cause. The common good 
is not, as it would be in a society that respects the fact of uneven attachment, 
constituted in the knowledge that part of what it is good for individuals is to be 
able to devote their time and efforts to those they are most attached to. 
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Beyond dystopian novels we see plenty more evidence in popular culture that the 
sense that uneven attachment is vital to our moral interests is deeply embedded 
in our thought. A staple of the Hollywood family movie is the damage caused to 
an individual by working in an environment that does not afford them sufficient 
time to spend with their children.307 The sheer volume of popular stories that start 
from this thought surely speaks to a widespread sense that the basic structure of 
our own economies fails to show sufficient deference to the fact of uneven 
attachment.  
 
I would like to finish my case that the fact of uneven attachment is rendered 
inevitable by the free development of human reason by offering the tentative 
suggestion that Rawls himself would have been attracted to this particular line of 
argument. In the section of Political Liberalism in which Rawls offer a theoretical 
justification as to why reasonable pluralism is an inevitable consequence of the 
free development of human reason, The Burdens of Judgement, he offers 
reasons why we inevitably disagree about matters of value. The list he offers is 
brief and the emphasis is largely on our intellectual capacities. However, buried 
in there is an explicit reference to something like the fact of uneven attachment. It 
is not a thought that Rawls extends but it is worth noting it is there. Rawls writes: 
 
„Religious and philosophical doctrines express views of the world and 
our life with one another, severally and collectively, as a whole. Our 
individual and associative points of view, intellectual affinities, and 
affective attachments, are too diverse, especially in a free society, to 
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enable those doctrines to serve as the basis of a lasting and reasoned 
political agreement.‟308  
 
Unequalising incentives 
 
Now that I have established that the fact of uneven attachment is a logical 
parallel of the fact of reasonable pluralism, we have to connect this to Rawls‟ 
tolerance of unequalising incentives. It needs to be shown that the „laws of 
psychology and economics,‟ which Rawls‟ decision-makers take on board in the 
original position, are necessary in order to make sure that principles are not 
proposed that will inevitably conflict with conceptions of the good held by citizens 
with such uneven attachments. 
 
My argument is a simple one: without knowledge of the necessity of some 
unequalising incentives Rawls‟ decision makers are liable to proposing principles 
that they find so radically incongruent with their own good that they would not be 
able to live with the consequences, or only do so with great and undesirable 
difficulty.309 We start with our knowledge that in a well-ordered political community 
there will be uneven attachment. 
 
Uneven attachment is a natural outcome of the free development of 
human reason. 
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From this fact of the free development of human reason we need to know what 
this implies for different sets of social arrangements. One way to go about this 
task would be to start from the assumption that no unequalising incentives are 
present in a political community characterised by the fact of uneven attachment. 
We then ask whether in such a political community citizens would find the basic 
structure to be incongruent with their sense of the good. If the answer is „yes,‟ 
then we know that, without taking on board the necessity of unequalising 
incentives, Rawls‟ theory is in danger of disadvantaging some of his citizens 
through no fault of their own. There has been a failure in the constructive 
process. 
 
To conduct this test I invite you to accept two facts: 1) any political community 
has some offices which carry such vital functions that they have to be occupied 
by some of the members of the citizenry. For example: banking, bureaucratic 
management and medical services; 2) Some of these vital offices require long 
periods of arduous training. The training for these offices thus requires an 
individual to spend less time with those to whom they are attached.310  
 
From these simple facts we can immediately see a problem. Unless those 
unevenly attached individuals are able to offset the cost of training and 
developing skills for vital tasks, perhaps with the promise of longer holidays in the 
future or more money for family holidays so that the time they do have is quality 
time, then it is difficult to see why unevenly attached individuals would ever freely 
undertake the training necessary to fulfil these vital functions. The state would 
                                                          
310
 It can be noted that the focus on training and skills is in conformity with the articulation of the reasons why unequalising 
incentives are necessary in the original edition of Theory: ‘If these inequalities set up various incentives which succeed in eliciting 
more productive efforts, a person in the original position may look upon them as necessary to cover the costs of training and to 
encourage more effective performance.’ Rawls, J. 1971. Theory, p151.
 
199 
 
then have to either not fill these offices or actively coerce individuals into 
performing them. Neither state of affairs represents what we want from our 
politics. It follows, I propose, that unequalising incentives are necessary if we are 
to show fidelity to our commitment to producing principles appropriate to those 
with uneven attachments.  
 
Without knowledge of the need for unequalising incentives, decision-
makers are in danger of producing principles incongruent with those 
conceptions of the good that develop as a result of the fact of uneven 
attachment. 
 
Some philosophically important points about the example I have created need to 
be raised. The only motivational fact (or fact about human nature) that was 
needed to create our example was the fact of uneven attachment. The fact of 
uneven attachment is not however, a brute fact. It is instead an implication of the 
conception of the person we want to express in our politics. Showing deference 
to it is then not a concession to an aspect of the self that members of a political 
community would consider an infirmity, but rather an expression of their own 
ideal. The other facts that were included do not depend upon human motivation. 
Individuals will need to be trained to do difficult and complex tasks in any 
economy which depends upon skilled labour. These are general facts of 
production that are independent of psychological assumptions that characterises 
much of economic theory. As we established in chapter 1 of this thesis, to not 
take such non-social facts into account would move ideal theory away from 
questions of politics and into realm of fantasy. We have then developed a reason 
for tolerating unequalising incentives in conformity with our explanation of 
realistic Utopia. Rawls uses a developmental account of human nature, and a 
commitment to using a conception of the person to isolate those features of 
ourselves that we want to express, to delineate how laws can be in an ideal 
world.  
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We are ready to bring together our argument about the implications of the fact of 
uneven attachment with what we have already shown to be the formal 
constrictions on Rawls‟ ideal principles of Justice. In doing so we offer a concise 
and formalised expression of our argument. We start with the formal constraint of 
principles of justice deduced in the last chapter and combine it with the parallel 
between the fact of uneven attachment and the fact of reasonable pluralism that 
has been made in this: 
 
1) Principles of Justice must not conflict with those conceptions 
of the good that are a product of citizens freely developing their 
reason. 
2) Uneven attachment is a natural outcome of the free 
development of human reason. 
Ergo 
3) Principles of Justice must not conflict with the conceptions of 
the good that we associate with the fact of uneven attachment. 
 
The conclusion 3) is turned into a premise and combined with premise 4), which 
was argued for in the example developed in this section, to finally establish our 
conclusion in 5): 
 
4) Without accepting unequalising incentives, decision-makers 
are in danger of producing principles incongruent with those 
conceptions of the good that develop as a result of the fact of uneven 
attachment. 
Ergo 
5) Principles of Justice must be sensitive to the need for 
unequalising incentives. 
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This is the perfectly ideal reason, consistent with Rawls‟ vow to take men as they 
are and laws as they can be, why Justice as Fairness must tolerate unequalising 
incentives. 
 
The liberty objection 
 
I have repeatedly stated that my argument ultimately comes to rest at variant of 
the liberty objection. I take us to have arrived at our destination. We rejected the 
idea that Rawls‟ principles could justify a right to dispose our labour power as we 
see fit, and instead suggested that all that could be secured from the logic of 
basic liberties was a right not to be coerced into selling our labour to a particular 
employer, or worse into having labour extracted coercively. What we have 
developed since is a form of the liberty objection which is consistent with this 
limited notion of freedom of occupational choice, but still justifies the need for 
some unequalising incentives. 
 
We argued that any political community interested in the development of the 
reason of its citizens will see those citizens become unevenly attached and thus 
face a choice of either offering incentives or coercing people into doing 
particularly difficult and long training exercises. Thus far we have said that 
choosing the latter would be a failure to express our ideals of politics appropriate 
for free and equal persons. We can now add that the restricted interpretation of 
the basic liberty of freedom of occupational choice helps to make sure that this 
moral concern is respected by our institutions. No individual ought to have their 
labour power extracted from them without her consent. It is this perfectly 
extendable thought--which makes no concession to the talented--that ultimately 
renders unequalising incentives necessary from the point of view of Justice as 
Fairness. Our argument is thus ultimately rooted in the moral concern that is 
expressed in the restricted basic liberty of freedom of occupational choice. It is a 
variant of the liberty objection that does not over-state the privileges and claims 
that can be attached under the banner of freedom of occupational choice. 
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Implications for the concessionary criticism 
 
Now that we have clearly articulated our variant of the liberty objection, we are 
ready to see what this means for the concessionary Criticism.  I would like to 
begin by making an observation about one of Cohen‟s minor arguments. We saw 
in Chapter 3 that Cohen believes that the difference principle can be understood 
in two distinct ways, the strict and the lax. In the lax interpretation we take the 
claim that inequalities are necessary to make the worst off as well off as they can 
be to assume the necessity of some unequalising incentives due to the „laws‟ of 
economics.311 In the strict interpretation, which Cohen claims to show a greater 
fidelity to the moral convictions of Rawls‟ citizens, unequalising incentives are not 
assumed in this test of necessity. The difference between these two 
interpretations amounts to the equality within Justice as Fairness that Cohen sets 
out to rescue. 
 
What we have achieved over the past two chapters is to show that Rawls‟ 
stipulation to the test of necessity is not arbitrary, or a concession to human 
selfishness. Instead it is there as it is necessary to make sure that principles are 
not understood and instituted in a way that fails to express our conception of the 
person as free and equal. The stipulation, and the lax interpretation of the 
difference principle, is needed to show consistent fidelity to our ideals. The strict 
interpretation, on the other hand, fails to show such fidelity and thus should be 
rejected from the pure point of view of justice, not because it is infeasible or 
difficult to obtain. It is rejected because it fails to properly express the ideal of 
justice as principles that properly express our conception of the person as free 
and equal.   
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We saw in Chapter 3 that Cohen‟s internal critique of Justice as Fairness 
depended upon the notion that reconciliation through „moral significance‟ and 
„fraternity‟ felt by citizens depended upon an illusion or worse, a deception.312 As 
neither illusion nor deception are acceptable means of persuasion for a political 
community committed to the autonomy of its citizens, this implied that the 
economic „facts‟ Rawls endowed his decision makers with destroyed the 
functional role that Rawls demanded of his own principles. Rawls‟ fact-sensitivity 
was alleged to render his principles lacking in reconciliatory force. This is 
Cohen‟s most important critique of Rawls as it does not depend upon any meta-
philosophcal assumptions that Rawls does not accept, but is instead a direct 
internal attack on the capacity for Rawls‟ method of doing political philosophy to 
produce principles with the virtues he himself claims for them. 
 
The way that we have reconstructed the liberty objection gives us a good reason 
to reject Cohen‟s assertion. The economic facts that Rawls endows his decision 
makers with are not selected because they are unfortunately persistent features 
of societies as we find them. Indeed the fact that we do find them to be true in 
our political communities is not offered as a reason at all. They are instead there 
as they are necessary to ensure that the ideal of principles appropriate to free 
and equal persons is not self-defeated by the lack of knowledge possessed by 
decision-makers about the implications of their own ideal conception of the 
person. The ideal conception of the person dictates which „facts of the 
development of human reason‟ are salient to justice rather than mere facts about 
the world dictating what conception of the person can and cannot be expressed.  
 
We conclude that those raising the liberty objection against Cohen were correct. 
Rawls does think that his citizens would look upon their freedoms in the labour 
market as an expression of the ideal of justice. As Rawls strongly puts it, in 
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Justice as Fairness: 'we expect and indeed want people to care about their 
liberties and opportunities in order to realise these powers, and we think they 
show a lack of self-respect and weakness of character in not doing so.'313 What 
we have shown is that the citizens of a well ordered society are able to assume 
this position, and Rawls‟ principles are able to take on reconciliatory force, 
because of the precise nature of the facts that make unequalising incentives 
necessary. They are facts that develop because we want individuals to freely 
develop their reason; it is in the very conception of the person that Justice as 
Fairness is predicated upon. If his citizens were to come to tolerate just 
unequalising incentives there is no reason to think they are being deceived into 
thinking that those inequalities are necessary to express their own moral point of 
view. Reconciliation in a Rawlsian well-ordered society would preserve the 
political autonomy of the citizenry. 
 
Possible objections 
 
I want to conclude this chapter by dealing with some potential objections that a 
Cohenite might have to my argument. The formality with which we have 
presented the argument makes it very clear what potential avenues of objection 
are available to those wishing to criticise it. There are two premises that are 
subject to possible counter claims which need to be considered. I will briefly deal 
with each of these in turn before moving on, in the following sections, to deal with 
two more fundamental objections to the approach I have developed.  
 
1) The fact of uneven attachment is not inevitable. 
 
The first premise in my argument that is subject to a form of empirical challenge 
is that that the fact of uneven attachment is an inevitable consequence of the free 
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development of reason. A critic could theoretically respond that under free 
institutions it is possible to imagine the mind developing a more egalitarian 
attachment. I do not think that a challenge to this particular premise is likely to be 
popular, but it is worth noting that the only material that is available to us when 
testing the claim is from worlds in which individuals are socialised into thinking 
that part of a good life is a core friendship group, a family and variety of other 
hierarchies of attachment. All of these institutions have been subject to criticisms 
of fundamentally diminishing the free development of reasons. We are tempted 
to say that, even if this is true, these institutions are so universal that they must 
exist to serve natural human sentiment. However, we must temper our certainty 
by noting that this is a claim we are in no position to test as there are no worlds 
where human reason has been able to develop free of unjust coercion.  
 
2) The fact of uneven attachment does not render unequalising 
incentives necessary. 
 
A central claim in our argument that is far more likely to be challenged is that the 
fact of uneven attachment renders unequalising incentives necessary. I say this 
is far more likely to be challenged as the opposite point of view, that even in a 
state of affairs where there is uneven attachment unequalising incentives would 
not be necessary to attract workers to important offices, has an obvious and 
popular standard bearer in Karl Marx. Marx describes, in Critique of the Gotha 
Programme, how he imagines man to transition from capitalism through a form of 
centralised socialism finally into what he calls „full communism.‟314 We may 
observe that in his depiction of full communism there is an apparent commitment 
to uneven attachment. One of the reasons that full communism does away with 
contribution-based distributive principles is to show proper concern for the 
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special interests that a worker develops in becoming a father or husband.315 
However, under full communism unequalising incentives are absent as all 
primary good are distributed on the basis of needs and work is distributed on the 
basis of ability to perform roles. Marx uses his own developmental account of 
human nature to suggest how such  productive system could become possible. If 
the productive forces are organised in a way that satisfies human needs 
independent of who produces them, then the individual comes to recognise that 
in his labour he is afforded the best opportunity to express his commitment to 
himself and to his fellow citizens. In Marx‟s famous phrase, „labour not only 
becomes a means of life but life‟s prime want.‟316  
 
To this line of response we reiterate the precise details of what the fact of uneven 
attachment states. We are not merely concerned with the interests of our loved 
ones being furthered in a political arrangement, something that is satisfied by 
Marx‟s distributive principle under full communism, but our ability to share a role 
in their pursuit of those interests. This is necessarily something that involves the 
capacity to remove ones labour and devote their time to non-labouring activities, 
rather than labour becoming one of life's prime wants. We can thus see that the 
most famous example of a line of an alternative conception of how labour could 
be distributed once human reason is able to develop fails to satisfy the demands 
put forward by the fact of uneven attachment. Marx‟s disagreement with Rawls is 
then really about the way that human reason would develop, and is thus a variety 
of the first objection, rather than about the implications of uneven attachment. 
 
Compensation or Incentives 
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A clarification needs to be made to ensure that the argument I am making is not 
thought to rest upon a failure to make a proper distinction between 
„compensation‟ and „incentives.‟  
 
Egalitarians have little problem dealing with cases whereby individuals require 
extra remuneration because the tasks they are carrying out are particularly 
burdensome. To offer additional remuneration for particularly burdensome tasks 
is simply to make sure that there is a properly egalitarian distribution of relief from 
burden and financial compensation as any properly egalitarian scheme takes into 
account a matrix of benefits and burdens when making distributive decisions. 
Most egalitarians would also advocate unequal resources in cases where an 
individual requires greater resources in order to have the same opportunity for 
welfare as other persons, such as a blind person requiring a guide dog. Cohen, 
for example, clearly states that a perfectly egalitarian society must compensate 
individuals for „special needs‟ or „specific burdens of their job‟ but stresses that 
this is conceptually different from „incentives.‟317  
 
Where incentives are involved we are dealing with cases whereby individuals are 
compensated in a way that moves away from an egalitarian distribution of 
benefits and burdens in order to get people to perform a certain task and, or, to 
perform it well. To pay an individual more money to work on an oil rig than they 
would receive for an inland job is to offer an egalitarian distribution of benefits 
and burdens. To pay someone extra to do an already attractive task, or a task no 
more burdensome than others, is to incentivise.  
 
The problem that my argument faces is that it might appear that the incentives 
necessitated by the fact of uneven attachment are more accurately depicted as 
egalitarian compensations, either for the special needs brought about by having 
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children or the special burden brought about by long and arduous training. If this 
is so then the fact of uneven attachment does not render unequalising incentives 
necessary but rather an egalitarian system sensitive to the special burdens and 
needs that the fact of uneven attachment brings about. Cohen has no problem 
stating that justice and equality demand compensation in such circumstances.318 
 
In order to demonstrate that my argument does not rest upon this conflation I 
would like to once again draw an analogy between the fact of uneven attachment 
and the fact of reasonable pluralism. It is my contention that in cases of 
reasonable pluralism we permit transfers that go beyond a mere recognition of 
special burden or special need and that this helps render clear an important 
feature of the extra remuneration demanded by our deference to the fact of 
uneven attachment. The extra remuneration demanded by the fact of uneven 
attachment and the fact of reasonable pluralism are a recognition of voluntary 
expensive tastes that egalitarians, particularly of the Cohenite stripe, do not 
usually consider to be demanded by equality. They are unequalising rather than 
compensatory transfers yet still demanded by justice. 
 
Before I can make this argument a little more work needs to be done explaining 
the relationship between compensation for „burdens‟ and „special needs,‟ and the 
idea of voluntary and involuntary expensive tastes.  
 
Expensive tastes are those preferences or facts about individuals that mean that 
they need more resources in order to have the same amount of welfare as other 
persons.319 The earlier case of the individual who was blinded for no fault of their 
own, who needs the extra resource of a guide dog, is an example of the sort of 
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involuntary expensive taste that egalitarians are usually happy to compensate 
for. Cohen is willing to follow the logic of these examples to its conclusion and 
state that any genuinely involuntary expensive taste demands compensation 
from the point of view of equality. If an individual genuinely has no opportunity for 
welfare in the absence of fine wines and high-end dining, and has not 
purposefully cultivated such tastes, then from the point of view of equality they 
ought to be compensated. Compensation in such circumstances, Cohen argues, 
is merely correcting involuntary disadvantage, genetically endowed expensive 
tastes, which is arbitrary from the moral point of view.320 The correlative of this is 
that any disadvantage with regards to converting resources to welfare which is a 
result of voluntary action does not require compensation from the point of view of 
equality. If we give extra resources to an uninsured skier who has crashed and 
requires extra medical attention we do so out of a moral sense, perhaps charity 
or compassion, that is quite distinct from equality.  
 
If we turn to the fact of reasonable pluralism I think it is pretty clear that there are 
preferences and desires that are generated as a result of the inevitable pluralism 
of religious belief that we recognise as amounting to a voluntary expensive taste 
yet do not mind making unequalising allowances for. For example, I would expect 
most liberals to believe that it is a voluntary decision to fast during Ramadan and 
simultaneously that Muslim‟s ought to be afforded relief from physical burdens at 
the workplace during the month if they request it without facing any monetary 
penalties. Many would also accept the case for public funding of a place of 
worship for a newly migrated religious community whilst again accepting that 
religious belief is a matter of personal choice. The key feature here is that whilst 
a pluralism of religious belief itself is an inevitably determined by the structure of 
liberal society, the actual religious observances of individuals remains a matter of 
voluntary choice. As, from the point of view of justice, we know that people will 
develop these beliefs that are central to their good we have reason to defer 
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resources and allowances when they do in fact occur even though we know 
ourselves not to be compensating for involuntary expensive tastes or special (in 
the relevant Cohenite sense) religious needs.  
 
The behavioural patterns and preferences that will inevitably develop as a result 
of the fact of uneven attachment are of the same quality. The claim of talented 
individuals that they need extra resources in order to be happy preparing in 
training for particular tasks, or to be happy living in given parts of the world, than 
less talented people would, is certainly a voluntary expensive tastes that equality 
does not demand that we compensate for. However, as we know that these 
tastes will inevitably develop and in a given society we could only create a basic 
structure which compels the talented to do these tasks without additional 
compensation in the knowledge that we are going to subject individuals to a 
diminishment of their good. Justice but not equality demands that we show 
deference towards these facts. 
 
 
Please note that the claim is not that the untalented do not develop such 
expensive tastes. They are just as likely to do so as the talented. However, I am 
assuming that the skills of the talented are scarce where as those of the 
untalented are replicable.  If I were to say I can‟t possibly do foreign office 
training without extra compensation allowing me to fly home to see my loved 
ones then the foreign office would find someone else equally skilled happy to do 
the task without unequalising incentives. If, however, the one person who speaks 
a vital language fluently were to do the same they would face a very different 
situation. Compelling a person to work without additional compensation would be 
to subject them to unhappiness as a result of their talents, giving them extra 
compensation would be to offer an incentive in response to a voluntarily 
cultivated expensive taste. 
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A possible objection to the line of argument I have pursued here needs to be 
addressed. Cohen claims that Rawls believes that „justice ignores expensive 
tastes.‟321 If this were straightforwardly true it would be problematic for my 
argument because it would imply that the voluntary expensive tastes generated 
by the facts of uneven attachment and the facts of reasonable pluralism were 
outside of concerns of justice. However, Rawls actually says something 
importantly different from what Cohen attributes to him. Whilst Rawls does say 
that citizens ought to „take responsibility for their own ends‟ and that society is not 
responsible for the „strength and psychological intensity of their claims,‟ he does 
so with an important caveat.322 The caveat is that we must show collective 
concern for wants and desires that amounts to an individual‟s „needs and wants 
as a citizen.‟  
 
This caveat is important as one can clearly see that without having the needs 
and wants generated by the fact of uneven attachment, or indeed the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, shown deference towards it is hard to stand in a 
relationship of liberal citizenship with those you share a political space with. A 
political community that demands allegiance which violates affectionate or 
reasonable religious concerns wishes to impose something akin to the status of 
subject on the individual. The individual can quite legitimately say to her fellow 
citizens that any political community they wish to be a part of must allow them to 
make economic decisions that put a large weight on these matters. However, 
when they do we have seen they are not demanding compensation for an 
involuntary expensive taste or a particularly burdensome task. 
 
The conclusion of our analysis of the preferences and desires developed as a 
result of the fact of uneven attachment is that extra remunerated introduced in 
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order to show deference towards them does not necessarily have the quality of 
being compensatory. Justice demand unequalising incentives not solely to 
compensate for special burdens or involuntary expensive tastes but also to 
provide incentives in the face of desirable and inevitable voluntary expensive 
tastes. The fact of uneven attachment generates the need for unequalising 
incentives and not merely compensation for burdens.  
 
Unfalsifiable theory 
 
I would like to finish with what I think is the strongest criticism of the line of 
argument that I have sought to pursue. The criticism is that my interpretation of 
realistic Utopia renders Rawls‟ theory unfalsifiable. Unlike the previous three 
objections this is not an attack on the premises of the argument, or the 
coherence of the distinctions that the argument relies upon, but rather the 
plausibility of the whole style of argument. This is not, I concede, a claim that we 
can reasonably reject. However, we ought not to think that this admission causes 
terminal damage to Rawls‟ theory. Unfalisifiability is instead a feature of ideal 
theory that Rawlsians must embrace, albeit with due caution. 
 
A theory or statement is unfalsifiable if it is impossible to demonstrate that its 
claims are false.323 The easiest way to grasp the idea is to by way of its opposite: 
the falsifiable statement. If I, having only ever come across swans that are white, 
were to infer that „all swans are white,‟ all that one would need to show that my 
claim is false is to observe a single case of a non-white swan. This could be done 
with a short trip to Dawlish Warren. „All swans are white‟ is then a false but 
importantly falsifiable claim. This is useful to us because it is impossible for any 
individual or institutions to observe every swan in the world and across all time 
periods, and thus we are not able to confirm the claim that all swans are white by 
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the process of direct observation. What is more, because categorical statements 
are supposed to be claims about the future, and the problem of induction tells us 
that x having always followed y is not enough reason to assert with certainty that 
x will always follow y, the problem of the verifiability of categorical claims is a 
constant menace. This is what leads advocates of „falsifiablity‟ to claim that any 
categorical statements about empirical facts must be falsifiable. By making a 
claim that is subject to falsifiablity we have a reason to believe that, so long as it 
actually hasn‟t been falsified, it represents the best available extrapolation of our 
inevitably limited empirical knowledge. If a categorical claim about the external 
world is not falsifiable, then we lose this source of security of our knowledge. 
 
Our justification for the ideality of Rawls‟ theory depends upon the claim that „the 
fact of uneven attachment is an inevitable result of the free development of 
human reason.‟ We saw that this is a parallel to a claim that Rawls himself makes 
about his deference to different opinions about religious and philosophical 
beliefs. To wit, „the fact of reasonable pluralism is an inevitable product of the free 
development of human reason.‟ Both of these are categorical claims about the 
development of human nature. They are instances of Rawls „taking men as they 
are.‟ 
 
The question that one might be tempted to ask is the following: are either of 
these categorical empirical claims falsifiable? The answer, I submit, is clearly not. 
Firstly the claims are made through a process of speculation about the way that 
man‟s nature would develop if it were the case that our reason was allowed to 
develop autonomously in a well-ordered society. Rawls does not believe us to 
live in well-ordered societies, but instead makes his claim on the basis of the way 
that our reason has developed in nearly just and nearly well-ordered societies. I 
have done the same for the fact of uneven attachment. The result is that we do 
not have available to us the correct conditions necessary to allow us to test the 
claim by the process of looking for cases whereby there is a well-ordered society 
which does not demonstrate either „reasonable pluralism‟ of „uneven attachment.‟ 
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If these are inferential claims they are not, in contrast to „all swans are white,‟ 
claims that we have reason to be more certain of in light of their non-falsifiablity. 
They are unfalsifiable claims. 
 
One may object to my characterisation of the „fact of uneven attachment‟ and „the 
fact of reasonable pluralism‟ as unfalsifiable by suggesting that I have been too 
strict in my understanding of what a falsifiable claim is. I have asked for a claim 
to be falsifiable given our present epistemic capacities, but, could we not make 
reasonable speculations and frame them with the thought in mind that they ought 
to be falsifiable in the future?  If you remember in the last chapter where I used 
the discovery of the Higgs Boson to explain a misinterpretation of reflective 
equilibrium, the empirical claim made by Higgs was not, at the time, in anyway 
testable.324 This is because it depended upon a speculation about the properties 
of a field of the physical world that we did not have the equipment to observe. 
However, Higgs‟ claim was at the very least theoretically falsifiable. He could say 
to his fellow scientists that „if it were the case that we could create x conditions‟ 
then there will be bosons which do not change and have a high mass.‟ It follows 
that „if we create x conditions and we do not observe bosons with high mass, 
Higgs‟ speculations are false.‟ Could Rawls‟ claims about the free development of 
human reason not be defended on the same grounds? 
 
Rawls‟s speculations about the development of human nature ought not, I think, 
to be afforded this status of „theoretical falsifiablity.‟ To do so would ignore the 
difficulty that there is in properly specifying the content of „conditions x‟ under 
which the claims could theoretically be tested. This is because the only potential 
candidate for „conditions x,‟ the free development of human reason is, in itself, an 
ideal state of affairs that we are uncertain of the appearance of. If someone were 
to point to a society which is not pluralistic or possesses an unusually egalitarian 
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distribution of attachment, they would have the further problem of then having to 
show that the society truly is one where human reason has been able to develop 
autonomously. This might sound like a possible task until one considers the 
difficulty of distinguishing between autonomous co-operation between equals and 
the dominance of one party over the other. Does a parent or teacher imbuing a 
child with a set of concepts about how to consider and evaluate the world count 
as heteronomous source? If so, how is it that we can even conceive of human 
reason developing? Sensible people may come up with wise suggestions about 
that division, but, unlike the conditions laid out by natural scientists, they do so 
knowing that they are trying to draw a line under what is probably an essentially 
contestable demarcation. There can be no specification of what amounts to the 
free development of human reason. There does not appear to be any way of 
rendering Rawls‟ theory falsifiable. 
 
Normative theory and non-falsifiablity 
 
This chapter has argued that the liberty objection is justifiable on the grounds that 
a tolerance of unequalising incentives is necessary to render Justice as Fairness 
consistent with the face of uneven attachment. I then went to suggest that the 
greatest difficulty for this line of response, and indeed Rawls‟ own justification for 
his deference to the fact of reasonable pluralism, is that it renders his theory 
unfalsifiable. I want to conclude this chapter by offering some reasons why we 
might think that this criticism does not cause terminal damage to Rawls‟ theory. 
 
Falsifiablity is, we have seen, a criterion used for having certainty in our 
categorical beliefs about the external world. The notion that falsifiablity is an 
important characteristic of such claims rose to prominence in the philosophy of 
science thanks to the work of Karl Popper.325 However, Popper‟s claim is made in 
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the specific context of attempting to properly demarcate between „scientific‟ and 
„non-scientific‟ knowledge. Popper‟s original motivation for drawing such a line 
was to attack the scientific pretentions of Karl Marx‟s historicism, which Popper 
believed to suffer from the same problems of specifying „conditions x‟ as we have 
identified in Rawls‟ developmental account of human nature.326 The Marxist, 
challenged with the claim that the predictions of historical materialism has failed 
to come true, could always take refuge in the suggestion that the productive 
forces have, as of yet, not ceased to develop. Historical Materialism, by not 
sufficiently specifying the conditions under which a revolution would come about, 
rests upon an unfalsifiable claim about the inevitability of a socialist revolution. 
Popper suggests that it is this feature of Marx‟s theory that makes it non-
scientific.327  
 
What is clear is that John Rawls‟ theory of justice, unlike Karl Marx‟s theory of 
history, does not claim to be scientific. It is self-consciously a work of normative 
ideal theory which might not necessarily require the same level of certainty in our 
knowledge as we would expect in scientific claims. This is the line that I would 
like to pursue with some observations about the tough choices that normative 
theorists have to make in the face of radical epistemic uncertainty. 
 
We introduced this thesis with an explanation of why normative theorists are 
interested in ideal theory. The basic premise that we offered is that political 
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philosophers need to know how we would behave if we weren‟t constrained by 
this or that fact if they are to properly isolate our moral perspective rather than 
how we prudentially respond to contingent circumstances. This thesis has 
centred round whether the normative theorist's indifference to facts ought to be 
extended to facts about human nature. G.A. Cohen insists that it should where as 
Rawls believes that it should not. However, we have seen that Rawls is not really 
interested in brute facts about human nature but rather speculations about how 
human nature would develop if we had a politics that properly expressed those 
aspects of the self that we wanted it to. We have thus far presented these two 
approaches as different conceptions of the ideal, one reconciling us with the 
limits of possibility and other prepared to go beyond the possible. However, we 
could just as easily consider them to be different approaches to the radical 
uncertainty that there is about where the limits of human nature lie.  
 
We have available to us a wealth of information about the „laws‟ and „rules‟ of 
psychology, sociology and economics which describe the cumulative effects of 
human behaviour. However, there is no pretence that whatever motivational 
capacities and desires that are expressed in these laws represent fixed barriers 
that humans will never go beyond. Cohen‟s response to the uncertainty that we 
have about what humans can and cannot motivate themselves to do is to 
suggest that we theorise under the assumption that there are no limits. This way 
we can be certain that we are never settling for something short of our best. 
Rawls‟ desire for the individual to achieve autonomy means that this is a path 
that is simply not available to him. Cohen‟s reaction to uncertainty about the limits 
of human motivation subjects the individual to permanently questioning whether 
they could achieve better or more. By encouraging us to make reasonable 
speculations as to what we can and cannot accept from the point of view of the 
ideal Rawls encourages us to sincerely contemplate the limits of human 
motivation so that, at least theoretically, we can be satisfied with our 
achievements.  
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We can note that Cohen‟s response, entirely fact-insensitive as it is, does not 
commit him to any unfalsifiable speculations. That is simply because he refrains 
from making any speculations about the development of human nature at all. If 
ideal theory is to be reconciliatory, it must respond to the radical fallibility we have 
about the limits of human nature by taking the other course. It must speculate, 
cautious all the while of the nature of its activity. We have no other way of 
engaging in ideal theory that does not either restrict us to our present moral 
failings or permanently deny us the possibility of autonomous reconciliation with 
our political arrangements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the first half of this chapter we used the structure of Rawls‟ defence of his 
deference to the fact of reasonable pluralism as a template for reconstructing the 
liberty objection. We saw that it is perfectly reasonable to endow decision-makers 
with a tolerance of unequalising incentives if we accept that the free development 
of human reason would inevitably lead to the uneven attachment between 
citizens. This is a fact, inherent in the logic of Rawls‟ ideal, which his ideal theory 
of justice simply must respond to.  
 
Although we have offered this reconstructed version of the liberty objection as a 
viable response to the concessionary criticism we did not do so without 
recognising the difficulties that it poses for Rawls‟ approach to ideal theory. By 
interpreting the need to „take men as they are‟ as requiring him to speculate 
about the demands of a freely developed and autonomous human reason Rawls 
leaves himself open to the charge that his theory is unfalsifiable. This potential 
criticism of Justice as Fairness is one that stands independent of whether one 
accepts my reconstruction of the liberty objection as it clearly stands against his 
own justification for his deference to the fact of reasonable pluralism. Despite 
raising this concern, however, it is one that I have offered us good reasons to 
reject. Normative theory, I suggest, unlike scientific claims, has to embrace the 
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radical uncertainty of human knowledge if it is to be performed properly. This is 
true of whatever approach one takes to ideal theory. I have then offered what I 
believe the best possible avenue for overcoming Cohen‟s concessionary criticism 
and in doing so defended the plausibility of realistic Utopia as a method of 
constructing ideal principles that is not inherently concessionary.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis began by stating clearly what was at stake in resolving the 
disagreement between John Rawls and G.A. Cohen about what distribution of 
obligations and duties in a society amount to justice. I argued that the dispute, 
whilst ostensibly about the permissibility of unequalising incentives, is best 
understood as a disagreement about how political philosophy ought to be 
conducted if our political language is to be able to help us clearly articulate our 
political ideals and criticise our moral failings. It is a dispute about how 
philosophy must be done if we are to afford the correct power to our political 
language. Cohen‟s most important claim in this dispute is that Rawls‟ method of 
realistic Utopia, endowing his decision makers with the facts about themselves 
that are necessary to make decisions as it does, will always produce principles 
which are subject to various infirmities within human nature, and will thus fail to 
produce the ideal principles which are necessary to perform the reconciliatory 
function that Rawls himself demands of them.  
 
The argument that I have developed shows that Cohen‟s critique of Rawls fails to 
substantiate this thesis: realistic Utopia is not necessarily concessionary. I did so 
by showing that reasonable assumptions about the free development of human 
reason gives us reason to believe that, without a tolerance of unequalising 
incentives, principles of justice will always be inconsistent with the good of some 
of the citizenry and thus produce the need for stabilising coercive practices. This 
was shown to amount to an ideal reason to tolerate unequalising incentives in 
precisely the same way that Rawls‟ response to the fact of reasonable pluralism 
was ideal: failure to do so would have amounted to accepting the design of a 
decision making procedure in contradiction with its citizen‟s desire for 
autonomous politics.  A modified version of the liberty objection was thus shown 
to be possible once one properly considers the formal constraints that Rawls‟ 
commitment to ideal theory places upon ideal concepts. What is more, these are 
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formal constraints that look reasonable in light of the options available to the 
political philosopher and the functional aims of ideal theory. 
 
In this conclusion I wish, for the sake of clarity, to summarise the contours of that 
argument and make some remarks about its importance. I have, I think, 
demonstrated an important strength of realistically Utopian philosophy that 
should be considered by all those who consider themselves to be advocates of 
ideal theory. In short it is possible, contra Cohen, to come up with concrete and 
ideal principles within its parameters that are not concessions to infirmities within 
human nature. In particular Rawls‟ method has the capacity to produce principles 
of justice that have the reconciliatory force that he attributes to them. However, in 
making this argument I have also rendered clear some of the weaknesses that 
are inherent in Rawls‟ approach. Most importantly I have shown how speculative 
it requires the philosopher to be about the possible constraints of an always 
developing human reason. I finish this essay with some thoughts on where this 
leaves normative political philosophy, in particular what the implications are for 
the substantive political issue of how we ought to respond to increasing 
inequalities in income and wealth.   
 
Outline of the argument 
 
My argument began by outlining the differences between Cohen and Rawls‟ 
respective conceptions of ideal theory. It was established that the two disagreed 
about whether ideal theory had to be entirely fact-insensitive and that this 
disagreement rested upon slightly divergent views about what ideal principles 
ought to be able to do. That is what I called their function. Whilst Cohen is 
comfortable with the thought that ideal principles may represent demands that go 
beyond the contours of human nature, as those principles could still play a vital 
critical role, Rawls is committed to the notion that political principles ought to be 
able to play a reconciliatory task in a just political community. This is the realistic 
Utopia that his ideal theory aspires towards. It was noted that as Rawls did not 
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believe us to be living in anything but a fundamentally unjust political community 
the role of his ideal principles would be, in practice, as „critical‟ or „inspirational‟ as 
Cohen‟s. 
 
Having established this fundamental division in the meta-philosophy between our 
two protagonists the next chapter presented Cohen‟s „concessionary criticism‟ of 
Justice as Fairness. This chapter demonstrated that Cohen‟s critique of Rawls 
does not rely upon meta-philosophical premises that Rawls could not accept, and 
was instead developed as an internal and dialogical critique. His concessionary 
criticism, properly understood as an internal critique of Rawls‟ project, suggests 
that the facts of psychology and economics which Rawls endows his decision 
makers with, which ultimately lead to the toleration of unequalising incentives, 
render the sense of fraternity and reconciliation through moral significance in 
Rawls‟ political community illusionary. If the citizens of Rawls‟ well-ordered 
society are reconciled to the political order they are so on the basis of the sort of 
false beliefs that Rawls explicitly rules out from playing a role in autonomous 
public reason. Cohen‟s concessionary criticism is thus a mortal threat to Rawls‟ 
claim that his middle-ground approach to fact-sensitivity can produce ideal 
principles. It is an existential threat to the viability of the realistically Utopian 
approach to political philosophy. 
 
The next stage in the argument was to present what is usually considered to be 
the most plausible response to the concessionary criticism: the liberty objection. 
The liberty objection is the claim that Cohen is wrong to imagine that 
unequalising incentives are rendered necessary by parts of the self that we 
consider to be immoral or unduly selfish, but are instead a reflection of the 
priority that a free community of equals would afford to the basic liberty of 
freedom of occupational choice. Unequalising incentives are necessary, 
according to this popular line of argument, for the perfectly ideal reason that it is 
a just demand that each individual be sovereign over her labour time. This, 
proponents of the liberty objection argue, is precisely how inequalities generated 
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by necessary incentives would be perceived by members of a well-ordered 
Rawlsian society. 
 
Although this essay comes to support a variety of the liberty objection, it only 
does so having exposed some previously unexamined difficulties with this line of 
response. In particular it is shown that on the basis of the egalitarian proviso that 
Rawls attaches to basic liberties, and his understanding that unequal liberties 
would fail to show equal respect to the citizenry, that many of claims and 
privileges associated with the term „freedom of occupational choice‟ are in fact 
very clearly not basic liberties. Textual support was offered for my scepticism of 
the straight-forward liberty objection in that Rawls does not mention freedom of 
occupational choice as a basic liberty in the lists he offers in Theory, and that 
where he does mention freedom of occupational choice elsewhere it is most 
plausibly read as advocating a far more constrained set of privileges and claims 
than raisers of the liberty objection need it to do. The liberty objection, I at this 
point provisionally conclude, has thus far not been levied in a way that would 
defeat Cohen‟s concessionary criticism. 
 
Despite the destructive assault on the liberty objection carried out in Chapter 4 of 
the thesis I then go on in following two chapters to rebuild the objection out of the 
rubble that I have created. The liberty objection can be successfully levied by 
arguing that unequalising are necessary given what I call the „fact of uneven 
attachment.‟ The fact of uneven attachment is deliberately named in a way that 
pays homage to Rawls‟ own arguments for why his theory must pay deference to 
„the fact of reasonable pluralism.‟ They are both not facts about the world but 
rather inevitable features about the flesh a blood citizens of a well-ordered 
society. If political principles could not be found to be acceptable by the flesh and 
blood citizens of a free community of equals then it must be the case that they 
have not been appropriately constructed. This is not, I was clear to point out, 
because of the demands of reflective equilibrium. It is instead necessary to not 
develop principles that inevitably cannot be accepted by flesh and blood citizens 
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of a well-ordered society because doing so would demand the coercive practices 
of „stability for the wrong reasons‟ and thus automatically produce principles in 
contradiction with the collective and ideal desire for autonomy.  
 
The reconstruction of the liberty objection that I have just outlined is a rather 
complex and tricky task. That is why it is broken into two chapters. I first establish 
why ideal principles must be acceptable to flesh and blood citizens, using the 
arguments that Rawls‟ uses in his response to Habermas‟ and Barry‟s critique of 
Rawls‟ deference to the fact of reasonable pluralism. The next chapter then 
outlines why the fact of uneven attachment ought to be considered as a logical 
parallel of the fact of reasonable pluralism. It too is an inevitable product of the 
free development of human reason and thus any ideal theory must show 
deference towards it. As a political community lacking unequalising incentives is 
in conflict with the fact of uneven attachment it must be the case that a set of 
ideal principles shows deference to those incentives. A tolerance of unequalising 
incentives has been demonstrated as necessary by the logic of Rawls‟ 
conception of ideal theory, and thus Cohen‟s concessionary criticism has been 
defeated. 
 
The political implications of realistic Utopia  
 
Now that I have outlined the argument presented in this thesis I want to finish 
with some thoughts about what I think the implications are. There are, I suggest, 
important substantial lessons that can be drawn from the arguments presented. 
These are lessons that go beyond the obvious contribution the thesis makes to 
the theoretical discussion about how ideal theory ought to be conducted and the 
role of fact-sensitivity in normative theory.  
 
The relevant substantial debate is that over the permissibility, from the point of 
view of justice, of unequalising incentives. Ought we to allow talented individuals 
large salaries that attract them to perform socially useful tasks, but which in so 
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doing move us further away from other more egalitarian judgements we have 
about how benefits and burdens ought to be distributed in a society? 
 
The first thing I would like to say is that whether one is more sympathetic to the 
arguments of Rawls or Cohen it is unlikely to have an effect on one‟s judgements 
as to whether the unequalising incentives that pervade our own society are just 
or unjust. Whilst it is not wrong to conceive of Rawls‟ position to be more tolerant 
of unequalising incentives than that of Cohen‟s, it is simply the case that the 
unequalising incentives we face fall way short of the criteria that we have seen 
Rawls puts forward as necessary before such distributions can be sanctioned by 
justice. The criteria is, we remember, that the incentives are strictly necessary to 
make the worst off as well off as they can be. If it is not the case that they a set of 
unequalising incentives are strictly necessary to achieve this task, then Justice 
as Fairness would not bestow the word justice upon them.  
 
This is a strict criteria but it has not stopped politicians making rhetorical use of 
Rawls‟ language and arguments to justify actually existing inequalities. For 
example, both of the major political parties of the United Kingdom have sought to 
justify the incomes of the very rich on the basis of their being necessary to 
improve the lot of the worst off in Britain. In a characteristically unapologetic 
defence of the super rich of London, Conservative Mayor Boris Johnson stresses  
„the prodigious sums of money that they (the rich) are contributing to the tax 
revenues of this country, and that enable us to look after our sick and our elderly 
and to build roads, railways and schools.‟328  The inequalities that he actively 
promotes are justified publicly on the basis of the benefits that they bring to the 
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sick and elderly. This line of almost Rawlsian reasoning,329 that the increasing 
wealth of the rich is justified on the basis that it brings advantages for the least 
well off, is repeated by the Labour Party. Tony Blair told Jeremy Paxman in a pre-
election 2001 interview that he didn‟t mind income inequality „so long as the least 
well-off were doing better off in absolute terms.‟330 
 
Politicians are of course unlikely to use the technical language of Rawls‟ theory 
when making these sorts of arguments, or even mention Rawls by name. Indeed 
evidence suggests that the particular politicians in question may never have even 
read A Theory of Justice at all.331 However, this does not stop those who make 
their living commenting upon professional politics making a public connection 
between these loosely expressed policy principles and comprehensive and 
complex philosophical theories. For example, The Economist assures us that 
President Obama‟s second-term interest in income inequality is the product of 
something that they call his „Rawlsian heuristic.‟ For good measure its journalist 
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tells us that Rawls‟ principles are „too demanding‟ for the realities faced by actual 
policy makers but „the gist‟ of his approach is „excellent.‟332 This is a rhetorical 
phenomenon that transcends the right/left divide. Commentators on the left of the 
political spectrum are also prone to suggesting that Rawls potentially provides an 
„obvious philosophical foundation‟ for the vague notions of fairness being 
trumpeted by the Tory British Prime Minister David Cameron.333 If politicians 
provide comments open enough to be interpreted as Rawlsian justifications of 
unequalising incentives, political commentators have done the job of making sure 
that, to the extent that Rawls‟ theories are publicly known at all, that is the way 
that they have been popularly understood.   
 
British politicians have certainly had lots of inequality to rhetorically justify. The 
High Pay Centre report that in the 1980s a typical CEO of a FTSE100 company 
could expect to be remunerated with between £100,000 and £200,000 for a year 
of his (and it was and is largely his) labour. By the turn of the millennium this had 
risen to a little over a £1,000,000. In 2012, in the aftermath of the near collapse 
of the global economic system, this had risen to a staggering £4,200,000 per 
annum.334 Such wage growth has not been enjoyed by the rank and file 
employees of their companies. In the 80s that same CEO could expect to earn 
roughly 20 times as much as the lowest paid employee at their firm, by 2012 the 
figure is closer to 160. These astonishing numbers only refer to inequalities in 
pay, but as Rawls says, income is but a flow of what wealth is a stock. Thomas 
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Piketty‟s empirical observations about the structure of contemporary capitalism 
have provoked a great deal of academic and popular interest, but it is his claim 
that there has been a significant rise in wealth inequality in the UK that has 
proven to be particularly politically controversial.335 It is not often that the 
Financial Times feels moved to produce front page spreads criticising techniques 
in data collection for large-n academic studies.336  
 
We are then in a situation of widening inequality of wealth and income, thanks in 
part to increases in pay for those at the top of our largest economic institutions. 
Rawls‟ theories, however loosely and badly understood, have been repeatedly 
used as a rhetorical device for justifying these increased inequalities. We must 
conclude with a heavy heart that Justice as Fairness is popularly understood as 
providing a moral theory that provides such a justification.  
 
The appropriation of Rawls for this ignoble cause of course relies upon a 
complete indifference to the actual content of his ideas. We have already noted 
that Rawls himself was convinced that welfare state capitalism, his phrase for the 
economic model that we see in contemporary Britain, could not realise the 
principles of justice that he thinks are appropriate to a community of free and 
equal citizens. We do not, however, need to take Rawls‟ word on this to see that 
the Johnsons and the Blairs misuse Rawlsian rhetoric. We have instead only to 
notice how far away the arguments presented for unequalising incentives in our 
contemporary society are from meeting Rawls‟ strict criteria of being absolutely 
necessary to make the worst off as well of as they can be.  
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The first thing to note is that according to Justice as Fairness the difference 
principle only kicks in once the equal basic liberty principle and the equal 
opportunity principle have been established. If citizens are not afforded an equal 
opportunity to gain access to offices that confer advantages upon the holder, they 
develop a reason to not wish the holder of that office to be well compensated, 
namely that it is unfair that they be excluded from the possibility of gaining those 
advantages themselves, which is lacking in a well-ordered society. Whatever 
virtues there are in Britain‟s major social institutions, it is hard to imagine anyone 
seriously arguing that its offices of advantages are equally open to all. To take the 
House of Commons as an example, only 27% of its members are women and 
only 4% have an ethnicity other than white British. This compares with figures of 
51% and 13% amongst the citizenry they represent. What is worse is that politics 
has better statistics on these matters than other major professions such as the 
judiciary or directors of FTSE500 companies.337 From the point of view of Justice 
as Fairness an appeal to the difference principle should not even get off the 
ground in Britain due to its failure to realise prior and more important principles. 
The British people have no reason to accept the necessity of advantages being 
conferred on offices which are not available to them.  
 
Even if we break with Rawls‟ intentions and take the difference principle in 
isolation there is an abundance of reasons to imagine that it will not justify the 
sort of unequalising incentives that it has been used to do. The most important 
thing to note is the claims that these salaries are necessary in order to attract the 
most talented labour available to socially productive firms already assumes a 
basic structure in which there is a „free market‟ in labour. It assumes that the 
talented have the right to buy and sell their labour to the highest bidder. Rawls‟ 
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conception of justice does not take the Basic Structure of a society to be a given 
and indeed assumes it to be the matter under discussion. This thesis has shown 
that there is no reason to imagine that a free market in labour could be a feature 
of a just basic structure. A cap on the pay that is and is not available to certain 
stations, and the shaping of opportunities available to citizens so that they have 
to do socially productive labour without unequalising reward, are both legitimate 
social arrangements according to Rawlsian principles of justice. We have no 
reason to accept the implications of wage demands in the context of free markets 
in labour when the free market in labour is a legitimate Rawlsian subject of 
justice. 
 
The empirical challenge to those who wish to show that present unequalising 
incentives are just is then far harder than showing they benefit the least well off in 
society. Justice as Fairness needs to know that those inequalities are necessary 
to make the worst off as well off as they can be, that the lexically prior principles 
of justice are also satisfied and that all possible arrangements of the basic 
structure of society have been considered. This is not, we can safely assume, the 
Rawlsian heuristic that The Economist has in mind. 
 
We have seen that Rawls‟ Justice as Fairness joins Cohen‟s more strictly 
egalitarian conception of distributive justice in offering no reason to support the 
unequalising incentives that pervade contemporary welfare state capitalisms. 
They provide separate grounds for rejecting these unequalising incentives as 
unjust. Despite this, we ought not to think that their dispute over unequalising 
incentives is a purely theoretical matter without political importance. Once we 
move beyond the critical task of a theory of justice, and imagine what a just 
society would look like, the theoretical divergence ultimately transmits itself into 
advocacy of extremely different political arrangements. It is in the difference 
between Rawls and Cohen‟s ideal societies, and thus the sort of political 
communities that they want us to work towards, that the political implications of 
this rupture in ideal theory lies.  
231 
 
 
In Cohen‟s last book published before his death, Why Not Socialism?,  he gives 
an account of a way of organising ourselves that he thinks, if we were given the 
chance, would represent how we would choose to distribute the benefits and 
burdens of economic activity. It is an account of a society that, he thinks, perfectly 
embodies justice if we could only realise it.338   
 
Cohen starts his depiction of a just society from the micro-environment of a 
camping trip amongst friends. There is plenty of work to be done on this camping 
trip; pots have to be cleaned; fishes caught and tents erected. However, the spirit 
of community that exists between the fellow campers means that these tasks are 
not allocated either through the sort of coercive practices that Rawls associated 
with stability for the wrong reasons, nor with a market system of incentives. 
Instead the campers celebrate the diversity of interests that exist amongst the 
group and allow those who enjoy cooking to work on the stove, those who enjoy 
fishing to take their rods and those who have a flair for construction to rummage 
around with the pegs and mallet.339 Where there is no harmony of interests and 
tasks, perhaps because a task is considered to be drudgery by all, each wants to 
give up their time to that task so as not to disadvantage other members of the 
political community. As Cohen puts it: 
 
                                                          
338
 Cohen, G.A. 2009. Why Not Socialism? Princeton University Press, Princeton: New Jersey.  
339
 Cohen is, we assume, deliberately evoking Marx’s famous description of the transformation of work under communism in 
The German Ideology. ‘In Communist Society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished 
in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and 
another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have in 
mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.’ Marx. K. 2000. ‘German Ideology’ in (McLellan, D. Ed.) Karl 
Marx’s Selected Writings, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p185. 
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„There are plenty of differences, but our mutual understandings, and 
the spirit of the enterprise, ensure there are no inequalities to which 
anyone could mount a principled objection.‟340 
 
In the rest of the book Cohen argues that our sympathy for the social 
arrangements of the camping trip reveals that if we could foster the spirit of 
enterprise and egalitarian ethos that governs the camping trip across a much 
larger economic community, then this is exactly what we would do. It is our failure 
to effectively design social institutions that organise on the basis of our 
egalitarian spirit, and relative success of our ability to organise economic 
institutions that respond to our base self-interest, that has led to us to preferring 
market models of social organisation over more collective arrangements. The 
preference for self-interest appealing incentives is not, the analogy is supposed 
to remind us, one which we typically express when problems of feasible technical 
design are not at stake and thus is unlikely to represent our real judgement about 
what duties and obligations we ought to be able to demand off of each other in 
our collective arrangements. 
 
It is fair to say that not everybody shares Cohen‟s excitement for the principles 
and arrangements of the camping trip. However, Cohen‟s concessionary criticism 
does not need his vision to gain widespread appeal if the argument from analogy 
is to hurt Rawls. Instead, all that would be necessary is to demonstrate is that 
these are sentiments that Rawls attributes to himself and his citizens. Indeed 
when we first presented the concessionary criticism we saw that this is exactly 
what Cohen sets out to demonstrate. We remember that Cohen was keen to 
highlight the difference in phrasing between two otherwise identical passages in 
the 1958 Justice as Fairness and the 1971 A Theory of Justice. In 1958 Rawls 
tells us that his citizens should look upon unequalising incentives as a 
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„concession to human nature‟ which takes us away from the „want to serve each 
other.‟ This language disappears in 1971, and his citizens instead see the 
unequalising incentives as „necessary to cover the cost of training.‟  Cohen 
suggests that the former configuration is a more honest reflection of the 
implications of Rawls‟ approach to political philosophy, but that it was an 
uncomfortable truth for Rawls to recognise. We are supposed to believe that the 
1958 Rawls reveals that his citizens would prefer a system, like that of the 
camping trip, whereby individuals want to serve one and another if they could 
have it.  
 
One of the things that this thesis has shown is that in fact there is little doubt that 
Rawls would not share this vision of if we could justice. What is wrong with 
extrapolating the principles of camping trip to the larger canvass of a complex 
political economy is not, as Cohen assumes, that it is presently infeasible. What 
is wrong is that it would never be acceptable to a political community which 
encourages the free development of the reason of its citizenry. A society 
committed to allowing citizens to develop their intellectual and moral capacities 
will always produce individuals who will find it an affront to their conception of the 
good to have to devote all of their time to the service of other persons. This is 
not, our reconstruction of the liberty objection invites you to accept, a reflection of 
human selfishness any more than human disagreement over philosophical 
matters is a reflection of inadequacies in our mental capacities. It is instead a 
reflection of the necessary implications to our wanting a political community that 
allows individuals to revise and develop their own conception of the good. A 
political community governed by the principles of the camping trip is very far from 
embodying our ideal of justice, we have ideal grounds for not affording the word 
justice to its description.  
 
I want to finish with an observation about the divergence between the passages 
that Cohen draws our attention to. There is another difference between the 
passages which I think is far more telling than the difference which excites 
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Cohen. In 1958 Rawls imparts the following thought on the citizens of a well-
ordered society: „they, like us, may think people ideally should want to serve one 
another.‟ In 1971 this changes instead to, „one might think that ideally individuals 
should want to serve one another.‟ The notion that the individual would ideally 
want to serve one another was, in 1958, one that Rawls was willing to attribute to 
himself, and to the readers that shared his considered moral judgements. 
However, by 1971 the sentiment is instead presented both less personally and 
less politically. It is a position that „one‟ might hold. This does not commit Rawls 
to the claim that it is a sentiment that either he, or his sympathetic readers, held. 
It is instead just one possibility of construction that needs to be considered 
alongside others. Cohen‟s concessionary criticism implicitly assumes that this 
change in language is insignificant and that Rawls remained committed to the if 
we could ideal of serving one another. It is indeed the animating principle of 
Cohen‟s own egalitarian ethos. However, this thesis ultimately offers an 
alternative explanation. Rawls no longer attributes the ideal of serving one 
another to himself because he no longer conceived of it as a political ideal. It 
was, he came to believe, a demand that was inconsistent with the development 
of the autonomous conception of the person that his principles of justice are 
formulated to serve. 
 
When those animated by a Rawlsian or Cohenite conception of justice oppose 
the inequalities of contemporary society they do so with very different alternative 
societies in mind. For Rawls, unlike Cohen, the notion of a collective desire to 
serve the other is simply inconsistent with what justice demands. What this thesis 
has shown is that this very real divergence takes place without Cohen‟s 
commitment to the discovery of if we could principles holding a monopoly over 
what is and is not ideal theory. Justice as Fairness also shows a consistent and 
plausible fidelity to the ideal as realistic Utopia understands it. Rawlsians can 
plausibly and consistently use the word justice to denote political and economic 
systems which incorporate unequalising incentives without robbing that word of 
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its capacity to remind us of the best of we can be. The language of Rawlsian 
justice retains our yearning for the ideal. 
 
Stuart Ingham, 
Oxford, 2014. 
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